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Chair: James M. Joyce
Some ‘ought’ claims are practical: If you want to make guacamole for dinner, you
ought to buy some avocados. Other ‘ought’ claims are moral: you ought not steal
the avocados. Still other ‘ought’ claims are epistemic: when you see a sign that says
the avocados are sold out, you ought to believe there aren’t any avocados for sale.
This final epistemic ‘ought’ claim doesn’t seem to be moral or dependent on your
desires, like the other two are. This dissertation is an investigation into the nature
of these kinds of ‘ought’ claims, the oughts for belief.
The first two chapters of this dissertation focus on a puzzle about correct belief.
The puzzle is about Hume’s dictum that no ‘ought’ follows from an ‘is’ – the
putative is-ought gap or autonomy of ethics. From the premise ‘Snow is white,’ we
can infer ‘Sophia’s belief that snow is white is correct.’ But, ‘Snow is white’ is
paradigmatically non-normative, and that Sophia’s belief is correct, which is a
claim about what belief she ought to have, seems to be normative. Moreover,
the argument seems valid, so the is-ought gap is supposed to block this kind of
inference. The puzzle is over whether we should give up the autonomy of ethics or
find another way to resolve the apparent conflict.
To even make sense of the puzzle, we must have a clear understanding of how
the is-ought gap is supposed to work. A.N. Prior showed in 1960 that a simple
formulation of the is-ought gap obviously fails. In the first chapter, I consider some
ways of reformulating it. I suggest that focusing on the syntax of arguments for a
solution, as some have tried, is misguided. Instead, we should look for a semantics-
based approach to understanding the autonomy claim. One such approach is
from Russell and Restall and employs models of deontic logic. I provide a new
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formulation of the autonomy of ethics in a more general semantic framework. A
downside of my approach is that it doesn’t treat the autonomy claim as blocking
inferences from one class of sentences to another. But, my approach is more general
than Russell and Restall’s, and it offers an explanation of what goes wrong in
purported counterexamples to the autonomy claim that the other account lacks.
With that understanding of the is-ought gap in hand, I turn in chapter 2 to
discussing the puzzle about correct belief. Allan Gibbard claims that by under-
standing how objective and subjective oughts relate to each other, we’ll see that
the offending argument doesn’t really bridge the is-ought gap. I cast doubt on
Gibbard’s proposed solution by claiming that no epistemology of the normative
fits nicely with it. Any epistemology that Gibbard could supply would either be
unable to explain an awkward asymmetry it must posit in the subjective ought or
make subjective oughts too detached from the agents they apply to. In arguing for
this disjunction, I also argue that the subjective ought does not play the role in our
deliberation that Gibbard expects it to. Really, there is no unique ought that factors
in our deliberation. We should reject Gibbard’s proposed solution to the puzzle,
I claim, because it gets wrong the relationship between objective and subjective
oughts. I suggest another solution to the puzzle, one that takes the concept BELIEF
to be normative.
In chapter 3, I turn to defend the solution suggested in the previous chapter
while more directly tackling the question of the nature of oughts for belief. I offer a
new explanation of why we ought to believe the truth. At the heart of the account
is the idea that the concept BELIEF is normative. It’s a conceptual truth, I claim, that
other things being equal, beliefs ought to be true. In support of this, I show how
it can give a compelling explanation of an aspect of knowledge ascriptions that is
otherwise difficult to explain. I then claim that being an agent requires being subject
to this norm of belief. This results in a non-moral, distinctly doxastic, account of
why we ought to believe the truth. My conclusion is that asking why we ought to
believe the truth is like asking why a bachelor must be unmarried: the answer is
contained in the ideas that make up the question.
In the final chapter, I respond to Gibbard’s claim that an analogous story cannot
work for ‘ought’ claims for degreed belief. In “Rational Credence and the Value
of Truth,” Gibbard makes two key claims: (1) that epistemic rationality cannot be
understood in terms of the aim of belief, and (2) that epistemic rationality is more
plausibly understood in terms of a practical notion, that of maximizing prospective
guidance value. When we clarify the role of idealizations in Gibbard’s explanation,
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we see that Gibbard is left appealing to merely hypothetical bets to explain epistemic
rationality even in ideal cases. I claim that these merely hypothetical bets don’t
seem to be able to play the role he needs them to though and Gibbard must explain
how these explanations work. I then undermine Gibbard’s motivation for pursuing
such an account in the first place, by showing that the argument for the first claim
is unsound. Gibbard isn’t using the best conception of the aim of belief. I survey
five senses in which something or someone can be said to ‘aim.’ According to the
normative sense in which ‘belief aims,’ belief aims at the truth because having a
true content is the standard of good or correct belief. By taking belief to have an




Mind the Is-Ought Gap
ABSTRACT
Hume supposedly taught us that ‘ought’s don’t follow from ’is’s – that’s
the Autonomy of Ethics. It has been known for a while that a simple
way to make sense of Hume’s claim fails. In this chapter, I consider
some ways of responding to the worry. I suggest that the way that some
have tried to save the Autonomy of Ethics, in terms of the syntax of
arguments, is misguided. Instead, we should look for a semantics-based
approach to understanding the autonomy claim. One such approach is
from Russell and Restall and employs models of deontic logic. I provide
a new formulation of the autonomy of ethics in a more general semantic
framework. A downside of my approach is that it doesn’t treat the auton-
omy claim as blocking inferences from one class of sentences to another.
But, my approach is more general than Russell and Restall’s, and it offers
an explanation of what goes wrong in purported counterexamples to
the autonomy claim that the other account lacks.
A lesson we learned from Hume is often summed up as “no ought from an is.”
Roughly, the idea is that how things are doesn’t determine how things ought to be.
This is the putative autonomy of ethics or is-ought gap.
The autonomy of ethics was challenged by several compelling hard cases from
Prior (1960a). Then defenses and modifications of the doctrine were proposed,
including those by Jackson (1974) and Pigden (1989).
In this chapter, I’ll motivate a new way to think about the autonomy of ethics.
The is-ought gap is best understood in terms of the semantics, rather than the
syntax, of arguments, I’ll claim. Russell and Restall (2010) give one such account of
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the autonomy claim in semantic terms. I’ll provide a new account in more general
semantic terms that is much simpler than their account and has some advantages
over their approach.
1.1 The Autonomies of Ethics
In book III, part I, section I of the Treatise of Human Nature, Hume gives the first
statement of the autonomy of ethics. He says:
In every system of morality, which I have hitherto met with, I have
always remark’d, that the author proceeds for some time in the ordinary
ways of reasoning, and establishes the being of a God, or makes observa-
tions concerning human affairs; when all of a sudden I am surpriz’d to
find, that instead of the usual copulations of propositions, is, and is not,
I meet with no proposition that is not connected with an ought, or an
ought not. This change is imperceptible; but is however, of the last con-
sequence. For as this ought, or ought not, expresses some new relation
or affirmation, ’tis necessary that it shou’d be observ’d and explain’d;
and at the same time that a reason should be given; for what seems
altogether inconceivable, how this new relation can be a deduction from
others, which are entirely different from it. (Hume 1978, p. 468)
Inferring normative facts from only descriptive facts, Hume seems to be claiming, is
unwarranted because “this new relation” of normativity seems “entirely different”
from descriptive or observational propositions. What is the case, the observational
or descriptive facts, do not seem to impinge at all on how things ought to be. This
simple doctrine is a first rough pass at the autonomy of ethics:
SIMPLE AUTONOMY The normative isn’t determined by anything non-normative.
SIMPLE AUTONOMY, if right, would have it that no way of fixing the descriptive
facts is enough to figure out how things ought to be. It follows from this that we
can’t properly argue from how things are to how they ought to be – that is, there
is no valid argument with only descriptive premises and a non-trivial normative
conclusion.
1.1.1 Two Conceptions of the Simple View
When Hume introduces the is-ought gap, he points to the arguments of his contem-
poraries that make moral conclusions from descriptive premises. He worries about
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whether there really is that link from the descriptive to the normative that those ar-
guments need. The normative part of the arguments “expresses some new relation
or affirmation, ’tis necessary that it shou’d be observ’d and explain’d; and at the
same time that a reason should be given; for what seems altogether inconceivable,
how this new relation can be a deduction from others, which are entirely different
from it,” he (1978, p. 468) tells us.
It seems to me that Hume’s worry, as stated, is ambiguous between an epistemic
reading and a metaphysical reading. On the epistemic reading, the claim is about
what we can properly infer: We cannot draw any conclusions about what ought
to be the case just from what is the case, because such an argument would be
semantically invalid or because it would be bad reasoning in another way. The
metaphysical reading expresses a deeper disconnection between the normative and
the non-normative. On the metaphysical reading, what is the case normatively isn’t
fixed by non-normative facts. If there were a creator who set up all of the facts, the
metaphysical version of the autonomy of ethics would demand that the creator set
the normative facts even after all of the non-normative facts were established.
Strictly speaking, both versions of the claim also admit of degreed readings:
The extreme version of the epistemic claim says that we can reach no normative
conclusions from non-normative premises. Less extreme versions claim that there
are at least some normative questions epistemically left open by the non-normative
facts. The analogous degreed understanding applies to the metaphysical version of
the autonomy claim: According to most extreme version, no normative facts are
fixed by the non-normative facts. On less extreme metaphysical readings of the
claim, there are least some normative questions metaphysically left open by the
non-normative facts.
There are also natural connections between the two versions of the autonomy
claim. For example, if the extreme version of the metaphysical claim is correct, it
would imply that one cannot properly argue from just non-normative facts to any
normative facts (without any bridge principles). On the other hand, if it’s possible
to reason from some non-normative sentences to some normative ones, then the
metaphysical claim would fail as well.
Since it has received the most attention in the literature, in this chapter, I’ll focus
exclusively on the most extreme versions of the epistemic claim, the claim that we
cannot properly reason from claims about how things are to a claim about how things
ought to be.1
1For more on the metaphysical version of the claim, see Blackburn’s (1971) discussion of the
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1.1.2 Problems with the Simple View
A. N. Prior (1960a) shows that the epistemic reading of SIMPLE AUTONOMY is false
with three examples:2
(A) 1. Tea-drinking is common in England.
2. Therefore, either tea-drinking is common in England or all New Zealan-
ders ought to be shot.
(B) 1. There is no man over 20ft high.
2. Therefore, there is no man over 20ft high who ought to sit in an ordinary
chair.
(C) 1. Undertakers are church officers.
2. Therefore, if church officers ought to be reverent, undertakers ought to
be reverent.
Each of these examples is a logically valid argument with non-normative premises
and a conclusion that contains a normative term essentially.3 So, the examples show
that there are formally valid arguments from non-normative claims to normative
conclusions that are valid solely in virtue of the semantics of the connectives. In
doing so, they show the failure of the epistemic reading of SIMPLE AUTONOMY: we
can properly reason from non-normative premises to a normative conclusion.4
There seems to be something deficient about each of the conclusions of these
argument. One might think that we could easily avoid Prior’s worries by identifying
that deficiency and omitting similarly deficient conclusions from the intended scope
of the autonomy of ethics.
Prior considers this move, but he argues that it won’t work by showing that
each of the conclusions can be used in the context of an argument where it appears
to have interesting, possibly action-guiding, normative force. For example, we can
deduce the conclusion of the first argument like this:
1. Anyone who does what is not common in England ought to be shot;
supervenience of the normative on the non-normative and Jackson’s (2013) remarks on how this
affects the metaphysical claim.
2Here I actually provide the slightly modified versions from Pigden (1989, p. 132) of each of
Prior’s examples.
3A term is essential when it cannot in general be replaced with another term of the same
grammatical category without a change in truth-value.
4Though Prior did not think of a claim like SIMPLE AUTONOMY as ambiguous between the two
given readings, they also show against the metaphysical reading of the claim: since there are valid
arguments from non-normative facts to some normative facts, that means that some non-normative
facts must fix some normative facts.
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2. All New Zealanders drink tea;
3. Therefore either tea-drinking is common in England or all New Zealanders
ought to be shot.
This example shows that, though we may have the feeling that there’s no real
force behind the normative terms in the conclusion of the first argument, it is not
normatively impotent. Prior concludes then that there is no is-ought gap.
1.2 Avoiding Counterexamples to the Epistemic Version?
Several responses to Prior’s worries for the epistemic version of the autonomy claim
have been given in the literature. One popular response is to limit the intended
domain of the autonomy of ethics to sufficiently simple normative conclusions. The
underlying idea is that none of Prior’s examples are compelling counterexamples
to the is-ought gap because none of them entail a simple statement of what ought
or ought not be the case. Gibbard (2012, p. 80-81), for example, argues that it’s quite
commonplace for hypothetical ought claims to follow from descriptive premises,
so the the autonomy claim should be restricted to sufficiently simple conclusions.
Gibbard (2012, p. 88) later contends that the specific puzzle he is considering does
not pose a problem for the autonomy of ethics when restricted to simple normative
conclusions, where a normative conclusion is simple when its main connective is
the primitive subjective ought that Gibbard is interested in.5
The kind of move that Gibbard employs, which restricts the conclusions that the
autonomy claims is meant to apply to, is both too strong and too weak. First, the
move is too strong because it excludes some arguments from the purview of the
autonomy of ethics that it should not. For instance, it excludes an argument with
the conclusion “Either Jane ought to eat tomato soup, or Ange ought to buy garlic
bread.” This conclusion doesn’t entail any simple normative sentence in Gibbard’s
sense, but surely the autonomy claim is meant to rule out the validity of arguments
with only non-normative premises and this conclusion.
Note that to show that Gibbard’s restriction is too strong, I need not actually
produce a valid argument from descriptive premises to this conclusion (as this
would also pronounce on the fate of the autonomy of ethics, not merely clarify its
intended domain). Rather, to show Gibbard’s restriction to be too strong, I must
5Note that Gibbard does take himself to be responding to Prior here. Rather, he is considering
some potential outs for the puzzle concerning correct belief discussed below. He does conclude
though that “We can maintain that no elementary ought follows analytically from an is” Gibbard
(2012, p. 88) in light of his consideration of that puzzle.
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only show that if there were such an argument, it would be a counterexample to
the autonomy of ethics. But surely an argument with only non-normative premises
and the given disjunctive conclusion “expresses some new relation or affirmation”
and “’tis necessary that it shou’d be observ’d and explain’d.”
Thinking of the autonomy of ethics as only applying to arguments with simple
normative conclusions also seems to be too weak. Russell (2010, p. 5) attributes the
following example to Gideon Rosen: Suppose “to flurg” means to do something
that one ought not do in front of children. Then we could deduce from “Lauren is
in front of children.” to “Lauren ought not flurg.” The conclusion here is simple, in
Gibbard’s sense, but it also follows from the non-normative premise.6 So, modifying
the domain of the autonomy of ethics to make it apply only to simple normative
sentences is too strong in that it doesn’t capture all of the intended domain of the
autonomy of ethics, and it is too weak in that it doesn’t save the claim of Prior-style
counterexamples like this one from Russell (2010, p. 5). Other modifications must
be sought.
In Prior’s original statement of his examples, he notices that the normative
terms in his first two examples seem to appear to do no particularly normative
work; in them, “the duty established is not one that we need ever be practically
anxious about” (1960a, p. 203). Prior diagnoses this as what he calls “contingent
vacuousness”. A term is contingently vacuous when it can be replaced with a
grammatical counterpart without sacrificing the validity of the argument. Prior’s
first two examples would be still be valid if ‘ought’ where replaced by ‘want’, for
example. Prior fears that this cannot be the feature that sets his counterexamples
to the is-ought gap apart from other arguments though, because he thinks that the
‘ought’ in his third example is not contingently vacuous (1960a, p. 204-206).
Jackson (1974) considers examples like Prior’s first two and diagnoses them as
having a property similar to Prior’s contingent vacuousness, that of being ethically
invariant. An argument is ethically invariant when the normative terms in it can
be replaced uniformly with any other grammatically appropriate term without
sacrificing argument validity (1974, p. 91).7 When an argument is ethically invariant,
6One might worry that stipulating concepts like FLURG is illegitimate and subject to worries like
those surrounding the concept TONK as discussed by Prior (1960b). In general, that seems right, but
this particular case is not worrisome. FLURG is plausibly quite similar to everyday concepts such
as BEING OBNOXIOUS: being obnoxious requires satisfying some descriptive criteria, such as being
loud or unrelenting, as well as being such that one ought not be that way. The example of ‘flurg’ is
used since it’s easier to specify in the stipulated case what exactly the descriptive content is.
7This is a slightly different property than Prior’s contingent vacuousness; see Pigden (1989, p.
133-134) for an explanation of the difference and discussion of it.
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its validity is, in a sense, independent of the ethical terms. Jackson considers this to
be a sufficient condition for being outside of the scope of the autonomy of ethics. If
the argument would be valid no matter which term is there, why would having a
normative term there be threatening in the way that “’tis necessary that it shou’d be
observ’d and explain’d”?
Following this line, Jackson proposes a new conception of the autonomy of
ethics that’s meant to avoid Prior’s examples:
JACKSON AOE No argument from factual premises to an ethical conclusion is valid
unless it is either factual-invariant or ethical-invariant (or both), or is reducible
to such by synonymy substitution. (1974, p. 93)
where an argument is Σ-invariant when its validity is independent of the meaning
of the terms of type Σ (1974, p. 91).
Pigden (1989, p. 134-135), following MacIntyre (1981, p. 54-55), objects to Jack-
son’s method:
If the redefined autonomy of ethics is not derived from some general
logical principle, what reason do we have to believe it true, besides the,
perhaps temporary, drying up of counterexamples? In Lakatosian terms
Jackson (and in effect Shorter) construct an exception-barring definition
which marks out a (hopefully) safe domain for the modified conjecture.
With this motivation, Pigden sets out to provide an argument for the safety of the is-
ought gap in (a class of arguments strictly wider than)8 Jackson’s class of arguments.
Pigden argues that it can be shown on the basis of the conservativeness of logic that
a valid argument from non-normative premises can only contain ‘ought’ (conceived
of as a predicate) in its conclusion vacuously. I will skip most of the details of that
argument here,9 but notice that the possibility of a faithful deontic logic poses a
threat to this way of defending the autonomy of ethics. If it makes sense to think of
‘ought’ as a sentential operator, like deontic logics do, then there will be truths of
deontic logic that contain ‘ought’ non-vacuously and that can be deduced from no
premises (and so any ‘ought’-free sentences as well). Perhaps Oφ → ¬O¬φ (If it
ought to be the case that φ, then it is permissible for it to be the case that φ) is one
such example that can deduced from any premises.10 For this reason, Pigden (1989,
8The difference between the class of arguments considered by the two authors to be the domain
of the autonomy of ethics will be irrelevant to this discussion.
9But, if one does focus on those details, one should also see Nelson’s (1995) critique of Pigden.
10Of course, any particular example is contestable, but any interesting deontic logic will admit
some similar example.
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p. 138-145) must reject that deontic logic is a feasible project, and he gives a series
of arguments against it. This seems like a problem for his account though, since
deontic logic seems to be quite productive in helping us understand normative
language.
1.3 Semantic Accounts of the Autonomy of Ethics
The epistemic version of the autonomy of ethics is a claim about whether we
can properly reason from just non-normative premises to a normative conclusion.
Jackson (1974) and Pigden (1989) both try to save that claim from Prior’s counterex-
amples by limiting the claim to a class of arguments in terms of the surface syntax
of the arguments. When we reason though, we don’t reason in terms of surface
syntax. Instead, we reason about the meanings of claims. So, to understand the
autonomy claim, I suggest that we focus our attention on the connection between
the contents of normative and the non-normative sentences in arguments.
Russell and Restall (2010) share this intuition and attempt to understand the
autonomy claim in terms of the semantics of normative language. They construct a
proof of the autonomy claim in terms of Kripke models for a particular deontic logic.
To do so, they must stipulate complex definitions of ‘normative’ and ‘descriptive,’
which seem not to map on exactly to the pre-theoretic notions. Their account also
isn’t very enlightening about what’s going on in Prior’s purported counterexamples.
As an alternative, I’ll provide another semantics-focused account of the au-
tonomy claim. Instead of using deontic logic, I’ll employ standard semantics for
normative language that assumes only that sentences are evaluated for truth with
respect to, at least, an ordinary possible world and a normative standard. I’ll show
that this offers a much simpler way to understand and defend Hume’s dictum. This
new approach can also explain the deficiency in Prior’s examples, unlike the other
approach.
1.3.1 Russell and Restall’s Approach
The semantic approach of Russell and Restall (2010) takes the autonomy claim to be
an instance of a more general notion of an implication barrier. There is an implica-
tion barrier from one class of sentences to another when no sentence of the second
type is implied by a collection of sentences of the first type. Restall and Russell
provide a general barrier theorem that they use to derive an implication barrier from
descriptive sentences to normative sentences, under a particular understanding of
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these classes of sentences in their models of deontic logic. The models they use are
standard models consisting of a set of worlds W and a relation S supplemented
with a distinguished actual world where sentences are evaluated. The relation is
one of deontic accessibility, so that if all of the worlds accessible from the actual
world are P-worlds, then P is obligatory. They also assume that S is transitive,
euclidean, serial and secondarily reflexive, though not all of these assumptions are
necessary for their proof.
The implication barrier theorem they employ works in cases where there is a
set of sentences that are not preserved under extensions of the models or under
changes of the worlds related by S. Normative claims appear to be such a class in
the deontic models they consider. For example, while it’s impermissible for Alice to
hit Bob, it’s permissible for Alice to hit Bob when they are in a boxing class. More
formally, Russell and Restall take it that a claim is normative when it’s truth-value is
always changeable either via model extension or tinkering with S in every deontic
model. A claim is descriptive when it is always preserved under tinkerings with
S. It then follows as an instance of their Barrier Construction Theorem that no
satisfiable collection of descriptive sentences entails a normative one. For a more
precise statement of their result, see Russell and Restall (2010, p. 252–7).
1.3.2 A New Semantic Approach
Russell and Restall argue that we can prove the autonomy of ethics by understand-
ing it terms of the semantics provided by models of deontic logic and a complicated
constructed understanding of ‘normativity’ and ‘descriptivity.’ Here, I aim to secure
the autonomy of ethics in terms of the semantics of normative language in a more
straightforward way. I will assume that we interpret sentences with respect to
points of evaluation that consist of (perhaps among other things) an ordinary possi-
ble world and a normative standard. By doing so, the solution remains agnostic
about interpreting the semantics as relativist, contextualist, or invariantist.11 For
11On the double indexing sort of semantics inherited from Stalnaker, Kaplan, and Lewis, points of
evaluation are structured in terms of a context that takes expressions into contents, and an index
(or circumstance of evaluation) that takes contents into extensions. According to the contextualist,
the relevant normative standard figures in the context and affects what proposition is expressed.
According to the relativist, the normative standard figures into the index and affects the truth value
of the proposition expressed in a context. According to the invariantist, the normative standard is
contained in the structure of the possible world, which is itself standardly treated as a coordinate
of the index. (In order to distinguish the interpretations of normative sentences that differ in truth
value, the invariantist will either need to allow impossible worlds that differ in which normative
standard is contained in the world or allow that the normative aspects of worlds are not fixed by the
non-normative aspects.) But what is important here is that normative sentences are evaluated for
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clarity of presentation, I will use a particular modeling framework for semantics,
the one given by Gibbard’s Thinking How to Live (2003), but the result should hold
for any plausible normative semantics.12
On Gibbard’s modeling framework, sentences are modeled with sets of pairs
consisting of a possible world and a complete plan for action in any hypothetically
possible scenario. Then, like any standard semantics, we model the content of a
sentence ‘P’ with the set of world-norm pairs that are compatible with that sentence.
Standard possible world semantics is a special instance of Gibbard’s semantics.
When we have a non-normative sentence like ‘Snow is white,’ we can represent
it as the collection of world-norm pairs where the world is one in which snow is
white. The semantics of ‘snow is white, or Mark ought to cook’ is given by the set
of world-plan pairs where either snow is white in the world or the plan calls for
Mark cooking.
A sentence will be non-normative, on this kind of semantics, when it is norm-
invariant, in that if some world is included in a pair in the set, then that world also
appears in the set in a pair with every possible plan. More explicitly, if W is the set
of possible worlds and N is the set of all complete plans,
NORM-INVARIANT a set of world-norm pairs P = {〈wi, nj〉} is norm-invariant iff
(∀w ∈W)(∃n(〈w, n〉 ∈ P)→ (∀n ∈ N)(〈w, n〉 ∈ P)).13
Intuitively, a set of world-norm pairs is norm-invariant when it doesn’t tell us
anything normative, since it’s compatible with all possible plans.
Consider some argument from premises {Pi} to conclusion C. We might be
inclined to flesh out the requirement of the autonomy of ethics on this argument
like this: If each of the Pi is norm-invariant, then C is norm-invariant. This is a
natural way to flesh out the idea that the autonomy claim requires that if all the
premises are non-normative then the conclusion must be non-normative. But this
simple suggestion fails just like SIMPLE AUTONOMY does. Consider again Prior’s
first example:
(A) 1. Tea-drinking is common in England.
2. Therefore, either tea-drinking is common in England or all New Zealan-
ders ought to be shot.
truth with respect to points of evaluation that consist of (at least) a world and a normative standard.
Many thanks to Alex Silk for helping me to clarify the flexibility of my proposal along these lines.
12Gibbard supplies this formal modeling framework to defend an expressivist account of norma-
tive language. I am only using the framework only in ways that are perpendicular to the dispute
over expressivism.
13This is a restatement of the definition of ‘norm-invariant’ employed by Schroeder (2011).
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The premise is norm-invariant, but the conclusion is not. The set of world-norm
pairs that represents the conclusion includes a world where there is no tea and all
New Zealanders ought to be shot, but it doesn’t include a tea-less world where
some New Zealanders ought not be shot. So, it is not norm-invariant, and this
world-norm-style analogue of SIMPLE AUTONOMY fails.
That analogue of SIMPLE AUTONOMY fails because the conclusion tells us some-
thing normative. But, as Prior noticed, there seems to be something deficient about
the normativity in the conclusion. When we consider this failure in the terms of
semantics that evaluates sentences with regard to a possible world and a normative
standard, we’re better positioned to diagnose that deficiency. The conclusion of the
puzzle argument only seems to give substantive normative guidance about what
ought to be the case in worlds unlike the ones described by the premise, namely
ones in which tea-drinking is not common in England. If we’re in a world where
tea-drinking is common in England, the conclusion doesn’t tell us what ought to
be the case here. When we consider the set of world-norm pairs compatible with
the conclusion that are also compatible with the premise, we notice that they are
norm-invariant. Given the premise, the conclusion tells us nothing about how
things ought to be.
When Hume introduces the autonomy claim, he complains that his contem-
poraries are improperly reasoning from claims about how things are to how they
ought to be. But, I claim, the kind of normativity present in the offending argument
from Prior isn’t the sort of thing Hume would complain about. It’s not good practice
to reason from ‘Tea-drinking is common in England’ to the offending conclusion not
because the argument is invalid; rather, what’s odd about drawing that normative
conclusion from that description of England is that the normative aspect of the
conclusion is irrelevant to the possibilities being reasoned about, namely ones in
which tea-drinking is common in England. The argument would be something for
Hume to complain about only if the conclusion made a claim about how things
ought to be in worlds where the premises are true.
We can easily restate this intuition in our semantic framework. To decide
whether the conclusion of an argument makes a claim about how things ought to
be in the worlds described by the premises, we just restrict our attention to those
worlds. In our semantics, when the premises are norm-invariant, deciding this
question is equivalent to deciding whether the conclusion conjoined with the premises
is norm-invariant. This results in a reformulated version of the autonomy of ethics
in Gibbard’s semantics:
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WORLD-NORM AOE If each of {Pi} is norm-invariant, then if P1 ∧ P2 ∧ . . . is satisfi-
able and {Pi} ` C, then P1 ∧ P2 ∧ . . . ∧ C is norm-invariant.
Intuitively, WORLD-NORM AOE tells us that if the premises to an argument are
norm-invariant, then the set of all world-norm pairs compatible with the conclusion
and the premises is also norm-invariant. By checking only the conjunction of the
premises with the conclusion for norm-invariance, we restrict our attention to only
those worlds where the premises are true. The satisfiability condition is included
to avoid the special case where non-norm-invariant claims follow trivially from
contradictory premises.
As it is presented here, WORLD-NORM AOE is clearly tailor-made to avoid the
first of Prior’s supposed counterexamples. WORLD-NORM AOE also avoids the other
puzzle cases. Consider this one:
(C) (a) Undertakers are church officers.
(b) Therefore, if church officers ought to be reverent, undertakers ought to
be reverent.
Here, the conjunction of the conclusion with the premise is a first-order tautology,
so it is compatible with every world-norm pair. Since every world-norm pair is in
the semantics of the conclusion conjoined with the premise, a fortiori every world in
a pair in the set is also paired with every possible norm. So it is norm-invariant.14
In fact, we can show that WORLD-NORM AOE is guaranteed by a semantics like the
one we’re considering. Here’s the proof: For some valid argument to C from {Pi},
suppose that each of {Pi} is norm-invariant, P1 ∧ P2 ∧ . . . is satisfiable, and {Pi} ` C.
Then since the argument is valid, C must be satisfied by every world-norm pair that
satisfies P1 ∧ P2 ∧ . . .. So, P1 ∧ P2 ∧ . . .∧C is satisfied by every world-norm pair that
satisfies P1 ∧ P2 ∧ . . .. Without loss of generality, let 〈w, n〉 be some world-norm pair
that satisfies P1 ∧ P2 ∧ . . . ∧ C. Since 〈w, n〉must satisfy each of the {Pi} and each of
the {Pi} is norm-invariant, for each {Pi} ∀n ∈ N(〈w, n〉 ∈ Pi). So ∀n ∈ N(〈w, n〉 ∈
P1 ∧ P2 ∧ . . .). Then since every world-norm pair that satisfies the conjunction of
the premises must satisfy the conclusion, ∀n ∈ N(〈w, n〉 ∈ P1 ∧ P2 ∧ . . . ∧ C). So
P1 ∧ P2 ∧ . . . ∧ C is norm-invariant.
Since WORLD-NORM AOE is a theorem, if WORLD-NORM AOE is a proper formu-
lation of the autonomy claim (and our semantics is correct for these claims), then
14Prior’s other supposed counterexample can be handled similarly. The conjunction of ‘There is
no man over 20ft high’ with the conclusion that ‘There is no man over 20ft high who ought to sit in
an ordinary chair’ is equivalent first-order equivalent to ‘There is no man over 20ft high,’ which is
norm-invariant.
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this formulation of the autonomy claim avoids Prior’s counterexamples. One might
worry though that it avoids Prior’s counterexamples only by excluding too many
arguments from the intended domain of the autonomy of ethics. One way to put
the worry is like this: WORLD-NORM AOE claims that to check an argument for a
violation of the autonomy of ethics, given some norm-invariant (so, non-normative)
premises, we only need to check that the conclusion conjoined with those premises
is also norm-invariant. But for any deductively valid argument, the conclusion con-
joined with the premises is logically equivalent to the conjunction of the premises.
So, WORLD-NORM AOE really only seems to check arguments from some premises
to themselves, the objector claims.
The objector is right that WORLD-NORM AOE essentially limits the scope of
the autonomy of ethics to arguments from premises to the conjunction of those
premises, but this isn’t problematic. The reason why is that if normativity arises
only when the conclusion of an argument is strictly weaker than the conjunction
of the premises, no reasoner employing the argument could properly come to a
conclusion about what they ought to do. The world-norm semantics gives us a
natural framework for understanding why this is so: Suppose Rachel wants to
know whether she ought to donate to charity. We can represent Rachel’s mental
state by the collection of world-norm pairs M compatible with what she believes
and the norms she accepts. For Rachel to become decided on whether she ought to
donate, it is for the plan in each world-norm pair in M to call for donating in the
(centered) possibility given by the world of the pair. If Rachel’s mental state doesn’t
already commit her to a view on whether she ought to donate, there must be two
world-norm pairs 〈w1, n1〉 and 〈w2, n2〉 in M such that n1 calls for donating in w1
and n2 permits not donating in w2. Now suppose Rachel happens across a valid
argument of the kind the objector above is concerned about, namely one where
the premises are norm-invariant but the conclusion is not (though the conclusion
conjoined with the premises is). The only way for Rachel to properly become
committed to donating in response to the argument is for the proper response to
the argument to require that she remove one of those two world-norm pairs from
the representation of her mental state. Since the argument is valid, Rachel must
either accept the conclusion or reject a premise. The premises are norm-invariant,
so we can think of them as ordinary centered possible world propositions. Rachel
accepts them when every world in a world-norm pair in M is contained in every
premise. So, if Rachel does accept them, w1 and w2 must be in every premise. Since
the premises are norm-invariant, the premises must also have w1 and w2 paired
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with every possible norm, so importantly, 〈w1, n1〉 and 〈w2, n2〉 must be in every
premise. But, since those world-norm pairs satisfy the premises and the argument is
valid, they must also satisfy the conclusion. So when Rachel accepts the conclusion,
those pairs will remain in her mental state, and she’ll remain uncommitted about
whether to donate. On the other hand, if Rachel does not accept the premises of the
argument, her mental state will not change either. So here again, she will remain
uncommitted about whether to donate.
This proof only works for deductive arguments because it requires that the
argument be non-ampliative. By accepting the conclusion of such an argument, the
reasoner is not committed to anything she wasn’t committed to before considering
the argument. Suppose though that our reasoner does become committed to the
premises or conclusion of the argument even though she wasn’t before. This is an
odd thing for her to do, epistemologically speaking, in response to an argument, but
it would make it possible that the reasoner would come to a decision about whether
to donate in response to the argument. If the reasoner does become committed
about whether to donate by accepting either a premise or the conclusion of the
argument, it must be because one of the two world-norm pairs 〈w1, n1〉 and 〈w2, n2〉
is removed from M. Assuming that she doesn’t learn anything strictly stronger
than the premises or the conclusion, this requires that the part of the argument
she comes to accept is false at either w1 or w2. But since the parts of the argument
are all silent about what ought to be the case at w1 and w2 (since they include
those worlds paired with every possible norm), the reasoner still doesn’t learn
anything normative from the argument. This means that even if the reasoner
acts in what appears to be an epistemically irresponsible way in response to the
argument, either by accepting a premise or the conclusion without already having
been committed to it, the information that the reasoner gains from the argument
can still be characterized in a norm-invariant way. So, if the reasoner does become
committed about whether to donate by accepting parts of the argument, she does so
only because she is already committed to a conditional of the form ‘If w1(/2) is not
actual, then I ought (not) donate.’ It is this conditional, which she must already be
committed to and which doesn’t follow from any part of the argument, that must
play the role of the normative bridge principle in her reasoning.
The motivating idea behind the above considerations is this: For arguments
from non-normative premises to a normative conclusion, the normativity in the
conclusion cannot be relevant to the possibilities described by the premises. Since a
deductive argument could only help us learn something about how things ought
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to be insomuch as we accept the premises, any potential normative guidance that
could be derived from non-normative premises must only really apply to possibili-
ties where the premises fail. When we ignore those possibilities by restricting our
attention only to the possibilities compatible with the premises, the normativity
disappears. So, WORLD-NORM AOE is correct to effectively limit the scope of the
autonomy of ethics to arguments from premises to a conjunction of the premises
with the conclusion. No reasoner employing a valid argument to a weaker conclu-
sion could properly decide what they ought to do just in virtue of accepting the
argument. So any normativity present in that conclusion is deficient for reasoning
about how things ought to be and can be ignored for the purposes of understanding
the autonomy claim.
Understanding the autonomy claim in terms of WORLD-NORM AOE also allows
us to clarify what’s going on with seemingly puzzling arguments involving con-
ceptual and analytic truths. Suppose that ‘courageous’ just means the same as the
conjunction of ‘done in the face of danger’ and ‘ought to be done’. Then consider
this argument:
1. It’s dangerous for Jeb to run into the burning building to save the cat.
2. So, if Jeb ought to save the cat, it would be courageous.
This argument is valid, but it also appears to be a case where we can derive some-
thing normative from only non-normative premises. But, we see that even though
the conclusion is normative, it is norm-invariant when conjoined with the premise.
This shows that, according to my formulation of the autonomy claim, this argument
is not a counterexample to that claim. Intuitively, this is the right result, as a rea-
soner employing this argument cannot learn anything new about what ought to be
the case, much like Rachel above. So WORLD-NORM AOE gets the right result about
arguments like this that rely on conceptual and analytical truths.
Finally, one might worry that the understanding of the autonomy claim that I
provide is too restricted because it applies only to valid, non-ampliative arguments.
One might think there is a plausible version of the autonomy claim that is meant
to apply to ampliative arguments. But the general version of this idea is clearly
implausible, since we could have an odd ampliative logic that permits arguments
from ‘snow is white’ to ‘Rachel ought to donate’. In the case of particular ampliative
logics, like logics of enumerative induction, an autonomy-like claim may hold. A
full understanding of those kinds of autonomy claims would have to proceed on an
individual basis for each logic though, which is not a task I will take up here.
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WORLD-NORM AOE requires taking a particular stance on what is the brand of
normativity that the autonomy claim is meant to apply to. It is the kind carved off by
norm-invariance in semantics that evaluate sentences with respect both to a possible
world and a normative standard. I presented it here using the formal modeling
framework offered by Gibbard (2003) as an example, but the result will hold for
any plausible semantics of normative language. As long as the semantics evaluates
the truth value of a sentence at a possible world and a normative standard, WORLD-
NORM AOE is a theorem. So, WORLD-NORM AOE is another semantically-driven
way to understand and defend the autonomy of ethics.
1.3.3 Comparing the Semantic Approaches
The account of the autonomy of ethics supplied here and the one by Russell and
Restall (2010) both aim to make sense of the claim in terms of the semantics of
normative language. There are many differences between our approaches though.
Russell and Restall’s approach employs Kripke models of deontic logic, and
claims that the class of normative sentences are those that have a certain feature
with respect to that class. They treat the class of descriptive sentences similarly.
Their stipulated account of normative sentences doesn’t seem to capture all of
the sentences that we might pretheoretically count as normative though. Peter
Vranas (2010), for example, shows that the sentence ‘All citizens ought to vote’ does
not count as normative on their account. Certainly though, as Vranas continues,
a hypothetical argument from descriptive premises to that conclusion is in the
intended domain of the autonomy of ethics. This appears to be a quite problematic
result for taking Russell and Restall’s understanding of the autonomy of ethics to
be fully general.
The reason that ‘All citizens ought to vote’ doesn’t count as normative on their
account is because the sentence is captured in their semantics as a universally
generalized disjunction. One of the disjuncts of each disjunction is non-normative,
namely that the object is a citizen. This results in the disjunction not being always
unstable under both model extension and tinkering with the accessibility relation,
which violates their definition of ‘normative.’ That said, their account also doesn’t
count the sentence as descriptive, as it is not always stable under model extension
either. This shows that their account is essentially incomplete.
The semantic account of the autonomy claim that I provide does count ‘All
citizens ought to vote’ as normative, since it is not norm-invariant: that all citizens
ought to vote is incompatible with a world-norm pair where the norm calls for
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some citizens not to vote. So, the account I provide would block arguments to this
conclusion. In fact, my account will put any non-trivial normative claim in the class
of claims that we can’t derive from the non-normative. This is because if the claim
rules out any ways the combination of the world and norms could be, it will not be
norm-invariant.15 This completeness does come at a cost though.
A benefit of Russell and Restall’s account is that it delineates two classes of
claims, the descriptive and the normative, and says that there are no valid arguments
from sentences in the first class to a conclusion in the second. Though not every
sentence falls into one of the two classes, putting the autonomy claim in terms
of classes of sentences for which there is no argument from one to the other is
straightforward in a way my account is not.
My account puts a restriction on what arguments are possible, but that restriction
is not statable as a restriction on arguments from one class of sentences to another.
My semantic account says that there are no valid arguments from norm-invariant
premises to a non-norm-invariant conjunction of a conclusion with the premises.
So what class of sentences cannot be derived, on my view, is dependent on the
premises being used. So although my account does seem to be fully general, it does
so at the cost of capturing the autonomy claim as a restriction on arguments from
one set of sentences to another.16
On Russell and Restall’s approach, the account of the autonomy of ethics falls
out of a unified understanding of implication barriers. Their account attempts to
reconcile the autonomy claim with other barriers to implication, including infer-
ences from particular claims to general claims, inferences from claims about the
past to claims about the future, and inferences from claims about actuality to claims
about necessity. The account I offer does not seem well-positioned to offer similar
15Notice though that there is still a class of claims that contain normative terms that my account
doesn’t count as normative, namely those that are trivially true. These include conceptual truths,
like ‘If you ought not sit, you’re not permitted to sit’ but also ordinary trivialities with normative
content like ‘Either you ought to sit, or it’s not the case that you ought to sit.’ This is a benefit of the
account though, as certainly, the autonomy claim is not meant to block inferences to these kinds of
claims.
16Notice that there is a general reason to think that no account of the autonomy of ethics could
both formulate the claim as blocking arguments from one class of sentences to another and also
be complete, in that it puts every sentence into exactly one of those classes. Take a general version
of one of Prior’s examples: ‘P. Therefore, P or Q.’ where P is non-normative and Q is normative.
For the account to put every sentence into exactly one class, it must count ‘P or Q’ as normative
or non-normative. If it’s normative, then the given example is a counterexample to the autonomy
claim. If it’s non-normative, then we can generate a new counterexample: ‘not-P. P or Q. Therefore,
Q.’ which would be a counterexample. So any account of the autonomy claim must suffer either the
incompleteness disadvantage that Russell and Restall’s faces or the disadvantage of not treating the
autonomy of ethics as blocking inferences from one class to another.
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explanations, since it’d be odd for a semantics to evaluate sentences in regard to the
parameters required for the analogous results.
Despite that, my approach does defend the autonomy of ethics with only the
weak assumption that our semantics models content with something like an ordi-
nary possible world and a normative standard. This framework is highly flexible
and isomorphic to many standard semantics for normative language. If Hume’s
dictum relies on only this weak assumption, it is much more secure than if it relies
on the more controversial semantics provided by deontic logics.
Another significant benefit of my approach is that it comes along with an expla-
nation of what goes wrong in Prior’s examples and other valid arguments from
non-normative premises to normative conclusions. On the epistemic reading of
the autonomy claim, that claim is about whether we can properly reason from
non-normative premises to a normative conclusion. According to WORLD-NORM
AOE, the autonomy of ethics is not challenged by the purported counterexamples
because we have independent grounds for thinking that no reasoner could properly
employ those arguments to reach a conclusion about what ought to be the case in
the situation they take themselves to be in. Putting the autonomy claim in terms
of a barrier to implication, as Russell and Restall do, does not offer an analogous
explanation.
It seemed from the outset that the autonomy of ethics was doomed by Prior’s
examples. Others have tried to save the claim by syntactically restricting its intended
domain, like Gibbard who proposes that we only view it as a limit on arguments
to simple normative conclusions. But this move is both too strong and too weak.
We ought instead to seek a semantically-motivated understanding of the autonomy
claim.
Russell and Restall’s approach, which is grounded in deontic logic, offers one
way to do that, but, as Vranas shows, it seems to be faced with a completeness
worry, like the syntactic approaches. I’ve introduced a new way to understand and
defend the autonomy of ethics in terms of a more general semantics of normative
terms. The new version seems to offer the required flexibility to make sense of the
autonomy claim, and it also offers a nice story about what goes wrong in Prior’s
cases. It does this at the cost of not being able to treat the autonomy claim an
instance of the unified notion of an implication barrier. On my account, whether a
conclusion is in the class of sentences that the autonomy of ethics is meant to block
is relative to the particular premises in play: it says we can’t get from non-normative
premises to conclusions that are normative when the premises are true.
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CHAPTER II
On a Puzzle about Correct Belief
ABSTRACT
From “Snow is white,” we can infer “If Dan believes snow is white, his
belief is correct.” Saying that a belief is correct is to say that it is the
belief one ought to have, for some sense of ‘ought.’ But this inference
seems to violate Hume’s autonomy of ethics, the claim that what is the
case doesn’t fix what ought to be the case. Gibbard (2012, Ch. 4) proposes
a solution to this puzzle. His proposal tries to resolve the puzzle by
trying to understand the kind of normativity that occurs in it. Gibbard
claims that by understanding how objective and subjective oughts relate
to each other, we’ll see that the offending argument doesn’t really bridge
the is-ought gap.
I cast doubt on Gibbard’s proposed solution by claiming the no epis-
temology of the normative fits nicely with it. Any epistemology that
Gibbard could supply would either be unable to explain an awkward
asymmetry it must posit in the subjective ought or make subjective
oughts too detached from the agents they apply to. In arguing for this
disjunction, I also argue that the subjective ought does not play the role
in our deliberation that Gibbard expects it to. Really, there is no unique
ought that factors in our deliberation.
We should reject Gibbard’s proposed solution to the puzzle, I claim,
because it gets wrong the relationship between objective and subjective
oughts. I suggest another solution to the puzzle, one that takes the
concept BELIEF to be normative.
Hume taught us that no ‘ought’ follows just from an ‘is’. That is, no substantive
normative claims are fixed by non-normative facts. This is the putative autonomy
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of ethics or the is-ought gap. There is a seemingly valid argument regarding correct
belief that appears to violate the autonomy of ethics and is discussed by Gibbard
(2012, Ch. 4). Gibbard proposes a way to make sense of the puzzle while maintaining
the autonomy of ethics. He claims that the conclusion of the offending argument
is trivial in a way that doesn’t threaten Hume’s dictum. I agree with his verdict
but disagree with Gibbard as to why. In this chapter, I’ll lay out the puzzle and
Gibbard’s proposed solution. I’ll show why one ought to reject Gibbard’s response
to the puzzle and show how the type of view advocated by Shah (2003) can also
explain the puzzle. In the next chapter, I provide a new argument for the key
premise of that second solution.
2.1 The Autonomy of Ethics
In the Treatise of Human Nature, Hume states the autonomy of ethics. He says:
In every system of morality, which I have hitherto met with, I have
always remark’d, that the author proceeds for some time in the ordinary
ways of reasoning, and establishes the being of a God, or makes observa-
tions concerning human affairs; when all of a sudden I am surpriz’d to
find, that instead of the usual copulations of propositions, is, and is not,
I meet with no proposition that is not connected with an ought, or an
ought not. This change is imperceptible; but is however, of the last con-
sequence. For as this ought, or ought not, expresses some new relation
or affirmation, ’tis necessary that it shou’d be observ’d and explain’d;
and at the same time that a reason should be given; for what seems
altogether inconceivable, how this new relation can be a deduction from
others, which are entirely different from it. (Hume 1978, p. 468)
Inferring normative facts from only non-normative facts is unwarranted, Hume
claims, because “this new relation” of normativity seems “entirely different” from
descriptive or natural propositions. What is the case, the ways things are, does
not seem fix at all how things ought to be. Here is a first pass at formalizing the
autonomy of ethics:
SIMPLE AUTONOMY The normative isn’t determined by anything non-normative.
SIMPLE AUTONOMY, if right, would have it that no way of fixing the descriptive
facts is enough to figure out how things ought to be. It follows from this that we
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can’t properly argue from how things are to how they ought to be – that is, there
is no valid argument with only descriptive premises and a non-trivial normative
conclusion.1
A. N. Prior (1960a) showed us that SIMPLE AUTONOMY fails. Here is one of his
three examples:2
(1) Tea-drinking is common in England.
∴ (2) Tea-drinking is common in England or all New Zealanders ought to be shot.
Like this one, each of Prior’s examples is a logically valid argument with non-
normative premises and a conclusion that contains a normative term essentially.3
Many ways of resurrecting the autonomy of ethics in light of these counterexam-
ples and others have been proposed. See, for example, Jackson (1974), Pigden (1989),
and Gibbard (2012, p. 80-81). Each of these accounts tries to save the autonomy
of ethics syntatically – that is, by restricting the class of normative claims that the
autonomy of ethics is meant to apply to by roping off some class on the basis of its
syntax. In Chapter I, I suggest that roping off the claims solely based on the syntax
doesn’t best capture the idea of the autonomy of ethics. Instead, we need a semantic
account of the autonomy of ethics. I provide such a semantic account and argue for
it there. Though the details of the argument here won’t depend on accepting my
account of the autonomy of ethics, they will require accepting some account that
avoids Prior’s counterexamples.
2.2 The Puzzle about Correct Belief
The purported counterexample to THE AUTONOMY OF ETHICS that Gibbard (2012,
Ch. 4) considers is this: If Sophia believes that snow is white and snow actually is
white, then her belief is correct. The judgment that Sophia’s belief is correct seems
to be a normative judgment. It’s the judgment that Sophia’s belief is the belief she
ought, in some sense, to have. Further, that normative claim seems to follow from
the non-normative claim that the content of the belief is true. This appears to violate
the Humean dictum discussed above that normative conclusions can’t follow from
merely non-normative premises.
1Here, I’m assuming that the normative conclusion is dependant on the premises and hence not
derivable from the empty set.
2Here I actually provide the slightly modified version from Pigden (1989, p. 132).
3A term is essential when it cannot in general be replaced with another term of the same gram-
matical category without a change in truth-value.
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More explicitly, the argument of the puzzle goes like this:4
(1) Snow is white.
(2) Sophia believes that snow is white.
∴ (3) Sophia’s belief that snow is white is correct.
The autonomy of ethics is supposed to block valid inferences of a normative claim
from non-normative premises. So the puzzle is one of how this argument about
belief correctness can be made to cohere with the autonomy of ethics.
What is interesting about this particular puzzle is that the argument doesn’t seem
to be like Prior’s examples. In each of Prior-style examples, satisfying the premise
makes it trivially true that the normative conclusion holds, so that conclusion is
no longer potentially guiding or prescriptive of action.5 Given that tea-drinking is
common in England, that tea-drinking is common in England or all New Zealanders
ought to be shot comes for free. But, the correctness of Sophia’s belief doesn’t appear
to be trivial in the same way. In the end, though the correctness conclusion doesn’t
seem to be trivial, I will argue that it really is.
2.2.1 Three Ways to Defuse the Puzzle
In broad brush strokes, there can be three kinds of approaches to this puzzle that
maintain both the autonomy of ethics and the truism that a belief is correct if its
content is true.
The first kind of response to the puzzle holds that the argument is strictly
speaking invalid. Proponents of this view might suggest that the argument seems
valid because we’re typically willing to grant an implicit normative premise – the
premise that a belief is correct if its content is true. According to this response, the
puzzle is resolved because the purported counterexample is not valid without the
hidden normative premise. I’ll call this kind of response an implicit premise response
4My formulation of the argument differs slightly from Gibbard’s in that Gibbard’s doesn’t contain
the second premise. The conclusion of his puzzle is that Sophia’s belief that snow is white is correct.
His formulation of the argument is enthymematic: it requires that Sophia exist in the first place and
that Sophia has the relevant belief. Boghossian (2003, p. 37) also recognizes the second requirement.
Strictly speaking, the conclusion would not obtain were one of these to fail, and the argument is
invalid without these. Let’s grant that Gibbard would include these premises since the mere addition
of the premises is not enough to solve the puzzle.
5My formulation of the autonomy of ethics allows us to make more sense of this notion of
triviality. More precisely, though the conclusion of the argument is normative, it cannot potentially
guide a reasoner to a normative conclusion she did not already accept. See Chapter I.
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to the puzzle.6 This kind of approach is investigated by Horwich (1990), (2000), and
Gibbard (2012, p. 80).
A second kind of response attempts to resolve the puzzle by denying that
the conclusion of the offending argument is normative. According to this kind of
response, correctness of belief, or at least the brand of correctness of belief employed
in the conclusion of the puzzle, is a non-normative notion, conveying not much
more than the truth (conceived of non-normatively) of the belief’s content. I’ll call
this kind of response a non-normative conclusion response.
The final kind of response doesn’t deny the normativity of correctness, but
rather it denies that the conclusion of the purported counterexample is a non-trivial
normative claim given the premises. That a belief that P is correct given P, on this
view, is a trivial normative claim like the conclusions of Prior’s examples. Deriving
insubstantial or non-trivial normative conclusions from non-normative premises
doesn’t challenge the autonomy of ethics because, in a sense, these claims don’t
really tell us anything about how things ought to be apart from how things are.7
I’ll call this kind of response a trivial conclusion response to the puzzle. Gibbard’s
solution is one such response. Shah (2003) and Shah and Velleman (2005) argue that
the concept BELIEF is a normative one. On this proposal, it’s a conceptual truth that
a belief is correct iff its content is true. This proposal, like Gibbard’s, would also
generate a trivial conclusion response to the puzzle – one that I’ll endorse.8
2.3 Gibbard’s Trivial Conclusion Response
The response that Gibbard proposes in chapter 4 of Meaning and Normativity is a
trivial conclusion response. First, Gibbard tells us that correct belief, which factors
in the conclusion of the puzzle, is the belief that one ought to have, for some
appropriately-conceived objective sense of ‘ought’ (2012, p. 75).9 Gibbard’s plan is
to claim that the triviality of the conclusion drops out of a proper account of this
sense of ‘ought’.
To make good on this, Gibbard gives a series of characteristics the suitable sense
6Thanks to J. Dmitri Gallow for first suggesting this kind of response to me.
7Any account that avoids Prior’s worries for the is-ought gap will say this. See Chapter I for
further discussion of one way to understand it.
8This solution will also say that the argument escapes the autonomy of ethics worry because
the second premise is normative. None-the-less, the conclusion is still trivial given the normative
premise.
9I take the move here to be an endorsement of Ewing’s (1939) and (1955, p. 341-342) proposal
that all normative claims are synonymous with ought claims – i.e. that ought is the fundamental
normative concept. The earlier Gibbard (1990, p. 42) endorses this move.
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of ‘ought’ must have. Since Sophia ought, in this sense, to believe that P when P is
true, regardless of the situation Sophia is in, the ‘ought’ must be one that ignores
costs and delivers ideal standards (2012, p. 78). Importantly, the norm generated is
also supposed to hold even of agents who don’t have all of the facts accessible to
them, as it is independent of the agent’s evidential state that if her belief is true, it is
correct. So, the ought must be an objective one – one that applies in light of all the
facts, not a subjective one – one that applies in light of the information available
to the agent. The objective and subjective ought differ in that “the basic normative
precepts that ground a subjective ought are subjectively applicable – applicable
in light of information the agent has” (Gibbard 2012, p. 76), whereas the precepts
that ground objective oughts may require information the agent has no way of
accessing.
Gibbard’s goal is to give a general strategy for accounting for the meaning of
objective oughts. It will fall out the meaning of the objective ought, he claims, that
the conclusion of the puzzle is trivial.10
To begin the project, Gibbard first argues that subjective oughts cannot be
reduced to objective ones – that is, the meaning of subjective ought claims cannot be
accounted for in terms of objective oughts. Roughly, the idea here is that subjective
ought claims contain strictly more information than objective ones. Gibbard gives
this example: Suppose you’re offered a bet on a coin where you’d receive $1000 if
it lands heads and lose $800 otherwise. In order to figure out what you objectively
ought to do to maximize money gain, we’d only need to know how the coin will
land and whether receiving $1000 is better or worse than losing $800. In order to
figure out what you ought to do subjectively, we’d need to know more, namely how
to compare the values of the possible money gains and loses. According to Gibbard,
“In terms of classical decision theory, the utility needed for objective oughts is
ordinal, whereas that for subjective oughts is cardinal: the scale must allow for
comparisons of preferability in degrees” (2012, p. 81). But objective oughts don’t
give us enough information to compare in degrees, Gibbard thinks. So, subjective
oughts cannot be defined solely in terms of objective ones.
In the particular case of belief, Gibbard notes that the objective ought claims
10It may seem strange that such a project is possible. That strangeness is ameliorated when we
notice that the we’re looking into doxastic, objective oughts – that is, claims about what one ought
to believe in light of all information. But plausibly, in light of full information, many things that may
seem strange are true. For instance, it may be that in science one objectively ought not even consider
the most plausible hypothesis on one’s evidence in light of all the facts since considering whether
¬P is true is silly in light of P.
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about belief fix fully what one ought to believe given all the information, but this
is not enough to fix what one ought to believe given a lack of information. “Much
more is needed to settle what degree of credence one ought subjectively to have,”
Gibbard contends. Objective oughts cannot provide the needed information because
were they able to, they’d answer a normative question about how to assess evidence,
but it seems that merely having the facts can’t answer this question. As Gibbard
puts it, “A person who knows all the facts still can’t determine, from this and sheer
analytic definitions alone, how, subjectively, I ought to assess my evidence.” (2012,
p. 82).
Given the failure of giving the meaning of subjective oughts in terms of objective
ones, Gibbard turns to providing the analysis in the other direction. We’ll see that
if Gibbard has provided the correct analysis in this direction, it will fall out of the
meaning of the objective ought that one objectively ought to believe that P when P.
One could give a rough gloss of Gibbard’s proposal like this: S objectively ought to
φ iff if S had full information, it would be the case that S subjectively ought to φ
(2012, p. 82).
We need a few revisions to flesh out the details, according to Gibbard: First,
to have full information is to believe all that’s true, including the properly de se
truths, such as those about one’s perspective and ignorance. But mere believing
isn’t sufficient since one ought not act on mere belief. One ought act on information
only if one is justified in that information (2012, p. 83).11 Further, actually having
the belief doesn’t seem to matter, so long as one ought to have the belief, Gibbard
claims. Hence, the proposal is refined to this (Gibbard 2012, p. 84):
GIBBARD’S ANALYSIS S objectively ought to φ iff were it that [S] [subjectively]
ought to accept all that’s so, [it would be the case that S] [subjectively] ought
to [φ].
If this proposal about the meaning of the objective ought is correct, then the
puzzle about belief is resolved. The strategy is this: Take any true proposition P.
Then were it that S subjectively ought to accept all that’s so, it would be the case
that S ought to accept that P. But that is just to say that S objectively ought to accept
that P, according to the proposed analysis. We can then cast a belief as correct if one
objectively ought to believe it. From this, it falls out that a belief that P is correct,
when P. So the normative conclusion that follows from the non-normative premises
11Others think the condition on proper action is strictly stronger, such as Hawthorne and Stanley
(2008) who think knowledge is required. Others might think Gibbard is mistaken and that mere
belief is all that is required.
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is trivial – it falls out of the meaning of the objective ought. Since any account of
the autonomy of ethics that avoids Prior’s worries will hold that trivial conclusions
aren’t in the domain of the autonomy claim, the puzzle is no longer threatening.
Put another way, Gibbard proposes that “Bob’s belief that snow is white is
correct” is synonymous with “Bob objectively ought to believe snow is white”,
which is in turn synonymous with “Were it that Bob subjectively ought to accept
all that’s so, it would be the case that Bob subjectively ought to accept that snow is
white.” Then we can transform the puzzle’s argument by substitution of synonyms
to an argument with the premise “Snow is white” and whose conclusion is “Were
it that Bob subjectively ought to accept all that’s so, it would be the case that
Bob subjectively ought to accept that snow is white.” This conclusion is clearly
trivial given the premise. So, the original argument isn’t a counterexample to the
autonomy of ethics. That is Gibbard’s resolution to puzzle about belief in Meaning
and Normativity.
2.4 On Subjective and Objective Oughts
The difference between the objective and subjective ought is often cast in terms of
what information the ought applies in light of. I’m using ‘information’ here to just
mean a collection of propositions. We’ll want to view these propositions as finely
individuated, so that two normative sentences may pick out different propositions
even if they share a truth value in every possible world.12 Here, I’ll mostly appeal
to natural intuitions about ‘in light of’ sentences. We can make sense of what one
ought to do in light of being a father, and we can contrast this with what one ought
to do in light of being a judge, for example.
The big picture of the oughts in play is this: The objective ought applies in light
of everything that’s true (including the de se truths of the agent). For example, if S is
in a rush and is approaching a blind intersection, in light of the fact that there is no
oncoming traffic, she objectively ought to continue through without stopping. But,
in light of the information available to the subject, S ought to slow down and look.
This second sense of ‘ought’ is the subjective one. What S subjectively ought to do
is what one ought to do in light of how things appear in S’s subjective situation.
Following Gibbard, I will also say that the subjective ought applies ‘in light of
the information available’ in S’s subjective situation, where this is meant to be
12For example, ‘stealing is wrong’ and ‘murder is wrong’ are both necessarily true, many people
believe. None-the-less, we can think of these sentences as picking out different propositions, perhaps
corresponding to the semantic content of the sentence.
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synonymous with ‘in light of how things appear’. ‘In light of the information
available’ has a factive reading, where some information can only be available if it’s
true. Neither Gibbard nor I intend to employ this reading.
In contrasting the subjective and objective oughts, Gibbard tells us:
Now in a way, objective oughts seem fishy. It would be nice, to be
sure, to know what objectively you ought to do. If indeed you could
check with an omniscient advisor, that’s what you would ask: If, say, you
wonder whether to take an umbrella, who better to ask than someone
with detailed foresight of whether it will be raining at moments you’ll
want to be outside? Such advisors, though, are in short supply. Your
real questions, then, are what to do on the basis of information you have.
. . . The ought-precepts you need, we can argue, will be for ‘ought’ not in
the fishy objective sense, but in the subjective sense . . . (2005, p. 343)13
We see here that Gibbard takes the subjective ought to be the one we deliberate
about. When I’m asking myself what ought I do, I’m asking myself, according to
Gibbard about what I subjectively ought to do. I’ll use the term “deliberative ought”
to denote the ought that factors in our deliberations as Gibbard describes. Gibbard’s
claim then is that the deliberative ought is the subjective ought.
I’ll show that we should reject Gibbard’s proposed analysis of the objective
ought because it doesn’t sit well with any epistemology of the normative. To do this,
I’ll break accounts of the epistemology of the normative into two camps: According
to the epistemologies in the first camp, we learn about the normative just like we
learn about the non-normative – much of it is essentially gained through experience.
On these views, to decide what to think about a normative proposition, we should
weigh the evidence we have for and against it. As such, different fully rational
people may disagree by having different evidence about the normative, which they
may weigh differently for and against various normative propositions. The defining
characteristic of this class of epistemologies will be that they admit the possibility
that two ideally rational people can have disagreeing views about a distinctly
normative proposition.14 Some epistemologies will make normative learning a
13This article by Gibbard appears to be a precursor to his chapter 4 of Meaning and Normativity. I
use some passages from that piece when they seem to more clearly or explicitly give Gibbard’s view
but not when they contradict that view.
14By “distinctly normative proposition”, I mean a normative proposition that does not rely on any
non-normative facts for its truth or falsity. For example, if there’s candy in a store, it’s wrong to steal it is
distinctly normative because once we fix the normative facts, the truth or falsity of this proposition
is fixed.
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priori, so unlike how we learn about most of the paradigmatically non-normative,
but still admit of the hallmark of this camp. Those views will be considered to be in
this camp of views as well, which I’ll call ‘rational disagreement permitting’ views.
The second camp of epistemologies of the normative say that what we know
about the normative must be a priori. No experience of how things are directly
informs us on how things ought to be, they might claim. As such, everything
we know about how things ought to be must be independent of our particular
experiences. Further, since fully rational agents have full access to what is a priori,
ideally rational people would converge on the same views of normative, according
to these views, just as ideally rational people would converge on views of the
mathematical. Gibbard’s (1990, 2003) view is like this,15 and many ideal response
theories, like those of Firth (1952) and Smith (1994, p. 187) are like this as well. These
views deny that fully rational agents would disagree about the distinctly normative,
so I’ll call them ‘rational agreement requiring’ views.
I’ll argue that if a view is in the first camp, the rational disagreement permitting
views, and adopts GIBBARD’S ANALYSIS, then the view must posit a problem-
atic asymmetry between the way that the subjective ought treats normative and
non-normative information. On the assumption that the deliberative ought is the
subjective ought, I’ll provide three reasons for thinking that this ought doesn’t
take the normative/non-normative difference into account, as GIBBARD’S ANALY-
SIS would suggest. I will contend that the difference between the normative and
non-normative does not, in fact, play an important role in the subjective ought.
What one subjectively ought to do, I claim, is what one ought to do in light of the
information available, regardless of whether is it normative or not.
I’ll then argue that there isn’t a unique ought that factors in our deliberations, and
as such, the subjective ought is not the deliberative ought. I’ll use the three reasons
given to conclude that neither the subjective ought nor any ought about which we
deliberate applies in light of information that is asymmetric between the normative
and non-normative. But, I’ll show that even without this problematic assumption,
the three reasons are still problematic for rational disagreement permitting views
15 Gibbard (1990, Ch. 3) gives an account of ‘rational’ whereby calling something rational is
tantamount to calling it the thing to do, pace Brandt (1979, p. 11, 149). Gibbard (2003, p. 12) also
infers from someone being fully rational that “she will form correct fundamental beliefs as to what
she ought to do”. Moreover, Gibbard (2008b, p. 10) claims that “if ought judgments are a priori, false
ones are rationally ruled out.” A confusing claim that Gibbard makes is that there can be ideally
coherent agents who are mistaken about some normative facts. See, for example, his discussion of
the ideally coherent anorexic (1990, p. 172) and the ideally coherent Caligula (1990, p. 196). As such,
Gibbard takes it that being ideally coherent is not sufficient for being ideally rational.
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that adopt Gibbard’s solution to the puzzle of correct belief.
Gibbard’s actual normative epistemology and others escape those worry by
being rational agreement requiring views and requiring that the correct normative
view is always available to ideally rational agents. While this move avoids the
problems for the first camp, it comes at another cost. By adopting Gibbard’s solution
to the puzzle, rational agreement requiring views force the subjective ought to be too
disconnected from the subjective situation of the agent – so much so that it doesn’t
even seem compatible with the triviality that what S subjectively ought to do is what
one ought to do in light of what’s available in S’s subjective situation. I conclude
that since no epistemology of the normative – that is, no rational disagreement
permitting or rational agreement requiring view – that adopts Gibbard’s solution to
the puzzle is acceptable, we ought to reject Gibbard’s solution.
2.4.1 The Asymmetry in Gibbard’s Subjective Ought
Above, I roughly characterized the subjective ought as applying in light of the
information available to the agent. Gibbard’s proposed understanding of the
objective ought requires us to understand this in an odd way, I’ll claim. If Gibbard
is right, subjective oughts apply in light of only the non-normative information
available to the subject, not in light of all of the information available to her. Gibbard
seems to recognize this, saying that “The distinction [between the objective and
subjective ought] is a matter of how much by way of the non-normative facts one
needs to know to ground a non-ultimate ought” (2012, my emphasis, p. 76).
To see why this is, recall that GIBBARD’S ANALYSIS has us understand what an
agent objectively ought to do in terms of what what the agent subjectively ought to
in the hypothetical scenario where the agent subjectively ought to accept all that’s
so. To accept all that’s so, Gibbard tells us, the agent “must believe a full and true
factual description of [her] circumstances.” (2012, p. 83). Gibbard is clear here, and
in the rest of the chapter, that he is using ‘factual’ in a way that precludes that the
term applies to normative truths. So, what one objectively ought to do is what it
would be the case that one subjectively ought to do were it that one subjectively
ought to accept all of the non-normative truths about one’s situation. With this
understanding of Gibbard’s proposal, we can show that treating the subjective
ought as applying in light of only the non-normative information available to the
agent, rather than all of the information available to the agent, is essential to the
kind of account Gibbard offers. Without this asymmetry in the subjective ought,
GIBBARD’S ANALYSIS is implausible:
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Suppose a proponent of GIBBARD’S ANALYSIS were to allow the subjective
ought to apply in light of all of the information available to the agent, including
the normative information. Recall that, in the sense Gibbard and I are using it,
the ‘information available’ to the agent is roughly what the agent has access to,
or how things appear to be from the agent’s perspective, regardless of whether
that’s accurate. So suppose further that the agent accepts (and perhaps even has
good reason to accept) some false normative claim, such as that needlessly inflicting
pain is permissible. Of course, objectively, the agent ought not needlessly inflict
pain. On this version of Gibbard’s view, that objective ought claim amounts to the
claim that were it the case that the agent subjectively ought to accept all that’s (non-
normatively) so, it would be the case that she subjectively ought not needlessly
inflect pain. By stipulation, the agent actually takes it that she may needlessly
inflict pain. So even if she ought to accept a full and accurate picture of the non-
normative facts about herself, we’d still expect to her to think that needlessly
inflicting pain is permissible.16 In that counterpossibility then, in light of the
information available to the agent, she may needlessly inflict pain.17 So it is not
true in this hypothetical scenario that she subjectively ought not needlessly inflict
pain, as GIBBARD’S ANALYSIS would require.18
We see then that GIBBARD’S ANALYSIS is committed to an asymmetry in the
way that the subjective ought handles normative and non-normative information in
the following sense: according to the analysis, the subjective ought applies in light
of the non-normative information available to the subject and the true normative
information, regardless of whether the agent has access to it.
16I’m assuming that we evaluate this kind of counterfactual by considering the possibility where
minimal changes from actuality are made to accommodate the supposition. In such a possibility, we
have no reason to think the agent’s normative attitudes have changed.
17Here I’m assuming that if an ‘ought’ applies in light of some normative information, then
generally-speaking, the information obtains when the operator applies. More explicitly, if O is the
‘ought’ operator, I’m assuming:
IN-LIGHT-OF REPETITION For all P and Σ, if O(P) ∈ Σ, then in light of Σ, O(P).
Notice that this is a very weak assumption as it just allows the repetition of some claim in Σ. It is
much weaker than monotonicity of ‘in light of’, in the sense that if in light of Σ, P, then in light of
Σ ∪Q, P. This monotonicity claim is much less plausible.
18Notice that a similar conclusion can be reached without the assumption that we consider a
scenario in which the agent subjectively ought to accept a full and accurate picture of the just the
non-normative information. Even if the agent subjectively ought to accept a complete and accurate
picture of her normative situation, the agent doesn’t necessarily do so. If the agent actually believes
a normative falsehood, then the nearest possibility in which she ought not believe it is plausibly one
in which she still does.
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2.4.2 The Four Envelope Problem and the Many Oughts
With that in mind, consider this case, a variant of the Three Envelope Problem19:
THE FOUR ENVELOPE PROBLEM S is on a game show and must choose exactly
one of four envelopes, envelopeA, envelopeB, envelopeC, and envelopeD. There
are four cards, card0, card1, card2, and card3, distributed in the envelopes. If
the envelope containing cardn is chosen, exactly n infants, who would have
otherwise died a pain- and anxiety-free death, will be saved. card2 is in
envelopeC and card1 is in envelopeD, and S knows that. One of card0 and card3
is in each of envelopes envelopeA and envelopeB. S knows that, but he doesn’t
have any reason to think one arrangement is more likely than the other.
About this scenario, we can ask, ‘Which envelope ought S choose?’ In doing so,
there are four senses of ‘ought’ that could be in play. For each envelope, there is a
sense of ‘ought’ under which S ought to take that envelope.
Suppose that, in fact, unbeknownst to S, card3 is in envelopeA. Since saving three
infants is better than saving none, just one, or just two, there is a sense in which S
ought to choose envelopeA. That is, given all the facts and given that card3 causes
the best possible outcome, S objectively ought to choose envelopeA.
Of course, S doesn’t have enough information to know that he objectively ought
to choose envelopeA. All he knows is that card3 is either in envelopeA or envelopeB.
So, using the information S has, he can only tell that the expected values of choosing
each card. So, since saving two infants is more than half as good as saving three,
the expected value of S choosing envelopeC is higher than the expected value of
choosing either envelopeA, envelopeB, or envelopeD. So, there is also a sense in
which S ought to choose envelopeC. This sense of ‘ought’ is Gibbard’s subjective
ought.
Now suppose, unlike me, S has been persuaded by anti-natalist arguments to
the conclusion that reproduction and bringing up infants causes overpopulation,
famine, and depletion of the resources required for our survival. Because of this,
S believes that, all other things being equal, we ought not prevent an infant from
dying a pain- and anxiety-free death. From S’s subjective situation, it appears that
letting infants painlessly perish is better than using our resources to raise them.
So, by S’s lights, choosing the envelope containing card0 causes the best possible
outcome. Given the fact that card0 is in envelopeB, from S’s view of things, the best
19This case is discussed by many authors, most notably Parfit (2011) who attributes it to Regan
(1980). Wedgwood (2007a) and Kolodny and MacFarlane (2010) have analogous examples.
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thing to do is choose envelopeB. If S is to best pursue what he thinks is the best thing
to do, he ought to choose envelopeB. So, there is a also sense of ‘ought’ in which S
ought to choose envelopeB.
Finally, because the amount of resources required to save the infants varies
proportionally to the number of infants saved, if the anti-natalist arguments are
right, then the value of saving infants is inversely proportional to the number of
infants saved. Then by S’s lights, it is much worse to get card3 than it is to get card1.
For S to rationally pursue the optimal outcome according to his own beliefs and
values, S ought to choose envelope envelopeD. So, there is a sense of ‘ought’ in
which S ought to choose envelope envelopeD.
The many senses of ‘ought’ in this case are generated because different ‘ought’
claims apply in light of different information.20 This general point was admitted
from the outset of this discussion: the proposal under consideration from Gibbard
requires that objective oughts apply in light of all that so, whereas his subjective
oughts apply in light of the non-normative information available to the agent. So,
Gibbard admits that for different collections of non-normative information, different
oughts apply. What Gibbard leaves unrecognized is that different oughts apply in
light of different normative information as well. The agent ought to choose envelopeA
or envelopeC, but in light of S’s anti-natalist commitments, consistency requires that
he ought to choose envelopeB or envelopeD.
2.4.3 An Asymmetry in the Subjective Ought?
In the example above, there were two collections of non-normative information
in play, the facts and what the agent takes the facts to be. There were also two
normative views in play, the facts about what the agent ought to do and what the
agent takes to be the facts about what she ought to do. For each combination of
normative and non-normative considerations, there is an ought that applies in light
of those considerations.
In the order that they appear in the example above, we see the following four
types of oughts:
20This is by no means a new point. Linguists and philosophers have long recognized that
oughts come in different flavors. See for standard references Kratzer (1977), Kratzer (1981), and
Kratzer (1991). Kolodny and MacFarlane (2010, Sec. 2) take Kratzer’s context-sensitive approach
to be importantly different in kind from Gibbard’s approach, that of distinguishing objective and
subjective oughts. But, whether the flavor of the ought is determined by context or is a more built-in
facet of the ought, I think, is irrelevant to the discussion here.
32
‘Ought’s in THE FOUR ENVELOPE PROBLEM
Type of Ought Non-normative Normative
Objective All Truths All Truths
Gibbard’s Subjective Agent’s View All Truths
Friendly Advisory All Truths Agent’s View
Subjective Agent’s View Agent’s View
The table lists the information in light of which the ought applies. For instance,
Gibbard’s subjective ought applies in light of the non-normative facts by the agent’s
lights and all of the normative truths, independent of whether the agent has access
to them. The names of the types of oughts will be useful for discussion of them
below. Gibbard and I both use the name “objective” for the first type, and I’ll
suggest that the final type is what we typically think of as the subjective ought.
I’ll call the third kind of ought “friendly advisory” because it is the ought that
one would use to advise someone on what to do while granting their normative
judgments.21
In the table, I use ‘Agent’s View’ to refer to the agent’s representation of how
things are and how they ought to be. Real agents’ representations differ from the
facts in two important ways though. Unlike the facts about how things are and how
they ought to be, our attitude towards these things are regularly incomplete and
degreed. So, in general, there is no collection of everyday propositions that fully
represents the agent’s views. Rather, there are degreed and incomplete attitudes
about how the world is and how it ought to be, and the subjective ought applies
in light of these. In this discussion, I won’t appeal to anything that hangs on this
difference between two collections of so-called ‘information.’22
Nothing I’ve said so far poses a problem for Gibbard’s solution to the puzzle of
correct belief. We can simply view GIBBARD’S ANALYSIS as giving a reduction of
the first kind of ought, the objective ought, to the second type, Gibbard’s subjective
ought.
According to Gibbard though, the ought that we deliberate about treats the
normative differently than it treats the non-normative. The deliberative ought,
which is the subjective ought on Gibbard’s view, applies in light of the agent’s
21This isn’t a point that is relevant to my main claim here; the role of the name is just to make
discussion easier.
22Notice that there is no special problem here for how an ought can apply in light of degreed or
incomplete information, since there isn’t even a story about how an ought can apply in light of any
kind of information yet. A full account of oughts would have to explain how oughts can apply in
light of the things they apply in light of, but that task is beyond the scope of this discussion.
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attitudes about non-normative matters but not in light of the agent’s views on
normative matters. I’ll claim that, when we make decisions and deliberate about
what to do, it is not so obvious that we respect or ought to respect this asymmetry.
Gibbard tells us that subjective oughts differ from objective ones in that subjec-
tive ones “are the oughts that exert normative governance – the oughts we accept
and whose acceptance is directly motivating. We must act, after all, in light of
information we have” (2012, p. 80). Surely Gibbard is right that we must act in light
of the information that we have, but Gibbard’s subjective ought doesn’t respond
to all of the information that we have. Agents often have normative information,
and this information is left out of the picture in Gibbard’s account of the subjective
ought. Gibbard must explain why the subjective ought applies in light of the con-
siderations available to us unless those considerations happen to be normative. Here are
three reasons to expect that the asymmetry can’t be explained:
First, look at standard accounts of decision theory: Decision theories are ac-
counts of ideal deliberation, and they treat the non-normative and the normative
symmetrically. What one ought to decide according to standard expected utility
theory is a function of one’s credences and the values one assigns to the possible
outcomes – the stand-ins for one’s non-normative and normative attitudes. Jeffrey
(1983, p. 5), for example, fleshes out what one ought to decide in terms of “the prob-
abilities that the agent attributes to the . . . conditions” and “the desirabilities that the
agent attributes to the . . . conditions” – not, as the asymmetry in Gibbard’s solution
would predict, in terms of the probabilities the agent attributes to the conditions
and the desirabilities simpliciter of the conditions. Similarly for other versions of
decision theory.23 As accounts of how we ought to make decisions, decision theories
aim to give an account of proper deliberation. As such, they should be read as
giving an account of the deliberative ought – one that is univocally symmetric with
respect to the non-normative and the normative.
Suppose that standard decision theories are right that, ideally, the deliberative
ought is in light of the agent’s normative and non-normative information. Even
so, that doesn’t entail that, in fact, the deliberative ought is symmetric with regard
to these two types of information. It could be that, in fact, when we deliberate,
we deliberate about an ought that applies in light of our own non-normative
information but the true norms. So this consideration regarding decision theory
23See for example Ramsey (1926, p. 176) who casts the desirabilities in terms of what can be
solicited from the agent and Lewis (1981, p. 6) who casts the value of an option W in terms of “how
satisfactory it seems to the agent for W to be the actual world”.
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doesn’t give us a strong reason to think that Gibbard is wrong about there being an
asymmetry in the deliberative ought. Rather, we should think that because decision
theories contain the symmetry and because it’s not a surprising (or even often argued
for) aspect of the theory, that’s some reason to suppose that the asymmetry doesn’t
exist in everyday (non-ideal) decision making. This is some reason to think that the
asymmetry that Gibbard posits in the subjective ought, which he equates with the
deliberative ought, is not there.
The second reason to think that the subjective ought is not asymmetric as Gib-
bard requires is that when deliberating or deciding what to do, we don’t privilege
our own non-normative information over our normative views, as Gibbard ought
to predict. Consider Jaina, a young woman at the grocery store who must decide
whether to buy meat. For her, the question hinges on two things:
CREDIT whether she has a sufficient amount of credit left to buy the meat, and
PERMISSIBLE whether it is morally permissible for her to eat meat.
It seems that these two propositions are on par for Jaina in the following sense:
Jaina’s decision depends on her views (rather than the truth) about CREDIT iff her
decision depends on her views (rather than the truth) about PERMISSIBLE.
Suppose Jaina decides to buy the meat and that this was the wrong decision.
Consider the following two possible excuses for Jaina’s poor decision:
CREDIT EXCUSE Jaina made the wrong decision about whether to buy the meat
because she didn’t have enough credit. But it’s ok because she had no way of
knowing that.
PERMISSIBLE EXCUSE Jaina made the wrong decision on whether to buy the meat
because eating meat is impermissible. But it’s ok because she had no way of
knowing that.
These are both accessibility-based excuses – that is, they attempt to excuse Jaina’s
decision because some information that ought to have factored in her decision
wasn’t available to her. My intuitions flip back and forth about whether either of
these excuses could apply to Jaina’s bad decision, but they are univocal that one
rebuking of Jaina is acceptable iff the other is. If not having access to some bit of
information required to make her decision is an acceptable excuse, it’s acceptable
excuse regardless of whether the bit of information is normative or not.
Gibbard’s analysis of the deliberative ought would most naturally predict differ-
ent results: What Jaina ought to decide in this case, according to Gibbard’s account
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of the deliberative ought, is a function of the non-normative information available
to Jaina and the truth about PERMISSIBLE. Whether Jaina has enough credit to
buy the meat is a non-normative matter. So, what Jaina ought to decide to do is
dependent only on what is accessible to her about her credit. Jaina ought then
to ask herself whether she believes that she has enough credit and whether any
further information is accessible to her about it. A proper answer to that question
fixes all of the non-normative information in light of which the ought that is being
considered by Jaina applies. On the other hand, whether eating meat is permissible
is a normative matter. So, what Jaina ought to decide depends not on Jaina’s beliefs
about that matter but on whether it is actually permissible.
Given this, Gibbard’s account would seem to predict that the accessibility-based
excuses that might apply to Jaina would differ based on whether the information
being accessed is normative or not. CREDIT EXCUSE couldn’t apply to Jaina’s
decision, Gibbard’s account would predict, because the truth about CREDIT is
irrelevant to whether Jaina decided properly. It’s only what is accessible to Jaina
about her credit that’s relevant. The opposite is true for PERMISSIBLE though.
According to Gibbard, the ought about which Jaina deliberates applies in light of
the truth about PERMISSIBLE. So, if we can excuse poor judgment on the basis of
facts not being accessible, we might be able to excuse Jaina by PERMISSIBLE EXCUSE.
So Gibbard’s account predicts the wrong result here. The intuition was that CREDIT
and PERMISSIBILITY were on par in that Jaina’s decision depends on the truth about
one iff it depends on the truth of the other. Gibbard’s account of the deliberative
ought seems to suggest that when we evaluate that decision, we can rebuke her for
failing to access one of the claims but not the other, even if she has equally good
access to both.
Before moving on to the third worry for the asymmetry that Gibbard posits, it’s
worth considering a general explanatory schema that might be open to a defender
of Gibbard here: One might think that we can explain the asymmetry Gibbard’s
account by appeal to a difference in how we learn the different types of information.
Much of the non-normative information we learn, like the colors and sizes of
everyday objects, is learned via our senses. In general, if we don’t get the right
sensory evidence, we wouldn’t have learned that information. Evidence for the
normative, on the other hand, doesn’t seem to be something that we can “reach out
and touch” in the same way. This asymmetry in our ability to access the information
could ground an asymmetry in the information in light of which the deliberative
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ought applies.24
This kind of move can’t account for the asymmetry, though. To show this, it’s
sufficient to show that at least some non-normative information is as accessible
as some normative information. If that’s the case, how accessible information
is doesn’t divide the normative and non-normative as the potential defender of
Gibbard would require. By the objector’s reasoning, if accessibility is the key to
the asymmetry, the deliberative ought should either apply in light of the accessible
non-normative information independently of the agent’s beliefs about it or apply in
light of the agent’s beliefs about the normative.
To see that the normative can’t be divided from the non-normative in terms
of accessibility, consider Harman’s (1977, p. 4) example where you “you round a
corner and see a group of young hoodlums pour gasoline on a cat and ignite it.” I
take the point of this example to be that normative information, at least sometimes,
is ascertained just like non-normative information; we “can see that it is wrong.”
Now suppose that the person rounding the corner were our deliberating agent. In
terms of accessibility, the normative and non-normative information in this case
seem to be on par.
Moreover, we often acquire non-normative information in very accessible ways,
e.g. a priori reasoning to simple mathematical truths. In such cases, it would also
seem that the non-normative information is at least as easily knowable as the an-
swers to hard normative questions, like the permissibility of late-term abortions. So,
a strict line between the normative and the non-normative cannot be drawn on the
basis of accessibility to the agent. So, when it comes to figuring out which informa-
tion the deliberative ought applies in light of, we can’t appeal to just accessibility.
If accessibility were to determine the divide between which information must be
accessible to the agent and which need not be, then Gibbard’s division between the
normative and the non-normative would not result.
Some views of the normative take all distinctively normative facts to be ac-
cessible to all agents or at least accessible to ideally rational agents. The rational
agreement requiring views, like Gibbard’s (2003) view and ideal observer theo-
ries, are like this. These accounts would claim that the ideally rational version of
Harman’s subject does have access to a conditional like that if there is a cat being
24For example, you might think that something like this could explain the worry about Jaina’s
decision. We can’t excuse Jaina’s decision for her failure to get the right information about CREDIT
since we can’t hold Jaina to the standard of only using the truth about CREDIT in her decisions. We
can’t be blamed for not having non-normative information, in general, (the objector claims) because
we could not have, on the basis of our evidence, ascertained it.
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burned by young people, that is bad. So, this kind of view skirts around the worry
posed here since they will claim that the normative should be at least as accessible
to the subject as any non-normative information. I don’t think this kind of view
adequately captures what is going on in Harman’s example, but after considering
the third worry for Gibbard’s asymmetry, I will show that the rational agreement
requiring views are subject to a much more worrisome objection if they adopt
Gibbard’s proposed solution to the puzzle of correct belief.
The third and final point against rational disagreement permitting views that
adopt GIBBARD’S ANALYSIS is more general than the previous two. The worry can
be summarized like this: We’d expect that the difference between the subjective
ought and the objective ought would be explained in terms of the difference be-
tween the subjective and the objective. Gibbard’s view suggests that to properly
characterize the subjective ought in contrast to the objective ought, the distinction
between the normative and non-normative must also be drawn.25 But, the contrast
between the general notions of objectivity and subjectivity does not privilege the
normative/non-normative distinction, I’ll claim. So, that the subjective ought (in
contrast to the objective one) importantly relies on the normative/non-normative
distinction is, at best, surprising.
Ideally, to make this argument, I would offer a complete account of objectivity
and subjectivity, but that is beyond the scope of the discussion here. Instead, I’ll
focus on the distinction between objective and subjective situations. Doing so
should be sufficient to make clear that the subjective and objective oughts being
different in terms of how they treat the normative and non-normative information
is not plausibly due to what distinguishes them, namely the objective/subjective
distinction.
What seems to be essential to the notion of subjectivity is the agent’s ability to
access what is subjective. That is, something is subjective when it’s importantly
tied to how things appear from the subject’s perspective. To capture this idea,
we can say that that some centered content is part of the subjective situation of an
agent if it is internal, in the sense that the agent can tell that she is in the state, or
it accessible from the inside. Some examples: being happy is part of the child’s
subjective situation since the child can tell that she’s happy, i.e. she can “see” her
25The idea is that since the objective and subjective oughts treat the normative and non-normative
differently, any way of distinguishing the objective from the subjective must account for this. Of
course, an adequate picture of the subjective and objective might not distinguish the normative from
the non-normative in those terms. Such an account may cut the terrain in a way that also splits the
normative from non-normative divide without describing it as such.
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happiness. Being (appeared to as if one is) in a red room is part of an agent’s
subjective situation if the agent has the experience as of being in a red room. Note
though that this is not meant to be an intellectual account in the sense that some
content is only internal if the agent believes that she’s in it. Certainly one can be
happy without having the concept of happiness or having any beliefs about being
happy.
On the flip side, I’ll say that some centered content is in the objective situation of
an agent if it is true of the agent, regardless of whether it is accessible to the agent.
That it’s sunny and cool today in Ann Arbor is part your objective situation, even
though you (probably) don’t have access to that fact. Note that on this formulation,
something could be part of both the objective and subjective situations of an agent.
According to Gibbard’s view, when we consider the information that the objective
ought applies in light of, there is no difference between the normative and the non-
normative – the objective ought applies in light of the all that’s so, regardless of
what the agent can tell. But when we move to the subjective ought, the difference
between the normative and the non-normative becomes relevant. Why would
the normative/non-normative distinction become relevant when we switch from
objective to subjective oughts? We’d expect that the distinction would enter only
because it plays some kind of role in characterizing the subjective in contrast to the
objective. I will argue that it doesn’t play any such role. Because of that, we should
be surprised if the distinction is actually is relevant.
Consider how the distinction between the normative and non-normative could
sneak into the semantics of the ‘ought’s with the introduction of the subjective
perspective. If the distinction comes with the subjectivity, then it must be because
either the distinction plays a role in the characterization of subjective situations,
i.e. in the distinction between the objective and the subjective, or the distinction
plays a role in the subjective situations themselves, i.e. in the content of a subjective
situation. But the normative/non-normative distinction doesn’t play any special
role in either of those, I’ll now claim.
First, the normative/non-normative distinction doesn’t appear to play an im-
portant role in the characterization of the subjective because the subjective can be
characterized roughly in terms of what is accessible to the agent. What is accessible
to the agent, in turn, is given by the true epistemology (of both the normative and
the non-normative). But, as I suggested above, any plausible complete epistemol-
ogy won’t display a telling difference in accessibility between the normative and
the non-normative. So, the normative/non-normative distinction doesn’t play an
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important role in the difference between subjective and objective situations.
Next, the normative/non-normative distinction also doesn’t play an important
role in distinguishing the content of subjective situations. Of course, my claim
isn’t that the normative/non-normative distinction doesn’t play an important role
in any subjective situations. It does, for example, in the subjective situation of a
metaethist who studies the distinction. But, for many, the distinction between the
normative and non-normative is no more important to their subjective situation
than the distinction between red and non-red objects. Certainly, our subjective
experience does not, for example, automatically classify content as either normative
or non-normative in a way that’s peculiar to normativity (in contrast to other
properties, such as redness). To see this, reflect on what it would feel like to be in
Harman’s cat example (given above, from Harman (1977, p. 4)). There, for example,
we’re receiving both normative and non-normative information (e.g. the color of
the hoodlooms’ clothes, their approximate height, the wrongness of the act, the
blameworthiness of those involved), but the various bits of information seem to
be on par in almost every way. All of the facts just appear to us in our subjective
experience. Experience is not any more broken down into the normative and the
non-normative than it is broken down into the red and not-red or the economic and
non-economic. In fact, many even gloss over the distinction in thought and casual
conversation, perhaps moving from a claim that something will increase happiness
to those involved to the claim that they ought to do it, without recognizing that that
is not merely an issue of the words involved.
So it appears then that the distinction between the normative and the non-
normative is not drawn by subjectivity, either as part of subjective experiences or as
part of the notion of subjectivity itself. Given that, it’s hard to see why we should
think that contrasting the objective and the subjective would draw such a line either.
So, if the difference between the objective and subjective ought really is a difference
between objectivity and subjectivity, that there would be an asymmetry in the
subjective ought regarding normativity would be an unexpected result. This is the
third reason to be suspicious of there being the asymmetry between normative and
non-normative information that is required by rational disagreement permitting
views that adopt GIBBARD’S ANALYSIS. It seems trivial that what S subjectively
ought to do is what one ought to do in light of what’s accessible in S’s subjective
situation. But, since subjective situations are not asymmetric between the normative
and the non-normative, subjective oughts are not either.
The three considerations I present show that rational disagreement permitting
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views ought to reject that the subjective ought is asymmetric with regard to which
kinds of information it applies in light of. Each of the three worries I present
presuppose that it’s possible for there to be some normative truths that even an
ideally rational agent might not have access to. As I mentioned above, rational
agreement requiring views avoid these problems by denying that the normative is
never really inaccessible to the ideally rational agent. These views face a different
problem when trying to adopt Gibbard’s solution to the puzzle of correct belief. I
will explain that problem below. First though, I must slightly refine the arguments
of this section, as they rely on a faulty assumption that the subjective ought is the
deliberative ought.
2.4.4 The Deliberative Ought
When we deliberate about a decision, we’re trying to decide what we ought to do.
What we’re looking for in deliberation then is an ought, but what kind of ought is it?
I’ll suggest here that the role of the deliberative ought is more complicated than it
seems at first. Both the objective and my subjective ought can play the deliberative
ought role in different contexts.
When I, in the first person, ask myself “What ought I do?”, I’m deliberating
about what to do. I’ll call the ought that factors in this kind of deliberative thought
the first-personal deliberative ought. When we’re wondering about the first-personal
deliberative ought, it seems that we want to know what we really ought to do in
light of all that’s so, not just what we ought to do given our limited knowledge of
the world, I’ll claim. To see this, suppose I am deciding what to do in a situation
were I take the question of whether P to be highly relevant to what I ought to do,
like Jaina does with CREDIT above. Were it the subjective ought that factors in
our first-personal deliberation, we would expect that learning that I believe P is
enough to close off consideration about the matter, since it’s part of the very idea the
subjective ought that it applies in light of the information available to the subject.
But, when P is important for the decision, just learning that I believe P doesn’t close
off my wondering about P.26 Were an omniscient advisor to approach me with the
information that I believe P, I would still ask her: “Sure, I believe P. But is P true?”
In other words, when we’re asking ourselves “What ought I do?”, what we believe
about a fact does not screen off the fact itself. So when we’re deciding what to do,
the ‘ought’ in play is synonymous with the objective ought – what we want to know
26That is, learning that I believe P is insufficient for employing P in the decision-making process.
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is what we ought to do in light of all the facts, normative and non-normative. It’s
the objective ought that plays the first-personal deliberative ought role.27
You might object that I’ve ignored the major motivation for thinking that the
subjective, rather than the objective, ought plays the first-personal deliberative
ought role. In the Three Envelope Case (or My FOUR ENVELOPE PROBLEM above),
it’s clear that one objectively ought to choose one of the two envelopes of unknown
contents. So, if I’m right that we’re deliberating about the objective ought, we
should be able to rule out taking anything other than one of the envelopes of
unknown content. Of course, though, were any of us actually in that scenario, we’d
conclude that we shouldn’t take either of those. Here, it looks like we coherently
conclude both that we objectively ought to take one of the envelopes of unknown
content but also that is not what we ought, in the first-personal deliberative sense,
to do. So, it looks like I am mistaken in taking the first-personal deliberative ought
to be the objective ought. That is, my argument seems to ignore the fact that we can
only act in light of the information that we have, the objector claims.
In response, first notice that this problem is structurally analogous to the problem
considered by Kolodny and MacFarlane (2010). While I will not endorse their
semantics for ‘ought’ here, I will point to their work as an indication that this
problem goes much deeper than my suggestion that the objective ought plays the
first-personal deliberative ought role.
This second point will hopefully be more illuminating: notice that the claim I’m
making here is that the ‘ought’ that plays the first-personal deliberative ought role is
the objective ought. That is, the ‘ought’ in “What ought I do?” is synonymous with
the ought that applies in light of all the facts. A separate (and false) claim would be
that when we conclude thinking about the question of what to do, concluding “I
ought to φ”, the ‘ought’ in the conclusion is always the objective ought. Let’s call
this second ought, the one that occurs in the conclusions of our deliberations about
what to do, the first-personal decisive ought. At least sometimes, like in the case above
and in the case from Kolodny and MacFarlane (2010), we answer a question about
what we objectively ought to do with an answer about what we subjectively ought
to do. That is, the ought that plays the first-personal deliberative role is not always
27In this paragraph, I don’t take myself to be disagreeing with Gibbard. Gibbard seems to make a
similar point about the objective ought in (2005, p. 343): “It would be nice, to be sure, to know what
objectively you ought to do. If indeed you could check with an omniscient advisor, that’s what you
would ask: If, say, you wonder whether to take an umbrella, who better to ask than someone with
detailed foresight of whether it will be raining at moments you’ll want to be outside?” Here I take
myself to be clarifying the role that the objective ought plays in deliberation.
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that same ought that plays the first-personal decisive role. Let me explain with an
example:
Suppose Naomi wants to know whether it will rain today. To find out, she asks
Emily, “Will it rain today?” Both Naomi and Emily know that it will either rain
or it won’t. But, none-the-less, Emily can felicitously answer “It’s 70% likely to
rain.” Given what Naomi and Emily both know about the rain, this answer seems
to be ruled out: it will either rain or it won’t. Emily’s answer is proper in this
case though because it gives Emily’s estimate of the probability of rain given the
information available to her.28 One might think that, strictly speaking, it doesn’t
answer Naomi’s question because the answer is incomplete,29 but we often interact
like this. Likewise with the envelopes: when I ask myself which envelope to take, I
want to know which one I objectively ought to take. Failing finding a proper answer
to that, I’ll take the best estimate of what I objectively ought to do, i.e. what I ought
to do in light of the information available to me.30
So, the case does not generate a problem for my claim that the objective ought
plays the first-personal deliberative ought role, as long as we realize that we don’t
always answer that question with a claim containing the objective ought. The
first-personal deliberative ought is not the first-personal decisive ought.31
So we see that at least some of our conclusions about what to do contain the
subjective ought in the first-personal decisive ought role, but we also have reason
to think that all of our conclusions about what to do are like that. Objective oughts
are true in light of all the facts, some potentially unknown to the agent to whom
the ought applies. But, when we conclude a deliberation about what to do, the
conclusion is directly motivating. Facts that I don’t have access to can’t motivate me.
So, when I conclude a deliberation about what to do, the ‘ought’ of my conclusion
must be one that applies in light of the information available to me.32
28I do not intend to be merely appealing to conversational norms, such as those explored by Grice
(1975), to justify the properness of this response. By giving this answer, Emily is doing more than
sharing all of the information she has on the topic; she’s also potentially providing evidence for one
of the binary answers to the original question. So, in this way, the answer is proper, but possibly
incomplete.
29Here I’m employing a rough notion of questions and answers where posing a question sets up a
partition of logical space. A complete answer picks out a cells of the partition, the one that the actual
world is in according to the answerer.
30Instances of this kind of case are littered around the partial belief epistemology literature. For
instance, we (subjectively) ought to have a credence of one-half in the fair coin having landed heads
even though we know that it either did or didn’t.
31This general line might also be able to be developed into a yet unconsidered response to the
problem posed by Kolodny and MacFarlane (2010).
32We can also see this by using the method of screening off appealed to above. If I conclude that
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We see then that the first-personal decisive ought must apply in light of the
information available to the agent. Since facts that I don’t have access to can’t
motivate me, regardless of whether those facts are normative or not, there doesn’t
appear to be an asymmetry between the non-normative and normative here. As
such, the ought that plays the first-personal decisive role is my subjective ought.
When we make a conclusion about what we ought to do, the ‘ought’ in that con-
clusion is the ought that applies in light of what the agent takes to be the case both
non-normatively and normatively.
To recap, we see that there is no single ought that factors in deliberations about
what to do. When we ask ourselves what to do, we’re wondering about what we
objectively ought to do. In the case of belief where we wonder whether P, we
can conclude that probably P or probably not-P on the basis of the information
available to us. Likewise for deciding what to do, we answer the question of what
we objectively ought to do with a subjective ought, one that applies in light of the
information available to us.
In the previous section, I gave three reasons for thinking that the subjective
ought, conceived of as a univocal ought about which we deliberate, does not respect
an asymmetry between the non-normative and the normative. Now that we see that
there is no unique ought that plays in our deliberation, the arguments above appear
to rely on a false premise, and the question of the asymmetry may be resurrected.
But, a careful look at the three arguments given will show that the first two only rely
on the ought playing the decisive deliberative role, whereas the last only depends
on it being subjective rather than objective. Both of those assumptions are supported
by the arguments in this section. As such, the three points above collectively serve
to show that neither the subjective ought nor the first-personal decisive ought
(which, I claim, is the same as the subjective ought) respect the asymmetry. Since
the only other ought that factors in deliberation is the objective one, I conclude that
no ought that serves in deliberation treats the normative differently from the non-
normative. So, advocates of views that allow for fully rational agents to disagree
about distinctly normative issues ought to reject Gibbard’s solution to the puzzle of
correct belief; Gibbard’s solution commits them to an awkward asymmetry between
I ought to φ, the ‘ought’ of my conclusion better be one where my subjective situation screens off
the facts, i.e. my beliefs about my situation give me as much information as I could need to decide
whether the ‘ought’ applies. Else, I couldn’t always be motivated by the ‘ought’ judgment. Gibbard
seems to agree on this point, and I take this kind of reasoning to be his motivation for thinking that
there is a unique deliberative ought that is the subjective ought (Gibbard 2005, p. 343). I expand on
this discussion below when I claim that judgments about my subjective ought are the motivating
ones.
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how normative and non-normative information is handled by the subjective ought.
2.4.5 Treating the Normative as Rationally Accessible
The points in the previous section show against any account of the subjective ought
that adopts Gibbard’s solution to the correct belief puzzle and allows that some
normative facts may be inaccessible to an ideally rational agent. My arguments rely
on it being possible that there is some normative information that is not accessible
to the rational agent. Some accounts of the epistemology of the normative will
avoid the above problems by denying that the normative considerations in light of
which the subjective ought applies can ever really be inaccessible to an agent, at
least in the limit of rationality. So in any subjective situation, an ideally rational
agent would have access to the normative facts, and they can factor in the subjective
oughts, the accounts claim.33
These accounts – the rational agreement requiring accounts – are subject to a
different worry though. I will argue here that if a rational agreement requiring view
adopts Gibbard’s solution to the puzzle of correct belief, it is forced to make the
subjective ought so inaccessible to some agents that it can hardly be considered
subjective. The problem is generated because what is accessible to the ideally rational
version of an agent is often not accessible, even in a weak or limited sense, to the
actual agent. Subjective oughts, I claim, cannot be this inaccessible.
2.4.5.1 An Accessibility Constraint on Subjective Oughts
In the literature on subjective oughts, the subjective ought is meant to play a number
of different roles. Holly M. Smith’s “Subjective Rightness” (2010, p. 72) catalogues
and discusses a number of these roles.34 The roles that the subjective ought is meant
to play include a few already mentioned here (either explicitly and implicitly):
The subjective ought is used to (1) explain how an action can be right in some
sense, such as the three-envelope problem, even though the action is also wrong, in
some sense (Smith calls this “Normative Adequacy”); (2) provide a sense of ‘ought’
that’s connected to blameworthiness in a way that objective oughts are not (which
Smith calls “Relation to Blameworthiness”); and (3) be an ‘ought’ that guides and
33See note 15 above about how Gibbard’s view fits into this camp.
34Smith concerns herself with the analogous notion of subjective rightness, rather than the sub-
jective ought, and particularly considers that kind of rightness in the moral realm. The same ideas
apply in the broader normative realm and concerning the subjective ought.
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motivates agents to act. I’ll call the last role “the guidance and motivational role.”35
To generate the disconnection worry that I’ll leverage against the rational agree-
ment requiring views below, I’ll need to say more about the final role for the
subjective ought, that of being the ought that can guide and motivate agents. The
guidance and motivational role consists of both a guidance aspect and a motiva-
tional aspect. For an ought to satisfy the guidance aspect, it must be that the agent
can be guided by the content of the subjective ought claim. To borrow Smith’s
example, if an agent accepts that she subjectively ought to stop at red lights, then
if the agent wanted to act in accord with the principle, she’d be able to derive a
way to act in accord with it.36 Smith (2010, p. 73) notes that this kind of guidance
criterion is ambiguous between an internal and external characterization: on the
external characterization, subjective ought claims guide if they provide the agent
a way of acting that makes his actions actually accord with the principle. On the
external understanding, the subject of the subjective ought claim about red lights
is guided by it if she can stop at red lights in virtue of accepting the principle. In
general, normative principles are not like this though – we can’t conform our action
to a principle in virtue of accepting that principle. Instead, we should think of the
subjective ought as internally guiding in that the agent can find some prescription
for action that at least appears to help the agent conform his behavior to the prin-
ciple, regardless of whether it succeeds. Smith (2010, p. 73) argues that we can at
least expect the subjective ought to be internally guiding:
[It] seems realistic to insist that principles of subjective rightness –
which, after all, are designed to guide agents in making decisions when
they are mistaken or uncertain about what the governing principle of
objective rightness requires of them – should at least be capable of being
used as internal decision guides. An agent who cannot find any way to
translate his moral values into his choice of what to do is an agent who
cannot find a way to govern his decision by the considerations he deems
most relevant. His decision does not express his moral values, and so in
an important way undermines his autonomy. Thus, we want principles
of subjective rightness to be capable of being used as internal guides
to action, even if they cannot successfully be used as external guides to
action.
35The final role I assign to the subjective ought doesn’t map on nicely to any of Smith’s. It includes
her “Guidance Adequacy,” but it is strictly stronger in that it includes a motivational aspect.
36This is very close to Smith’s characterization of the similar role on page 73.
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Following Smith, I’ll take it that subjective oughts do meet this internal guidance
criterion: If an agent subjectively ought to follow some principle, then the agent
is capable to deriving some prescription for action from that principle (though
following that prescription may not guarantee that the agent’s actions conform to
the principle). Gibbard seems to accept something at least this strong in requiring
that the norms that we accept be couched in recognitional terms (Gibbard 2002).
The guidance aspect of the guidance and motivation role requires that the
subjective oughts that apply to us can guide our action, at least in an internal way.
The motivational aspect is supposed to capture what Gibbard claims about the
subjective ought, that they “are the oughts that exert normative governance – the
oughts we accept and whose acceptance is directly motivating” (2012, p. 80). The
motivational aspect, unlike the guidance aspect, requires that if an agent accepts a
subjective ought, the agent is motivated to conform to it. Gibbard points out that
the subjective ought playing this motivational role is reason to think that it applies
only in light of the information available to the agent, saying, “We must act, after all,
in light of information we have” (2012, p. 80). This is, in part, how our acceptance
of a subjectively ought claim can motivate us – it applies in light of the things we
take to be true.
It is important to clarify this last claim, that subjective oughts motivate us
in virtue of applying in light of what we take to be true. One might think this
claim omits an important aspect of how how subjective ought claims work, that
they often apply in virtue of our ignorance, as well, like in the envelope case
above. A few modifications must be made then: First, if agents’ attitudes come in
degrees, then we can say that the ought claims apply in virtue of the agents’ degreed
attitudes, regardless of whether those constitute acceptance, rejection, or suspension
of belief. Also, if we have non-belief attitudes that represent their content as true,
the subjective ought should apply in light of the contents of these attitudes as
well. Finally, even if agents’ attitudes come in degrees, agents can fail to have even
intermediately degreed attitudes in some cases – contrast, for example, having
an intermediate credence in whether the coin will come up heads with having no
credence at all about that. Subjective oughts may also apply in light of the having of
an attitude or lack thereof. Together, we can think of these things, all of the agent’s
attitudes that represent their content as true to the agent, as the agent’s picture of
reality. This then is what the subjective ought applies in light of. The subjective
ought can motivate because its prescriptions are based in how we take things to be,
in this wide sense. Below, when I discuss ‘what an agent takes to be true’ or similar
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notions, I will be referring to the agent’s picture of reality, in this sense.
With this idea in mind then, we can formulate the motivation aspect of the
subjective ought role with two prongs: first, when we accept a subjective ought,
we’re motivated to accord our action with it, and second, acceptance of subjective
oughts motivates us because they apply in light of what we take to be true. Follow-
ing Smith and Gibbard, I’ll assume that the subjective ought plays the guidance
and motivation role. This results in the following accessibility condition on the
subjective ought:
ACCESSIBILITY S subjectively ought to φ only if
(a) S is capable of being guided by that subjective ought – that is, S is capable
to deriving some internal prescription for action from that S subjectively
ought to φ,
(b) if S were to accept that S subjectively ought to φ, S would be motivated
to φ because the ought applies in light of what S takes to be true.
Together, these two requirements put an accessibility requirement on subjective
oughts. For it to be the case that an agent subjectively ought to do something, two
conditions must obtain: that principle must be accessible to the agent in that the
agent is able to try to follow it, and the agent would be motivated to try to follow
it if she were to accept that she ought to and her motivation is in part explicable
because the ought applies in light of what the agent takes to be true.
One might worry that the accessibility condition I’ve given here is still too strong.
Consider this subjective ought, for example:
Sandra, who is 5 years old, thinks that the chance of winning a dollar in the
lotto is over .5, and she thinks that having a dollar is more than twice as good
as having a quarter. So, she ought to choose the lotto ticket over the guaranteed
quarter.
In this case, as described, it seems that Sandra subjectively ought to choose the
ticket, even if Sandra is not in a position to have any notion of anything like the
expected value of the ticket, perhaps because she’s lacking the relevant concepts.
The worry would then be that because Sandra lacks the relevant concepts, she’s not
in a position to be guided by that directive to buy the ticket.
This worry, as stated, is not a worry for condition of ACCESSIBILITY given above.
All that ACCESSIBILITY requires is that Sandra be able to be guided by the directive
to buy the ticket and be motivated by accepting it. This doesn’t require that Sandra
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be able to reason herself into a position where she tell why she ought to buy the ticket.
All it requires is that she able to deduce some action that, by her own lights, helps
her conform her action to the directive. She need not have the concept EXPECTED
UTILITY to do that.
There is a nearby worry though. Consider an agent who starts out with a
incoherent collection of beliefs: Suppose Sandra, now an adult, is again offered the
lotto ticket for a dollar payoff or the quarter. Suppose that she believes the ticket
is .5 likely to payoff, that it’s more than two times better to have a dollar than to
have a quarter, and accepts the norms of standard rational decision theory. Suppose
further that Sandra does some quick (and mistaken) math and concludes that she
ought to take the quarter.
Even though Sandra believes that she subjectively ought to take the quarter, it
seems that Sandra really subjectively ought not take the quarter. This is incompatible
with ACCESSIBILITY because ACCESSIBILITY requires that were the agent to accept
that she subjectively ought not take the quarter, then she’d be motivated to refrain
from doing it because that ought applies in light of what she takes to be true. But,
Sandra takes it to be true that she ought to take the quarter. So, in light of what
Sandra takes to be true, Sandra ought to take the quarter. This is just an instance of
the trivial logical schema appealed to in note 17 above, IN-LIGHT-OF REPETITION:
For all P and Σ, if O(P) ∈ Σ, then in light of Σ, O(P), where O is the ‘ought’
operator.37 So, assuming that it can’t be the case that she both ought and ought not
take the quarter, the ‘ought’ that tells her to refrain from taking the quarter does not
apply in light of what Sandra takes to be true. Strictly speaking then, that Sandra
subjectively ought not take the quarter is precluded by the motivation aspect of
ACCESSIBILITY as it stands.
We think though that Sandra subjectively ought to give up on her belief that
she ought to take the quarter. Why is this? It’s because taking the ticket is required
by what Sandra is really committed to (namely, her beliefs about the likelihood of
37If Sandra is to be motivated by accepting that she subjectively ought not take the quarter because
it applies in light of what she takes to be true, then Sandra would have to be committed to a
contradictory collection of beliefs about what she ought to do (namely, take only the ticket and take
only the quarter). I’m assuming it’s possible to accept a contradictory collection of beliefs about
what one ought to do. We often do this. For example, I think I should treat each of my students
equally. This means that each of them should receive the same amount of time on the test. But Sunny
has a disability that warrants that he receive extra time. I also think that students with disabilities
ought to be accommodated. In doing so, I accept a contradictory collection of norms. That said, we
typically have ways of revising what we accept in these cases (but that doesn’t threaten my claim).
Notice also that this is strictly weaker than the much more controversial claim that there are real
ethical dilemmas. The latter claim looks much less plausible.
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winning and the relative values of the possible outcomes). Her belief that she ought
to take the quarter is the result of mistaken math, not her considered judgments.
So, to make sense of cases where agents have mistaken views about what they
subjectively ought to do or the more general case where agents are committed
to norms that are in tension with each other, we should revise the accessibility
requirement to WEAK ACCESSIBILITY:
WEAK ACCESSIBILITY S subjectively ought to φ only if
(a) S is capable of being guided by that subjective ought – that is, S is capable
to deriving some internal prescription for action from that S subjectively
ought to φ, and
(b) if S were to accept that S subjectively ought to φ, S would be motivated
to φ because the ought applies in light of what would be S’s considered
judgments about what is true.38
This is an accessibility constraint that any subjective ought must satisfy. Subjective
oughts must be able to guide the agents to whom they apply, and they’re able to
motivate the agents who accept them because they apply in light of the considered
judgments of the agent. I’ll show in the next section that rational agreement requir-
ing views that adopt Gibbard’s proposed solution to the puzzle about correct belief
cannot give an account of the subjective ought that satisfies WEAK ACCESSIBILITY.
2.4.5.2 The Disconnection Worry
I will show in this section that rational agreement requiring views that adopt
Gibbard’s solution to the puzzle of correct belief, which takes the subjective ought
to apply in light of the true norms, must deny WEAK ACCESSIBILITY. Showing that
these views must deny one of the conjuncts of WEAK ACCESSIBILITY is enough to
prove the claim, but I’ll show that the views must actually deny both of them.
First, consider my super honest cousin Jeb. Jeb thinks that it’s impermissible to
lie under any circumstances. Jeb accepts many of the other norms that we accept,
including normal epistemic norms, but he isn’t nearly as committed to those as
38To make sense of what would be S’s considered judgments about what ought to be true, we
can employ the notion of a reflective equilibrium, but this isn’t strictly speaking necessary. Also,
you might think that this condition should be that the ought applies in light of what should be S’s
considered judgments. This ‘should’ must be the subjective one, if we’re to retain the subjective
aspect of the accessibility constraint. That’s not a problem for the view being presented, since it isn’t
intended to be a reduction or analysis of the subjective ought.
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he is to the norm against lying. So, no amount of reasoning would make him
change his mind about lying.39 So by Jeb’s lights, the best thing to do if a known
killer is at his door seeking information about his friend is to not lie. Because Jeb
feels to strongly about lying and not nearly as strongly about any other norm (or
collection of norms), this is part of Jeb’s considered judgments about what the
correct norms are. Presumably though, if the killer is going to kill an innocent
person, then objectively speaking, Jeb ought to lie to the killer.
Now apply GIBBARD’S ANALYSIS to this objective ought: that Jeb objectively
ought to lie amounts to it being the case that were it that Jeb subjectively ought to
accept all that’s so, it would be the case that Jeb subjectively ought to lie. Notice
that given ACCESSIBILITY, it can’t be the case that Jeb actually subjectively ought to
lie. That’s because that subjective ought is incompatible with the motivation aspect
of the subjective ought role, that if S were to accept that S subjectively ought to φ, S
would be motivated to φ because the ought applies in light of what would be S’s
considered judgments about what is true. It’s part of Jeb’s considered judgments
that he subjectively ought not lie. So in light of his considered judgments, he
subjectively ought not lie. Were he to accept that he ought to lie, it would not
motivate him because it applies in light of his considered judgments. In fact, it
blatantly contradicts his considered judgments. By the subject’s lights, it can’t be
the case that he ought to lie, so it’s not the case that he subjectively ought to lie.
What then about the counterfactual where Jeb subjectively ought to accept
all that’s so? Recall that for Jeb to accept all that’s so, in the sense GIBBARD’S
ANALYSIS intends it, is for him to accept “a full and true factual description of [his]
circumstances” (2012, p. 83). That is, Jeb accepts all that’s so when he accepts all of
the non-normative facts that are true of him and his situation.40 If Jeb, our super
honest fellow, were to do this, it hardly seems he’d give up on his commitment
to honesty. Jeb, you’ll recall, is committed to not lying more than he’s attached to
39Really, it’s not that he wouldn’t change his mind. It’s that changing his mind doesn’t improve his
views by his own lights. So, he wouldn’t change his mind in a way that he would now approve of.
40One might think that the best way to interpret the antecedent of the conditional is as talking
about the possibility were one subjectively ought to believe all that’s so, including all of the normative
facts. Gibbard explicitly rules this out. But also, it might make objective oughts too easy: Suppose
that S subjectively ought to accept that she objectively ought to φ. That means that in light of what
is available to her, she ought to think that she objectively ought to φ. But if what is available to
her suggests thinking that she (objectively) ought to φ, it’s easy to imagine that what is available
to her would also suggest φ-ing. If so, then she subjectively ought to φ. So, it seems that if the
antecedent of GIBBARD’S ANALYSIS is supposed to include all information including facts about
what the subject objectively ought to do, then GIBBARD’S ANALYSIS would entail that many, if not
all, objective oughts come for free.
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anything else he believes. Surely, it would be a strange scenario, perhaps one in
which Jeb subjectively ought to believe things that aren’t suggested by his evidence.
But, it doesn’t look like a situation where Jeb would be required to change his
deep-seated beliefs about lying. So, were he to accept all of the non-normative facts,
it still seems that it’d be part of his considered judgments that he ought not lie.
Then, by the above reasoning again, it won’t be the case, even in this counterfactual
scenario that Jeb subjectively ought to lie. We see then that if WEAK ACCESSIBILITY
is true, GIBBARD’S ANALYSIS predicts the wrong results about Jeb. GIBBARD’S
ANALYSIS is incompatible with the motivational aspect of the subjective ought role.
The example of Jeb relies on there being agents who are deeply committed to
false normative claims. Jeb is deeply committed to not lying, in that his normative
commitment is stable in the sense of Egan (2007). He is deeply committed when
“no change that the believer would endorse as an improvement would lead them to
abandon it” (2007, p. 212).
According to the rational agreement requiring views, ideally rational agents
believe only true normative claims. Given this, advocates of rational agreement
requiring accounts have two options: they must either think that we can be deeply
committed to false normative claims or deny the possibility of agents like Jeb.
Denying the possibility of agents who would have false normative commitments
under any change that they would endorse as an improvement in their normative
attitudes would be rash, and Gibbard doesn’t do this.41 It is at least possible that
we may be deeply confused or committed in ways that simply don’t permit us to
overcome our normative mistakes merely by deliberation. So that leads the views
under consideration to deny that we can reach ideal rationality by improvements
we would deem to be improvements in our own attitudes.
Denying that we can reach ideal rationality just by changes in our attitudes
that we would deem to be improvements may not seem like such a bad option.
This leaves the view saying that the subjective ought really applies (and would be
accessible to) the ideally rational agents, not us mere mortals. But, this move makes
the subjective ought too detached from the agent.
In order to be guiding and motivating, subjective oughts must be applicable
in light of what the agent takes to be the case.42 But if an advocate of a rational
agreement requiring view accepts GIBBARD’S ANALYSIS to solve the puzzle of
41See footnote 15 for a discussion of in what sense Gibbard accepts this.
42I take Gibbard to characterize the subjective ought like that as well. Gibbard says, “The basic
normative precepts that ground a subjective ought are subjectively applicable – applicable in light of
information the agent has” (2012, p. 76).
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correct belief, she is forced to think that subjective oughts are really only subjectively
applicable to the ideally rational versions of the agents to whom they apply, and
the ideally rational versions of agents may be markedly inaccessible to the agent
in that the idealized agent wouldn’t even be an improvement of the agent by the
agent’s lights.
The marked inaccessibility of ideally rational agents on this view is particularly
stark in the case where actual agents lack the concepts involved in the subjective
ought claims. Take the case of Luke, who has spent his whole life in the detached
village of Peaceville. Peaceville has never had any criminal activity, so that possi-
bility rarely, if ever, crosses the residents’ minds. Luke, in fact, doesn’t even have
the concept CRIMINAL, so he can’t even conceive of the idea.43 On Tuesday, Luke
is crossing the street when he sees John breaking the window of the local jeweller
and quickly putting all of the merchandise into a bag. Of course, John is criminally
robbing the jeweller. Suppose that the concept CRIMINAL is a thick concept consist-
ing of the non-normative quality of violating the law and the normative quality of
breaking the law being wrong.44 Luke does not see it as a criminal matter though,
because Luke doesn’t have the requisite concepts.
In the scenario under consideration, we can imagine that it is the case that Luke
ought to accept a full non-normative picture of how things are, at least with regard
to the robbery. Luke has the relevant perceptual justification for believing all of the
non-normative facts about the robbery.
Suppose now that Luke finds himself as the prosecuting lawyer at the trial
for John, still lacking the concept CRIMINAL. Objectively speaking, the best thing
for Luke to do is to convince the judge that John has committed a criminal act.
So, according to the solution under consideration, were it that Luke subjectively
ought to accept a full non-normative picture of how things are, it would be the
case that Luke subjectively ought to convince the judge that John has committed
a criminal act. But here, it is the case that Luke subjectively ought to accept a full
non-normative picture of how things are. Hence, according to the solution, Luke
subjectively ought to convince the judge that John has committed a criminal act,
even though he doesn’t even have the concept CRIMINAL.
But without the concept CRIMINAL, it doesn’t seem that Luke could even try
43I’m assuming here that concepts are the constituents of thoughts. If one lacks a concept of
something, then she cannot think about it. I’m also assuming, against views like Fodor (1975), that
we can lack concepts. If I am wrong that we can lack concepts, this example can be reformulated
into a case where Luke fails to ever apply the concept.
44For discussion of this, see Elgin (2005, p. 343).
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to convince the judge of this.45 WEAK ACCESSIBILITY requires that subjective
oughts be able to guide the agent, in that if S subjectively ought to φ only if S is
capable to deriving some internal prescription for action from that S subjectively
ought to φ. In this case, Luke cannot derive such a prescription for action. Luke
cannot even think the thought that he ought to convince the judge that John is has
committed a criminal act, so how could he possibly derive a prescription for action
from it? This combination of views requires that subjective oughts violate WEAK
ACCESSIBILITY, so subjective oughts on this picture are too disconnected from the
subjective situation of the agents to whom they apply.46
One might object that my WEAK ACCESSIBILITY is too strong. In the case of Jeb,
we see that WEAK ACCESSIBILITY entails that if an agent is deeply committed to
it being the case that she subjectively ought to φ, then it can’t be the case that she
subjectively ought not φ. Roughly, this says that agents can’t be deeply mistaken
about what they subjectively ought to do. If that’s right, then one might object that
WEAK ACCESSIBILITY entails that subjective ought claims aren’t normative. When I
say that Jeb subjectively ought not lie, it seems that I’m just reporting something
about Jeb’s mental state, namely his deep commitment to not lying; I’m not making
45One might think that the actions prescribed by ought claims can always be formulated in purely
non-normative terms. This might avoid my criticism as the antecedent of the conditional of the
solution would require the the agent have the relevant conceptual scheme. For example, in this
case, one might say that what Luke really subjectively ought to do is make the sounds and arm
movements required to get the judge to accept the sentence in his own language that means that
John is a criminal. Plausibly, John could conceptualize this if he subjectively ought to accept a full
non-normative account of how things are since that account will include facts about the judge’s
mental states and how they affect whether John is punished by the state. I reject this move though,
and here’s why: Even though making the sounds and arm movements required to get the judge
to accept some sentence actually corresponds to convincing the judge that John is a criminal, these
two things have different modal profiles. The action that John ought to do is convince the judge
that John is a criminal, even in possible worlds where this doesn’t line up with the non-normative
characterization.
46The subjective ought is so detached from subjective situations on these accounts, that it can
advise agents to ignore their own considered judgments about facts in light of their evidence. Take a
case analogous to Jeb’s above: If Raul evaluates his evidence as indicating that P is mostly likely,
even if he would maintain this as a considered judgment, the subjective ought of these accounts
would permit that Raul subjectively ought to judge that P is false. This would happen when Raul is
deeply committed to non-optimal epistemic principles, such as sharing information with as many
colleagues as possible. (See Zollman (2007), where he shows some surprising results about what
kinds of communication networks best promote our epistemic goals.) It seems reasonable to think
that when Raul is mistaken about how to respond to his evidence, then he objectively ought to judge
it differently than he would think he should. But if Raul is committed to thinking that P is supported
by his evidence because he is deeply committed to sharing information with colleagues, it’s difficult
to imagine that Raul subjectively ought not think that P. This certainly flies in the face of the spirit
of subjectivist partial belief views, such as de Finetti (1937) and Jeffrey (1983). Gibbard also appears
to think that questions about how to respond to one’s evidence are intended to be handled by the
subjective ought and highly dependent on the subject’s views in this way (2012, p. 80-82).
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a normative claim, the objector claims.47 Given WEAK ACCESSIBILITY, the objection
is that claims about what an agent subjectively ought to do merely report what the
agent is deeply committed to, not what the agent ought, in any normative sense, to
do.
In one respect, the objector is right: in some cases, the subjective ought is
restricted by the non-normative, such as when the agent is deeply committed to a
claim about what she subjectively ought to do. In response to the worry though,
notice that there being some non-normative way of picking out some instances
of the property that ‘subjective ought’ picks out isn’t threatening to the view that
the subjective ought is normative. What would be more threatening is if WEAK
ACCESSIBILITY entailed that the subjective ought means something about the agent’s
mental states. Of course, this is false, for two reasons. First, WEAK ACCESSIBILITY
doesn’t make any claims about what the subjective ought means; it merely gives
a necessary condition for its application. Second, even if WEAK ACCESSIBILITY
were a claim about meaning, it would not be even close to complete. Most of the
time, we have either no views or at most partial views about what we subjectively
ought to do. Even then, we’re typically more committed to other norms (cast in
non-subjective terms) that can override our subjective ought beliefs when we fully
consider our commitments. If we’ve promised to pick up the kids from school
on time and finish the project at work on time, when we come to realize that
there’s not enough time to do both, we’re in general more deeply committed to our
non-normative beliefs than we are to views about what we ought to do.48 Cases
where an agent’s considered commitments deliver judgments about what to do are
rare. So, in general, when the subjective ought is used to prescribe what an agent
ought to do, its being normative is not threatened by the requirements of WEAK
47A possible line of response to this worry (which I accept) is inspired by Shah (2003) and Evans
and Shah (2010). Shah argues that facts about what an agent believes are normative facts. Evans and
Shah (2010) consider the possibility that all mental states are similarly normative. If that’s right, then
making a claim about an agent’s mental state is making a normative judgment. So, the purportedly
non-normative subjective ought facts are genuinely normative even when they are fixed by the facts
about the agent’s mental states because those facts are normative too. Gibbard (2012) rejects the
second solution because he thinks it gives an inaccurate account of belief. Gibbard also takes his
explanatory project in the chapter to hinge on explaining belief in terms of sentence acceptance, a
non-normative notion. But this requirement of the project assumes that the objective ought can be
explained in terms of the subjective ought. The arguments above show that there is no acceptable
view of the normative compatible with Gibbard’s way of explaining the objective ought in terms of
the subjective ought. So, the above considerations cast doubt on the proposed explanation.
48I’m assuming here that we’re also committed to some norms about how to resolve conflicts or
seek advice. This isn’t strictly speaking necessary though. Any case where the subject’s views don’t
deliver a considered judgments about what the subject subjectively ought to do will be sufficient.
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ACCESSIBILITY.
Rational agreement requiring accounts that employ Gibbard’s solution to the
puzzle of correct belief must make the subjective ought so markedly disconnected
from the subjective situation of the agent that it can’t motivate or guide the agent,
so it can’t play the role we want the subjective ought to play. The subjective ought,
on these views, violates both conjuncts of WEAK ACCESSIBILITY as shown with the
cases of Jeb and Luke. Since any account of normative epistemology must either be
rational disagreement permitting or rational agreement requiring, we see that no
way of adopting Gibbard’s solution is acceptable. The first class is left without an
explanation of the asymmetry it must posit in the subjective ought, and what the
second class calls ‘the subjective ought’ can hardly be considered subjective. Since
no epistemology of the normative can nicely account for the subjective ought and
adopt Gibbard’s solution to the puzzle of correct belief, we ought to reject Gibbard’s
solution.
2.5 Solving the Puzzle
Here again is the puzzle about correct belief that motivated GIBBARD’S ANALYSIS:
(1) Snow is white.
(2) Sophia believes that snow is white.
∴ (3) Sophia’s belief that snow is white is correct.
The autonomy of ethics is supposed to block valid inferences of a normative claims
from non-normative premises. The puzzle is to show explain how this argument can
be valid without denying the autonomy of ethics. A benefit of Gibbard’s approach
to the puzzle was that it aimed to save the appearances: it tried to maintain both
the validity of the argument and the normativity of the conclusion while squaring
it with the autonomy of ethics. Unfortunately, we ought to reject Gibbard’s solution
for the reasons given above.
In place of Gibbard’s solution, I propose a different trivial conclusion response.
My explanation the puzzle employs the insight of Shah (2003), that the concept
BELIEF is normative. On this view, it’s a conceptual truth that a belief that P is
correct if P. Using this conceptual truth, the puzzle can be explained easily. The
autonomy of ethics is not violated because the argument contains a normative
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premise, the one that ascribes belief to Sophia.49
In the Chapter III, I argue for NORMATIVE TRUTH REGULATION:
NORMATIVE TRUTH REGULATION It’s a conceptual truth about belief that if some
attitude is a belief that P, one ought, other things being equal, have that
attitude if and only if P.
If we take ‘correct’ in this context as normative and think of the correct belief as the
belief that one ought to have, then my claim nicely folds into Shah’s.50 So, with the
argument I provide in the next chapter, we have the resources needed to explain
the puzzle. It’s part of the very idea of belief that beliefs ought to be true. So, when
we ascribe Sophia the belief that snow is white, we’re making a normative claim.
The autonomy of ethics is not violated because the argument contains a normative
premise.
49Recall that my formulation of the puzzle differs slightly from Gibbard’s. Gibbard’s version does
not contain a normative premise, but the conclusion is trivial given the premises. These kinds of
arguments don’t threaten the autonomy of ethics in the same way that it isn’t threatened by Prior’s
(1960a) examples. Given the premise that snow is white, then it falls out as trivial that Sophia’s belief
that snow is white is correct due to the meaning of ‘belief’.
50Treating ‘correct’ in this way is done by Shah and Gibbard as well. The idea is that, following




Why Believe the Truth
ABSTRACT
Clifford (1877) claims that we have a moral obligation to accord our
beliefs with our evidence. What to believe, at least about mundane
topics, doesn’t seem like a moral issue, though. What we ought to
believe also doesn’t seem to be determined by our desires. But, what
else could ground facts about what we ought to believe? I offer a new
account of the truth norm, which can play this role. At the heart of the
account is the idea that the concept BELIEF is normative. It’s a conceptual
truth, I claim, that other things being equal, beliefs ought to be true. In
support of this claim, I show how it can give a compelling explanation of
an aspect of knowledge ascriptions that is otherwise difficult to explain.
I then claim that being an agent requires being subject to this norm of
belief. This results in a non-moral, distinctly doxastic, account of why we
ought to believe the truth. My conclusion is that asking why we ought
to believe the truth is like asking why a bachelor must be unmarried:
the answer is contained in the ideas that make up the question.
William K. Clifford starts out “The Ethics of Belief” (1877) with the example of
the shipowner:
A shipowner was about to send to sea an emigrant-ship. He knew
that she was old, and not overwell built at the first; that she had seen
many seas and climes, and often had needed repairs. Doubts had been
suggested to him that possibly she was not seaworthy. These doubts
preyed upon his mind, and made him unhappy; he thought that perhaps
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he ought to have her thoroughly overhauled and refitted, even though
this should put him at great expense. Before the ship sailed, however,
he succeeded in overcoming these melancholy reflections. He said to
himself that she had gone safely through so many voyages and weath-
ered so many storms that it was idle to suppose she would not come
safely home from this trip also. He would put his trust in Providence,
which could hardly fail to protect all these unhappy families that were
leaving their fatherland to seek for better times elsewhere. He would
dismiss from his mind all ungenerous suspicions about the honesty of
builders and contractors. In such ways he acquired a sincere and com-
fortable conviction that his vessel was thoroughly safe and seaworthy;
he watched her departure with a light heart, and benevolent wishes for
the success of the exiles in their strange new home that was to be; and
he got his insurance-money when she went down in mid-ocean and told
no tales.
Clifford uses this kind of example to defend the principle that “it is wrong
always, everywhere, and for anyone, to believe anything upon insufficient evidence.”
Importantly, Clifford’s principle is supposed to be a moral one. We’re morally
obliged to believe only with sufficient evidence, according to Clifford, since “it is
not possible so to sever the belief from the action it suggests as to condemn the one
without condemning the other.” Clifford also takes his dictum to hold for all beliefs,
since they all have “some influence upon the actions of him who holds it.”
The norm that Clifford endorses is an epistemic norm in that it gives agents
accessible instructions about what to believe. In contrast, William James commands
us to “Believe truth! Shun error!” (1979, p. 24). Those commands set the doxastic
standard – a standard that agents may not be in a position to immediately satisfy.
Many authors take there to be a natural connection between James’s doxastic
standard and epistemic norms like Clifford’s. The doxastic standard sets the goal
for belief while epistemic norms tell us how to reach it.1 Following that line, we’d
expect that if we have a moral obligation to believe only with sufficient evidence,
it’s because we have a moral obligation to believe the truth.
In the example above, the shipowner not proportioning his beliefs to his evidence
does have morally grave consequences, but it’s odd to think that Clifford’s norm is
a moral one. To borrow an example from Tom Kelly (2003, p. 262), if before you’ve
seen the newly-released film, your colleague blurts out that the main character dies
1See Owens (2003, p. 283) for a discussion of the relationship between the two types of norms.
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at the end, you should believe her. But, it’s hard to think that you have a particularly
moral duty to believe her, as Clifford would predict. If you ignore her testimony,
you’ve done something wrong, but you hardly seem unethical.2
One might try to replace Clifford’s appeal to the moral with an appeal to the
pragmatic: perhaps we ought to accord our belief to the evidence because doing so
best promotes our goals. But this kind of account won’t work either. Sometimes
we have beliefs about things that are completely independent of our goals, like
my belief about what my phone number was 15 years ago. We are also subject
to epistemic norms even when they conflict with our goals. Kelly’s (2003, p. 262)
movie example shows this too: even if you have the goal of not finding out the
ending to the movie so you can enjoy it when you see it, you must apportion your
belief to the evidence after your colleague blurts out the ending. So a pragmatic
account of these norms, like Clifford’s moral story, doesn’t look sufficiently general
either.
My goal here is to offer an account of why we ought to believe the truth that
doesn’t treat it as a moral or pragmatic issue. The account proceeds in two steps:
First, I endorse a position advanced by Shah (2003) that the concept of belief is
normative. I offer new support for the normativity claim by showing that it offers
a compelling explanation of an aspect of knowledge attributions that is otherwise
difficult to account for. Second, I show that being an agent requires being subject
to the norms of belief. Since the norm “Believe the truth” is meant to apply to all
and only agents, that gives us a non-moral, distinctly doxastic, account of why we
ought to believe the truth. My conclusion is that asking why we ought to believe
the truth is like asking why a bachelor must be unmarried: the answer is contained
in the ideas that make up the question.
Before beginning, a note about the explanandum: When we ask ‘why ought
we φ?’ there are two things we might be asking. We might want an explanation
of why we ought, all things considered, to φ, or we might want an explanation of
why we ought, other things being equal, to φ.3 When it comes to why we ought to
2 Clifford seems to be led to think that the constraint is a moral one because having beliefs not
grounded in evidence can have morally grave effects, e.g. the destruction of a country. Of course,
having beliefs not grounded in evidence can also have morally beneficial effects. A prisoner might,
for example, adopt religious beliefs without evidence and do many more good things than he would
have otherwise. So, it seems that if the promotion of moral action is the end for which we ought to
believe, Clifford’s conclusion is unwarranted.
3The same distinction can be put in terms of pro tanto and all things considered reasons. I avoid
talk of reasons here because, in the doxastic realm, ‘reasons’ talk often gets conflated with ‘evidence’
talk in a way that will be unhelpful to this discussion.
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believe the truth, some claim we have only an other-things-being-equal obligation
to do so. I’ll avoid that dispute here. In general, what we ought to do all things
considered is fixed by what we ought to do other things being equal. Here I’ll offer
an explanation of the more foundational notion – why we ought, other things being
equal, to believe the truth.4 Proponents of an all-things-considered obligation to
believe the truth can then build their explanation out of mine.
3.1 Beliefs Ought to be True
The account I’ll give takes the concept BELIEF to be normative. The idea is often put
like this: it’s a conceptual truth that a belief that P is correct if and only if P.5 It’s
important that the sense of ‘correct’ being used is normative, like in ‘correct action.’
This normative sense is distinguished from the merely descriptive deflationary
sense of the term, where it means the same as ‘true’, as in ‘correct supposition’.
Following Ewing (1939), we can say that the correct belief, on the normative view, is
the belief we ought to have, for some sense of ‘ought.’
It is also important to distinguish the normativity claim from the ambiguous
claim that belief aims at the truth. There are two senses in which belief might aim at
the truth. According to the descriptive sense, belief is (generally) produced, revised,
and destroyed by truth-conducive processes. The normative sense of ‘aiming at the
truth’ is different: it says that beliefs ought to be true (independently of whether
they are). Velleman (2000, p. 17) endorses both senses, but the account I give here
will only require the normative version, which I’ll defend as a conceptual truth:
NORMATIVE TRUTH REGULATION It’s a conceptual truth about belief that if some
attitude is a belief that P, one ought, other things being equal, have that
4As such, in the following explanation, I’ll use ‘ought’ without restriction to mean the same as
‘ought, others things being equal.’
5For example, see Shah (2003), Wedgwood (2002), and Shah and Velleman (2005). In the first
paper, Shah only advocates for the ‘only if’ direction of this claim. In the later paper, the biconditional
is advanced.
Along with each of these authors, I treat the concept BELIEF as normative because it generates
a normative conceptual truth. Some authors, including the literature inspired by Quine (1951),
Williamson (2003), and Williamson (2007, ch. 4), suspect that there are no conceptual truths. It’s
possible to endorse a normative account of BELIEF without thinking this requires it being a conceptual
truth, but that story will not fit with the explanation I give below. In order to explain the phenomenon
I discuss below, that belief is correct when true must be accessible to all knowledge attributers. I
flesh out this accessibility in terms of it being a conceptual truth about belief. One option here is to
treat conceptual truths as rationally accessible to agents who posses the concepts. As Williamson
(2003, p. 291) notes, this kind of conception of conceptual truth avoids his criticisms there, and it also
appears to avoid his attacks in Williamson (2007, ch. 4), as noted by Wedgwood (2007b, p. 18-21),
which responds to earlier versions of those arguments in Williamson (2006).
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attitude if and only if P.
There is a lot of disagreement in the literature about what is required for something
to be a conceptual truth (see note 5). Here I will assume that if it is a conceptual truth
about something x that everything that is an x has some feature, then nothing counts
as an x unless it has that feature. So, in this case, NORMATIVE TRUTH REGULATION
requires that if an attitude counts as a belief that P, then it is the sort of thing one
ought to have if and only if P. Below, I will paraphrase this requirement with the
phrase ‘belief ought to be true’. Further, I will assume that conceptual truths are
accessible, in some sense, to those who have the concept, so that concept holders
only properly apply the concept to things that have the relevant feature.6
Notice that NORMATIVE TRUTH REGULATION is distinct from claims about
norms of justified or rational belief. If a reliabilist view of justification is right, then
in order to have justified beliefs, one’s beliefs must be formed by a reliable process.
Nonetheless, a belief may satisfy the proposed norm of mere belief (by being true)
without being reliably formed. NORMATIVE TRUTH REGULATION is about a norm
that governs belief itself, not justified or rational belief.7
Shah (2003) and Shah and Velleman (2005) defend a version of NORMATIVE
TRUTH REGULATION. They argue that the concept BELIEF being normative in this
way best explains the phenomenon of transparency, that “when asking oneself
whether to believe that p, [one must] immediately recognize that this question is
settled by, and only by, answering the question whether p is true” (2003, p. 447).
Steglich-Petersen (2006) argues that a more sophisticated non-normative account
of BELIEF can explain transparency equally well.8 So, while I accept the argument
from Shah and Velleman, I’ll provide some new support for NORMATIVE TRUTH
REGULATION.
3.1.1 New Support for the Normativity of Belief
John Greco (2003) argues that knowledge attributions function to give credit to the
subject for their true belief. A lucky gambler may claim that she knew that her horse
would win while her friend denies it. When they’re fighting about the knowledge
6As I mention in note 5, in light of the arguments from Williamson regarding epistemic con-
ceptions of conceptual truth, it might make sense to flesh out this kind of accessibility as rational
accessibility, which is compatible with the conditions given here.
7Notice that this leaves open the possibility that the norms of belief spring from a deeper norm
that all belief ought to be justified. My claim is merely that they are conceptually distinct.
8Shah and Velleman’s argument also requires that transparency necessarily obtains. Its necessity
isn’t entirely obvious though, as Chappell (2005) points out.
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attribution, what they seem to be disagreeing about is whether the gambler is due
credit for her true belief that the horse would win. We also give credit to students
(sometimes in two senses) for their true beliefs when they know the right answer
to a question. If we discover that a student is not due credit for his true belief,
perhaps because he cheated, we’d say he didn’t know the answer in the first place.
What seems to be going on here, as Greco claims, is that our knowledge attributions
convey that the subject is due credit for his or her true belief. I’ll call this ‘the
credit-giving phenomenon.’ Greco argues that it can explain both the lottery and
Gettier problems. In Gettier cases, subjects have true belief only by accident, so
they are not due the credit they would receive from a knowledge attribution, Greco
claims. The lottery problem is treated similarly.
Importantly, the the credit-giving phenomenon is distinct from the more con-
troversial claims of virtue epistemologists, who claim that knowledge is, at least
in part, a kind of credit-worthy state, like Zagzebski (1996), Sosa (2007), and Greco
(2009). One may accept that this phenomenon obtains while still offering a tradi-
tional justified, true belief account of knowledge, for example, by merely claiming
that credit-worthiness is entailed by having knowledge.
Suppose for a moment that Greco is right and that we do use knowledge as-
criptions to give credit for true belief, at least in some important cases. Notice that
giving credit for something requires having a positive evaluation of it. If I give you
credit for being well-read in metaethics, I must think that there is something good
about your being so well-read. On a first pass, this is the difference between giving
you credit for it and blaming you for it: were I to think that your being well-read was
negative, I would blame you for it instead.9 Admittedly, some cases are tough to
capture in this framework: We can credit Hitler for being the most ruthless dictator
in history. Below, I argue that these outlier cases can be made sense of neatly, so for
now, let’s suppose that we give credit for something only if we view it in a positive
light.10
9There is another sense of ‘credit’ that we use to attribute casual responsibility to people that
doesn’t require the positive spin. For example, I can credit an error in baseball without taking an
error to be positive. The kind of credit in play in the phenomenon to be explained isn’t this kind
though, since of course, the gambler’s true belief was causally his own.
10I’m being purposefully vague about what exactly this positive normative perspective is. One
might flesh it out as viewing the thing as good, or at least having a complicated good-based attitude
toward the thing, as Moore (1903, §1-2) would be inclined to do. Others might take the attitude to be
one of viewing it as correct (right, positive), without reducing correctness (rightness, positiveness)
to some kind of goodness. All I require here is that it’s a positive normative assessment. Greco (2003,
p. 121) takes being deserving of credit to require that the object have some kind of value, and he
attributes this account to a natural widening of a view he attributes to Joel Feinberg (see Greco’s fn
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So, given our supposition that we use knowledge ascriptions to give credit for
true belief, we must also positively assess true belief when we say that someone
knows. This is the weaker phenomenon of POSITIVE EVALUATION OF TRUE BELIEF:
POSITIVE EVALUATION OF TRUE BELIEF When we attribute knowledge, we posi-
tively evaluate the subject’s true belief.11
POSITIVE EVALUATION OF TRUE BELIEF is a weaker phenomenon than Greco’s credit-
giving phenomenon in that one can accept that POSITIVE EVALUATION OF TRUE
BELIEF occurs without thinking that we give credit to subjects for their true belief
when we say that they know. In fact, advocates of many accounts of knowledge
very different from Greco’s will also expect POSITIVE EVALUATION OF TRUE BELIEF.
Consider an account of knowledge that takes knowledge to be safely true be-
lief, inspired by the kinds of views discussed by Williamson (2000) and Pritchard
(2007).12 The key idea of this kind of account is that knowledge is non-lucky true
belief. So, they will hold that someone knows that P when their belief is true and
free from error in all nearby possible scenarios.13
Intuitively, it seems like thinking of a mental state as knowledge requires taking
it to deserve a kind of positive evaluation not due to mere true opinion. How might
an advocate of the safe-true-belief account of knowledge explain this? A natural
move here would be to appeal to the goodness of safety. The safety of the mental
state (partially) adds the positive evaluation due to knowledge states that is not
due to mere true opinion, the advocate would say.
Roughly, this is right, I think. Having a safely true belief is better than having
a mere true belief, in the same kind of way that having knowledge is better than
having mere true opinion. The betterness added by safety can’t be due to the safety
itself though, since safety by itself seems to be evaluatively neutral: Tripping a
14). My partial account of these positive judgments will be compatible with many ways of telling
the whole story.
11There is a de dicto and a de re reading of this statement of the claim, but I intend to use only the
de dicto reading, that we give credit for the true belief as true belief. This reading is supported by the
credit-giving phenomenon, since credit-giving is intensional.
12Williamson (2000, ch. 4-7) spends a lot of a time discussing a (non-reductive) understanding of
knowledge as requiring safely true belief. Williamson doesn’t claim that this account is complete,
so there may be other conditions necessary for knowledge. Williamson also doesn’t offer any
contenders here though, so the view is at least worth considering as complete. See Goldman (2010)
for more discussion of this view. Pritchard (2007) also does not take safe true belief to be sufficient
for knowledge, but he does take safety to be the core of a proper account of knowledge.
13This is an intentional simplification of the views actually on offer here. It will be easy to see why
an advocate of this simplified view would expect POSITIVE EVALUATION OF TRUE BELIEF, and the
main thread will carry over to the more sophisticated views.
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friend while running a race is bad, for example, but safely, i.e. non-accidentally,
tripping a friend is worse. Safety, then, isn’t always a good thing. It seems to act
like an evaluative magnifier: safely doing well is better than merely doing it, but
safely doing badly is worse.
Once we see that safety acts like an evaluative magnifier, the advocate of the
safe-true-belief account of knowledge needs a new story about why thinking of
a mental state as knowledge is to think it deserves a positive evaluation not due
to mere true belief. The addition of safety to true belief magnifies the positive
evaluation due to true belief, so while true belief is due some positive evaluation,
knowledge is due strictly more.
Notice though that in giving this account, the advocate of this account must
admit POSITIVE EVALUATION OF TRUE BELIEF. In order for safety to magnify the
positive evaluation due to true belief in the way required to make sense of our
special evaluation of knowledge, the true belief must be taken to be positively
evaluable in the first place.
One might worry that the story I’ve given here about the safe-true-belief account
of knowledge being committed to POSITIVE EVALUATION OF TRUE BELIEF is peculiar
because it relies on there not being some fourth aspect of knowledge that could be
responsible for the distinct positive evaluation due to knowledge that’s not due
to mere true opinion. So, for example, an account of knowledge that takes it to be
justified, safely true belief may appear not to be committed to the phenomenon
occurring, since it could appeal to a distinctive value of justification.
Strictly speaking, this worry is correct; if the positive evaluation that’s associated
with knowledge is totally due to our positive evaluation of justification, in the
example account, then its advocate need not be committed to POSITIVE EVALUATION
OF TRUE BELIEF. She could just think that we can explain our positive evaluation of
knowledge in terms of our evaluation of justification. This seems like an implausible
claim though, and our exploration of the safe-true-belief account brings this out:
all that’s required to be committed to POSITIVE EVALUATION OF TRUE BELIEF is
that we think that our positive evaluation of knowledge is in part derivative on our
taking true belief to be positive. But of course knowledge attributors think that the
value they ascribe to the knower is partially due to their true belief being valuable.
So, thinking that there’s a fourth aspect of knowledge could allow an account to
escape thinking that POSITIVE EVALUATION OF TRUE BELIEF obtains but only at the
cost of losing the ability to explain our positive evaluation of knowledge in terms
of a positive evaluation of true belief at all. So any plausible story about knowledge
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attributions seems like it should be committed to POSITIVE EVALUATION OF TRUE
BELIEF:
POSITIVE EVALUATION OF TRUE BELIEF When we attribute knowledge, we posi-
tively evaluate the subject’s true belief.
Here, I’ll assume POSITIVE EVALUATION OF TRUE BELIEF and show that NORMATIVE
TRUTH REGULATION, the claim that BELIEF is a normative concept, best explains
this phenomenon.
3.1.1.1 Explaining the Positive Evaluation of True Belief
Knowledge attributors positively evaluate the subject’s true belief when they at-
tribute knowledge. Any good account of this phenomenon must explain two aspects
of it: it must explain in virtue of what knowledge attributors take true belief to be
positive. Is it true belief’s guidance value? Or, maybe, is true belief intrinsically
positive? I’ll call this the “metaphysical explanandum.” Any good account of the
phenomenon must also explain how knowledge attributors are in a position to be
aware of true belief being positive. Even if true belief is valuable for it’s ability to
guide us, for example, how do knowledge attributors know that, especially in cases
of abstract or esoteric true belief? This is the “epistemological explanandum.” I’ll
argue here that taking BELIEF to be a normative concept best explains both of these
explananda.
To see this, start by dividing the possible explanations of the phenomenon by
how they respond to the metaphysical explanandum. If true belief deserves a posi-
tive evaluation, that positive evaluation must be due to something either intrinsic
or extrinsic to true belief. I’ll claim that just taking true belief to be extrinsically
positive doesn’t give an adequate explanation of the epistemological explanandum.
Taking true belief to be intrinsically positive but not as a conceptual matter is subject
to the same worry. That it’s a conceptual truth that other things being equal, beliefs
ought to be true offers the most plausible explanation of the phenomenon.
Many possible accounts of POSITIVE EVALUATION OF TRUE BELIEF take true
belief to be positive merely in virtue of its relationship to something else. True belief
might be good, for example, insomuch as it has guidance value, the ability to help us
complete our projects. Certainly, for example, true beliefs about the location of the
cookie jar will help the cookie monster in his quest.
But, POSITIVE EVALUATION OF TRUE BELIEF can’t be explained solely in terms
of true belief having guidance value. If it were, we’d expect knowledge attributors
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to take true belief to have guidance value at least most of the time. It’s hard to think
we usually do this. As Goldman (1999, p. 3) points out, “The dinosaur extinction
fascinates us, although knowing its cause would have no material impact on our
lives.” Similarly, it’s hard to see how a set theorist’s knowledge about transfinite
ordinals or the librarian’s knowledge of the first word of the 171st page of Ulysses is
guiding. Of course, one might be able to contrive strange situations in which these
esoteric bits of knowledge might guide us, but generally, we don’t think of these
knowledge contents as having guidance value.14 Knowledge attributors simply
don’t need to take a subject’s true belief to be guiding to ascribe knowledge. So,
that knowledge attributors positively assess true belief because we take it to have
guidance value seems implausible.
In trying to locate the source of epistemic normativity in our desires, Hilary
Kornblith (1993) gives a sophisticated argument to the conclusion that true belief
is universally instrumentally valuable for the achievement of goals. The value of
true belief, on this account, is derived from the value we place in satisfying our
goals.15 Following this line, we might expect that we could explain the knowledge
attributor’s positive assessment of true belief in terms of its universal instrumental
value.
Kornblith’s account, even if it is right, doesn’t fully explain how knowledge
attributors would positively assess true belief though. As I mentioned above, in
order to explain POSITIVE EVALUATION OF TRUE BELIEF, we need more than just an
account of what true belief is taken to be positive for. We also need an explanation
of how knowledge attributors might be in a position to assess true belief as positive
in the way described. This is the demand of the epistemological explanandum.
If knowledge attributors don’t know about true belief being universally instru-
mentally valuable as Kornblith claims, even if it is valuable as such, knowledge
attributors wouldn’t view it that way. Kornblith’s account doesn’t naturally lend
itself to an account of this, the epistemological explanandum.
One might think that Kornblith’s account could be extended to answer the
epistemological explanandum; it would say that knowledge attributors view true
beliefs as universally instrumentally valuable. But, this seems implausible. Consider
again the knowledge attributions about transfinite cardinals. It’s hard to imagine
14For example, knowledge about transfinite cardinals might be guiding in some very odd betting
situations. We don’t typically attribute knowledge of advanced mathematics with this kind of
guidance value in mind though.
15Kornblith takes one of the neat features of his argument to be that true belief turns out to be
instrumentally valuable for the achievement of our goals, regardless of what those goals are.
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that we give the set theorist credit for his true belief because we take it to be
pragmatically valuable (even if it is valuable in that way).16 So, even if Kornblith’s
account is right about the value of true belief, the account doesn’t adequately
explain POSITIVE EVALUATION OF TRUE BELIEF.
We can generalize the worry above to most accounts of POSITIVE EVALUATION
OF TRUE BELIEF that take the positive assessment of true belief to be about true
belief’s relationship to something else: Let e an extrinsic end, like guidance value,
for which true belief is purportedly positively assessed by knowledge attributors.
In general, if it’s possible for there to be someone who lacks a concept of e and still
attributes knowledge, that knowledge attributor can’t positively assess true belief
because of its relation to e when she attributes knowledge, since she can’t even think
thoughts of e. For many things e extrinsic to true belief, it seems possible for there to
be such a knowledge attributor. For example, Albert is a possible brain in a vat who
can only think thoughts about set theory and knowledge. Albert, it seems, should
be able to attribute knowledge of a mathematical theorem to himself even if he lacks
concepts required to think about guidance value. So, true belief’s relationship to
guidance value can’t be for what knowledge attributors positively assess true belief.
This model is easily generalizable into an argument schema that can be used to
show against most accounts of POSITIVE EVALUATION OF TRUE BELIEF that attempt
to explain the metaphysical explanandum in terms of something extrinsic to true
belief.
Of course, there are some possible accounts of the phenomenon in terms of
something extrinsic to true belief that aren’t subject to the kind of argument given.
If an account of the phenomenon can explain the positive evaluation in terms of true
belief being viewed as positive in virtue of its relationship to something extrinsic,
the end has to be something that knowledge attributors must have a concept of.
Such accounts include those that take justification or knowledge to be in virtue of
what true belief is positively evaluated. I’ll argue later that these accounts are also
lacking. Before that though, let’s consider accounts that try to explain POSITIVE
EVALUATION OF TRUE BELIEF in terms of true belief being intrinsically positive.
Goldman, among many others, takes it that “true belief is the ultimate value
in the epistemic sphere” (2002, p. 53). This view, veritism, takes true belief to be
valuable for its own sake.17 It might seem well-suited to explain how knowledge
16Again here we can strengthen the case by considering a knower whose intentions are wholly
evil, like the terrorist case above. There, a knowledge attributor wouldn’t positively assess true
belief for being instrumentally valuable to that agent.
17See Grimm (2009) for a discussion of veritism.
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attributors positively assess true belief, since it locates the source of the value of
true belief in something tangible to any knowledge attributor, namely the true belief
itself.
Mere veritism doesn’t tell the whole story though; even if true belief is intrinsi-
cally valuable, an agent cannot give credit for it unless he also familiar with that
value. To explain the phenomenon, we need an explanation of how knowledge
attributors are acquainted with the intrinsic value of true belief – that is, veritism
must also answer the epistemological explanandum. Veritism tells us that true
belief is valuable, but it doesn’t explain how knowledge attributors know about
that value. It must be supplemented with an epistemology of the intrinsic value –
one that makes the value of true belief accessible to knowledge attributors.
NORMATIVE TRUTH REGULATION can offer both parts of the explanation. There’s
a simple story about the positive evaluation of true belief: According to NORMATIVE
TRUTH REGULATION, it’s a conceptual truth about belief that belief ought to be true.
So, true belief is belief the way it ought to be.18 Unlike veritism, NORMATIVE TRUTH
REGULATION can also account for the epistemological explanandum. Since it is
conceptual truth about belief that beliefs ought to be true, we have a simple story
about how knowledge attributors are aware of that: having the concept BELIEF
is required for thinking KNOWLEDGE thoughts in the first place, and having the
concept BELIEF is sufficient for having access to the requirement that belief ought to
be true.
So, NORMATIVE TRUTH REGULATION offers a simple explanation of both the
metaphysical and epistemological explananda. As such, the proposal offers a
better explanation of the credit-giving phenomenon than any of the other kinds of
accounts considered so far.
One might think that if we took normative epistemology to be a priori (but not
conceptual), like Gibbard (1990, 2003), Audi (2005), Huemer (2005), and Wedgwood
(2007a, p. 245), we could explain the phenomenon equally well. Its being a priori that
beliefs ought to be true, according to these accounts, explains how it is accessible to
all knowledge attributors.
The a prioristic accounts aren’t so well-off, though. If these accounts also allow
for genuine normative disagreement, they cannot explain the credit-giving phe-
nomenon as well as NORMATIVE TRUTH REGULATION: Tooley, for example, thinks
that abortion is permissible and Marquis disagrees. Their disagreement is not about
18In this way, NORMATIVE TRUTH REGULATION agrees with veritism. NORMATIVE TRUTH REGU-
LATION says strictly more than veritism by making it a conceptual truth about belief.
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any non-normative matter of fact. It’s about the distinctly normative issue of the
permissibility of abortion. A prioristic accounts like Gibbard’s (2003, esp. ch. 7 and
ch. 14) go through great pains to explain how this kind of genuine disagreement is
possible. But if disagreement about the distinctly normative is possible on these
views, then it should be possible for a knowledge attributor to mistakenly not assess
true belief positively, if we take it to be merely a priori that beliefs ought to be true.
The accounts don’t explain how, these knowledge attributors, the ones for whom it
is a priori that belief ought to be true but who fail to realize it, positively evaluate
true belief.19
To finish canvassing the possible explanations of POSITIVE EVALUATION OF TRUE
BELIEF, let’s return to the kinds of accounts I deferred above that take the positive
evaluation of true belief to be due to its relation to justification or knowledge. Like
my account, these possible accounts can also locate the source of the proposed
goodness of true belief in things accessible to knowledge attributors, namely that
the true belief is justified (assuming that knowledge requires justification) or that
the true belief is knowledge. As such, they are not subject to the general argument
schema from above.20 But, as explanatory theses, these proposals are less satisfying
than NORMATIVE TRUTH REGULATION. Here’s why:
First let’s consider accounts of POSITIVE EVALUATION OF TRUE BELIEF that
attempt to explain the positive assessment of true belief in terms of its relationship
to justification. If justification is not required for knowledge, like in the account
of knowledge offered by Lewis (1996) and the safe-true-belief kinds of accounts
discussed above, then the account will be subject to the general argument schema
given above. There will be a possible knowledge attributor who positively assess the
subject’s true belief when she attributes knowledge, but she couldn’t be doing that
in virtue of true belief’s relationship to justification because she lacks the relevant
concept. So, let’s consider how the justification story fares when justification is
taken to be required for knowledge.21
19 This problem can be taken as a dilemma: either the accounts claim that these agents must see
true belief as good (in the relevant sense) or they allow that they may not. If agents must always
view true belief as good, then they must explain why this normative judgment is unlike others,
where we can disagree. If they allow that agents may not, they are still saddled with the project of
explaining how these agents can make knowledge attributions (or hold, counterintuitively, that they
cannot). By treating the concept BELIEF as containing the normative standard, we can explain more
generally how knowledge attributors are in a position to give credit for true belief.
20I’ll grant that knowledge attributors have access to the proposed value or goodness of knowledge
or being justified.
21At first glance, taking our positive evaluation of true belief to be due to its connection to
justification may appear to be too strong. It seems to get the Gettier and lottery problem cases
70
One benefit of thinking that the true belief of knowers receives a positive eval-
uation by the attributor is that it opens the door to an easy account of the Gettier
and lottery cases. This is a generalization of Greco’s claim that we can solve these
problems by thinking that knowledge claims give credit to the subject for their true
belief. On Greco’s account, the positive evaluation is a particular type – the kind
associated with giving credit. But a story similar to Greco’s will go through about
the Gettier and lottery cases as long as we take the positive evaluation of true belief
to be a kind of positive evaluation that wouldn’t be due to a Gettiered or lotteried
subject.
Accounts that appeal to true belief’s connection to justification to explain POSI-
TIVE EVALUATION OF TRUE BELIEF lose the ability to tell this kind of story about
Gettier and lottery cases. This is because if the positive evaluation of true belief
that knowledge attributors have is due to true belief’s connection to justification,
we should expect that if the subject is sufficiently secure in her justification and the
subject’s belief bears the right connection to that justification, the subject should be
due that positive evaluation. In the Gettier and lottery cases though, there are no
special restrictions on the connection between the subject’s belief and her justifi-
cation, and subjects can bear as strong a justificatory relationship to the believed
true proposition as needed to suggest that the positive evaluation is due. So the
justification-based accounts of POSITIVE EVALUATION OF TRUE BELIEF ought to
predict that in some Gettier and lottery cases we do give the positive evaluation
of the true belief. But then, those accounts lose the ability to explain why we with-
hold knowledge attributions in those cases by appeal to the lack of the positive
evaluation of the subject’s true belief.
For example, consider a justification-based account that takes the type of positive
evaluation knowledge attributors give to true belief to be the credit-worthiness kind,
like Greco’s. Roughly, according to such a view, justification is the source of the
wrong. In those cases, the agents do have justified (true) belief, but we don’t give give the positive
evaluation. So if we explain the positive evaluation of true belief in terms of justification, the account
seems to predict that we should give the thumbs up to those cases.
That argument against the justification view is too fast though. If it were correct, it would show
against my view as well, since Gettier and lottery subjects also have true beliefs. It’s important
to notice that, according to the justification view, it is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for
receiving the positive evaluation that one have justification. There could be other conditions that are
also required for the evaluation. For example, it might be that being due the positive evaluation
requires that the justified true belief also spring from the subject’s own abilities, i.e. the subject is
responsible for it. In the Gettier and lottery cases, agents have the justified true belief, but it fails to
spring from their own abilities. So, they are not due the positive evaluation, according to both my
view and the proposed justification view.
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credit-worthiness judgment, and true belief is valuable as a means to justification.
So the account ought to predict that the agent is due the positive evaluation for
her true belief when she is due credit for her justification and her true belief bears
the right relation to that justification. In the Gettier cases though, the subject goes
through a competent deduction to arrive at her justified true belief. So, justification
does spring from the agent’s abilities, and she is due credit for her justification.
So, this view would predict that we do give the positive evaluation in the Gettier
cases, and therefore, it wouldn’t be able to explain the Gettier cases as Greco aims
to. A generalized version of this reasoning shows that other justification-based
accounts of POSITIVE EVALUATION OF TRUE BELIEF also cannot employ the simple
story about the Gettier and lottery cases. NORMATIVE TRUTH REGULATION avoids
this reasoning by locating the source of the positive evaluation of true belief in the
true belief itself, not in its relation to anything else.22
Another type of account that avoids the general argument from above is one that
explains POSITIVE EVALUATION OF TRUE BELIEF in terms of true belief’s relationship
with knowledge, which they take to be the only relevant thing of value. One might
think that Williamson’s (2000) primacy of knowledge argument naturally motivates
this kind of view. The idea being that since the concept KNOWLEDGE doesn’t
breakdown cleanly into any other concepts, when we positively assess some mental
state as knowledge, we don’t take the true belief to be a valuable proper part of
knowledge. Rather, we’re positively evaluating knowledge, and the true belief that
constitutes that knowledge comes along for the ride.23
This kind of knowledge-based account would most naturally reject the phe-
nomenon being explained here. Were an advocate of such an account to accept
the phenomenon, she would be claiming that though knowledge attributors see
22One might worry that this means that NORMATIVE TRUTH REGULATION predicts that the positive
evaluation (that is supposed to explain the Gettier and lottery cases) must be present anytime true
belief is. This doesn’t follow. NORMATIVE TRUTH REGULATION only makes true belief a necessary
condition for the positive evaluation. Other natural conditions will also be required for the positive
evaluation, like perhaps that the agent is due credit for that true belief, as Greco requires.
23Though this kind of reasoning may motivate some readers, I don’t think it ought to. The primacy
argument for knowledge that Williamson (2000) gives are arguments for the primacy of analysis,
not primacy of value. The primacy of analysis of KNOWLEDGE gives us no reason to think that what
we take to be positive about knowledge is irreducible to what we take to be positive about some of
the parts. Suppose, for example, that GENOCIDE is analytically prime – that is, that genocide cannot
be understood solely in other terms (as say, many killings combined with some political motivation).
Even if that’s so, we may still think that the badness of genocide is partially due to the badness of the
killings. Similarly for knowledge: even if KNOWLEDGE is unanalyzable, that doesn’t give us reason
to think that the positive evaluation associated with it doesn’t ultimately come from the positive
evaluation we give to true belief.
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knowledge as the source of the positive evaluation, we none-the-less positively
evaluate true belief when we say that someone knows. But, if we think that the
knowledge itself is the source of the positive evaluation, why would we think that
we’re positively evaluating the true belief (rather than the knowledge) with knowl-
edge attributions? This is an unnatural position to hold. Since my claim here is that
NORMATIVE TRUTH REGULATION offers the most plausible explanation of POSITIVE
EVALUATION OF TRUE BELIEF and these knowledge-based accounts ought to just
reject the phenomenon rather than explain it, I will ignore the knowledge-based
accounts here.24
According to NORMATIVE TRUTH REGULATION, it’s part of the idea of belief
that true belief is belief the way it ought to be. I claim that this best explains
why when we attribute knowledge, we positively evaluate the subject’s true belief.
An alternative proposal might claim that the phenomenon is best explained by
a symmetrical fact about TRUTH – that the concept TRUTH is normative. Such a
proposal seems to be able to employ all of the same moves I do in defense of my
claim about BELIEF, due to truth’s similar positioning with belief in the phenomenon.
Price (1998) attributes to Wright (1994), for example, the claim that “Any reason to
believe that p is true is a reason to believe (and hence allow the assertion) that p” is
a norm of truth. Many others have made similar claims about norms of truth that
relate belief and assertion to truth.25
I agree with many of the proposed norms and in particular the claim that a
proposition being true makes it the case that a belief in that proposition is correct.
That said, these proposed “norms of truth” seem to be better understood as norms
of belief or assertion than as norms generated by an inherent normativity of the
concept TRUTH. If a concept is normative, we should expect that in general when the
concept applies, some ‘ought’ claim or prescription follows. If something is wrong,
for example, it ought not be done, or if something is disgusting, one ought to avoid
24Notice that there is worry for the knowledge-based accounts though when they are combined
with Greco’s claims about the nature of the positive evaluation as credit-giving: Recall Greco’s claim
that the credit-giving phenomenon can explain the Gettier and lottery problem cases. There, our
unwillingness to give credit is supposed to explain our unwillingness to attribute knowledge. If
that’s right, then explanations of the credit-giving phenomenon that take true belief to be good in
service of knowledge leave us with an unsatisfyingly small explanatory circle: the Gettiered subject
is not due credit for his true belief because his belief does not constitute knowledge, and his belief
does not constitute knowledge because he is not due credit for it. While there is no inconsistency in
this position, it’s not very enlightening either.
25Price (1998, p. 248) claims, for example, that it’s a norm of truth that “One is incorrect to assert
that p if, in fact, it is not the case that p.” Horwich (2006, p. 347) also describes a similar norm of
truth: “It is desirable to believe what is true and only what is true.” For more examples, see Engel
(2002).
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it.26 TRUTH doesn’t seem to be like that. Take, for example, a paradigmatically non-
normative claim, like “snow is white.” Since “snow is white” is paradigmatically
non-normative, I take it that it doesn’t entail any (non-trivial) ‘ought’ claims or
prescriptions. If TRUTH is a normative concept, we should expect that “snow is
white is true” entails some ‘ought’ claims or prescriptions. But “snow is white” and
“snow is white is true” seem to entail exactly the same claims. So, that’s one way
in which TRUTH doesn’t appear to work like other normative concepts.27 Taking
BELIEF to be a normative concept is a more plausible explanation of NORMATIVE
TRUTH REGULATION than taking TRUTH to be normative.
In the preceding discussion, I canvassed many of the possible explanations
of POSITIVE EVALUATION OF TRUE BELIEF. The considerations there show that
NORMATIVE TRUTH REGULATION makes sense of the phenomenon in ways that
the other views cannot. The views that attempt to explain the metaphysical ex-
planandum in terms of something extrinsic to true belief generally fail to explain
the epistemological explanandum, and the same worry applies to the view that
attempts the explanation in terms of the intrinsic goodness of true belief. Those
extrinsic accounts that may be able to explain the epistemological explanandum,
the views given in terms of true belief’s connection to justification and knowledge,
don’t explain the phenomenon very well either. The justification-based views lose a
natural story about the role of the positive evaluation in explaining Gettier and lot-
tery cases, and the most natural versions of the knowledge-based accounts reject the
phenomenon to be explained. Finally, I argued that a view that takes TRUTH to be a
normative concept (rather than BELIEF) is less plausibly correct than NORMATIVE
TRUTH REGULATION, since TRUTH doesn’t seem to exhibit the symptoms of norma-
tivity. While I haven’t surveyed every possible explanation POSITIVE EVALUATION
OF TRUE BELIEF, the above considerations are sufficient to provide a new reason
to think that NORMATIVE TRUTH REGULATION is true. Taking the concept BELIEF
to be normative gives us a simple story about both for what and how knowledge
26We might think there are trivially normative concepts, i.e. concepts that are understood in
normative terms but need not be. For example, we could generate a concept NORMRED that applies
to all things that are red and such that if murder is wrong, we ought not murder. Such a concept
is normative, in some sense, because to capture the meaning of the term, one must use normative
language. But this new concept is not normative in a standard sense where normative concepts
non-trivially guide. Surely, the advocates of the claim that TRUTH is normative, insomuch as it’s an
interesting claim, must take it that TRUTH is normative in a non-trivial way.
27One might also think that because ‘true’ factors in true norms, this is enough to show that it’s
a normative notion. I don’t think this is right. For example, it’s a norm of chess that one ought
to checkmate the opponent. But what it is for the opponent to be checkmated is just for one of a
number of possible board positions to occur, which can be understood completely non-normatively.
74
attributors positively evaluate true belief. It’s a conceptual truth that true belief is
belief the way it ought to be, and because this is part of the very idea of belief, that
fact is accessible to knowledge attributors.
Above, when I motivated thinking that POSITIVE EVALUATION OF TRUE BELIEF
occurs in the context of Greco’s conception of knowledge ascriptions, I claimed that
when we give credit for something, we must take that thing to be, in a loose sense,
positive. But there are some hard cases for this claim: We can credit Hitler for being
the most ruthless dictator in history, and being a ruthless dictator isn’t positive.
Before concluding this section, I’ll show that these hard cases are resolved once we
clarify the kinds of things we give credit for.
The explanation of POSITIVE EVALUATION OF TRUE BELIEF I endorse says that we
positively evaluate true belief because it’s a conceptual truth about belief that belief
ought to be true. This is an instance of a broader pattern of positively evaluating
satisfying conceptually-given standards, I claim. For example, it’s a conceptual truth
about playing chess that players ought to follow the rules, and we give a player
credit for playing chess correctly when he does. Mark Schroeder (2010) makes a
similar point with this example: We need not approve at all of being an assassin,
but nonetheless, we can make sense of what it is to be good by the standards of being
an assassin. It’s being an effective killer. That’s a conceptual truth about being an
assassin. We can give credit to the effective killer for being good as an assassin.
When we credit Hitler, we’re applauding him for satisfying the conceptually-given
standards of the activity in which he was engaged, being a ruthless dictator. This is how
we give credit in the hard cases: we give credit for satisfying the standards of an
activity. Similarly for belief: we positively evaluate true belief because true belief
satisfies the standard that’s part of the idea of belief, that of being true.
3.2 Agents as Believers
The truth norm is supposed to be categorical – we all ought to believe the truth,
regardless of the particular projects or aims each of us has. If NORMATIVE TRUTH
REGULATION is true, where does this leave us on the project of explaining why we
ought to believe the truth? According to the proposal, it’s part of the concept BELIEF
that beliefs ought to be true. So, to think of an attitude as belief, rather than as
supposition, desire, or some other attitude, in part requires thinking that it ought to
75
be true.28 But, just showing that a concept has a normative aspect doesn’t show that
we’re subject to that constraint, just as showing that something is a requirement
of etiquette doesn’t show that we’re subject to it either. So we need a further story
about why that norm of belief applies to us.
What we do get from the claim that BELIEF is normative in the sense of NOR-
MATIVE TRUTH REGULATION is that if someone is a believer, then he or she ought to
believe the truth.29 The charge then is to show that the antecedent is satisfied by
every agent. That is, we must show that every agent is a believer. Then we’d have a
complete explanation of the norm:
(1) NORMATIVE TRUTH REGULATION: It’s a conceptual truth about belief that if
some attitude is a belief that P, one ought, other things being equal, have that
attitude if and only if P.
(2) So, if S is a believer, S ought to believe the truth.
(3) All agents are believers.
(4) So, agents ought to believe the truth.
In this section, I’ll argue that claim (3) is true: agents are believers, in that they have
beliefs in the normative sense defended above.
It is a presupposition of action theory that an agent is an entity that performs
actions. What then is required to perform an action? On the belief/desire model,
an agent’s actions can be explained in terms of her beliefs and desires. It is Jon’s
desire for ice cream, for example, that when combined with his belief about the
location of the ice cream, explains why he went to the kitchen. Donald Davidson’s
(1963) highly influential account offers roughly this picture. There, one’s actions are
explained in terms of, among other things, a primary reason, which is the pairing
of a desire and an instrumental belief of the agent. On this picture, agents must be
believers. Many other philosophers follow Davidson in requiring agents to have
similar kinds of beliefs.
The belief-desire-intention model of agency (Bratman 1987), which has become
a standard model of agency in artificial intelligence research (Georgeff et al. 1999),
also models agents in terms of their pro-attitudes and beliefs.
Modern decision theories and formal epistemologies, such as Bayesianism,
28Probably this isn’t all that’s required to think of an attitude as belief. For one, this doesn’t
separate belief from hypothesis, which is plausibly also normatively truth regulated. Belief, for
example, also seems to be non-normatively regulated by truth, as explained by Shah and Velleman
(2005).
29Again, here, as above, the sense of ‘ought’ is the restricted other-things-being-equal sense.
76
also require rational agents to have a kind of belief. In these theories, agents are
represented as having partial, degreed beliefs. The degreed beliefs then factor
essentially into agents’ decisions and consequent actions.30
The common theme is that in order to be an agent, an entity that acts, one must
also be a believer.31 So, agents must be believers. When we combine this with the
conceptual truth about belief, that if S is a believer, S ought to believe the truth, we
get the desired categorical norm: All agents ought to believe the truth.
One might think that we can explain the actions of agents in a way that avoids
the normative implications by appealing to other attitudes of the agent. But, the
possibility of developing this kind of account of action is daunting, I’ll claim. We’d
expect there to be some attitude – call it ‘schmelief’ – that plays the kind of role belief
was meant to play in standard explanations of action. When we try to characterize
schmelief, we should restrict it to being an attitude that agents actually have, since
we can’t appeal to merely potential attitudes to explain actual actions. Further, we’d
expect that if schmelief can play the role of belief in agents’ reasons, it must be an
attitude that represents its content as true. That is, we’d expect schmelief to be a
cognitive, rather than conative or affective attitude. Examples of non-belief attitudes
like this include supposing, imagining, assuming, hypothesizing, remembering,
accepting, judging, and understanding.
Many of these options for schmelief require that agents believe in order to
have them. Understanding, for example, seems to require believing: For José to
understand that 2 + 2 = 4, he must believe it as well. Remembering, accepting,
and judging are like this, too. So, schmelief can’t be one of these attitudes, if we’re
aiming to avoid the normative implications of NORMATIVE TRUTH REGULATION.32
Attitudes that are generally insensitive to evidence, like supposition, don’t seem
well-suited to be schmelief either. Say that Jon wants ice cream and merely supposes
that there’s ice cream in the kitchen. Jon then enters the kitchen. When we want
to know what Jon’s reason was for moving to the kitchen, we can’t point to his
supposition. That’s partly because he would have had that purported reason even
30Treating belief as degreed or graded is not problematic for the view that belief ought to be true,
it just requires us to reformulate what it means for those beliefs to be true. See Joyce (2009) for
further discussion of this issue.
31Agents having beliefs might also be required to explain the identity of agents over time, in terms
of their memories or expectations, Railton (1997) points out in discussing this kind of account.
32One might think that schmelief could be acceptance, like the notion used in the constructive
empiricism of Van Fraassen (1980, p. 12). According to that view though, “acceptance of a theory
involves as belief only that it is empirically adequate.” Because accepting that P requires having a
belief, accepting cannot be the non-normative notion we’re looking for here.
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if his evidence about the location of the ice cream were widely different. In general,
to explain an action, we must show why the action would have made sense from
the agent’s perspective. But, Jon knows that his suppositions are insensitive to his
evidence, so he wouldn’t rely on that attitude to guide his action.33 This kind of
worry would apply to other proposed explanations of action in terms of generally
evidence-insensitive attitudes, like imagining and assuming. So, schmelief must be
an attitude that is generally tied to evidence in the right way. Otherwise schmelief
can’t explain how actions make sense to agents.
So we see that for schmelief to play the right role in explaining actions, it must
look a lot like belief.34 A last resort option here would be to claim that schmelief
just is the same attitude (property) as belief, but the concept SCHMELIEF provides
a non-normative way of describing that property.35 Employing this move doesn’t
avoid my conclusion though: The hedonist can admit that the concept MAXIMIZING
NET PLEASURE picks out the good in a non-normative way, without thereby denying
that we ought to do good things. Analogously, if SCHMELIEF is a non-normative
way of picking out belief, this doesn’t show against the normativity of belief being
able to explain the categoricity of the truth norm.36
Given that schmelief, insomuch as it can play the belief role in explaining action,
33Even if Jon’s supposition is right and he knew it, the reason for Jon’s movement couldn’t be
his supposition (along with his desire). That’s because Jon’s supposition is still insensitive to the
evidence. In other nearby possibilities where Jon doesn’t believe that the ice cream is in the kitchen,
the supposition remains.
34My opponent might try to appeal to a disjunctive attitude to avoid my claim here. For example,
if we let schmelief be an attitude that ought to be true in regard to propositions that might guide
action, such as ones about locations of cookie jars, but the same attitude doesn’t put any normative
constraints on propositions that cannot guide us, perhaps such as ones about large cardinals. There
are three problems with this kind of move: First, we have no reason to think agents have such
an attitude, so positing it seems to be more costly overall than accepting my conclusion. Second,
phenomenologically, it doesn’t seem that how we regard propositions differently based on their
potential guidance to us, especially since we often lack insight into whether a proposition will
potentially guide us. Thirdly, such a story would still accept my explanation of why we ought to
believe the truth about a wide variety of propositions, namely the potentially guiding ones. So, such
an account doesn’t really avoid my conclusion in an interesting way.
35Gibbard (1992) argues that, in general, we cannot decompose thick normative concepts (like
what I am taking BELIEF to be) into their normative and non-normative components, as this move
would require. McDowell (1981, p. 144) offers a similar argument. For the sake of strengthening my
opponent’s position, I will ignore those arguments here.
36More explicitly, the hedonist will accept the following argument: (1) Goodness ought to be
promoted for its own sake. (Conceptual Truth); (2) Goodness is pleasure. (Claim of the hedonist);
So, (3) pleasure ought to be promoted for its own sake. Analogously, the advocate of explaining
action in terms of schmelief (thought of as the same property as belief) ought to accept the following
argument: (1) Belief ought to be true. (Conceptual Truth); (2) Belief is schmelief.; So (3) Schmelief
ought to be true. The conclusion of this argument won’t be a conceptual truth, but it can still explain
why the truth norm applies categorically.
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must be an evidence-sensitive cognitive attitude that isn’t the same property as
belief, it’s difficult to see exactly what attitude it would be. It’s much more plausible
that when agents act, it’s their beliefs explain their actions. But to think of that
attitude as a belief is to think that it’s an attitude that ought to be true.
At the beginning of the discussion, I set out to discuss the source of some
epistemic norms. Clifford points at a particular norm about evidence and claims
that the norm applies to us in the same way that moral norms apply to us. My goal
here was to provide an alternative account, not of Clifford’s norm, but of the truth
norm, a norm that seems to be more fundamental than Clifford’s norm. According
to the truth norm, we must believe the truth. So, to provide an explanation of that
norm, I must show how it could arise and in virtue of what it applies. I claim to
have done that. The explanation I provide is this:
(1) NORMATIVE TRUTH REGULATION: It’s a conceptual truth about belief that if
some attitude is a belief that P, one ought, other things being equal, have that
attitude if and only if P.
(2) So, if S is a believer, S ought to believe the truth.
(3) All agents are believers.
(4) So, agents ought to believe the truth.
This give us an alternative to Clifford’s understanding of epistemic normativity: we
can understand (at least some) epistemic norms as having a non-moral, distinctly
doxastic, source. It’s part of the very idea of belief that beliefs ought to be true, and
because agents must all believe, that norm applies to all agents.
3.3 Some Objections and Replies
Now that I’ve set out a distinctly doxastic way of understanding the truth norm, I’ll
consider some objections to it as an explanation of that norm.
Objection: More and More Beliefs?
One might think that the account I offered above, if right, would require agents
to constantly be searching for new truths to believe. This would require agents to
be constantly counting blades of grass and memorizing phone books. And even if
the account does not require that they must do these things, since the normative
requirement on agents is only an other-things-being-equal constraint, the account
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seems to suggest that agents always have some reason to do these things, the objector
claims.
While some authors do think that we always have some reason to adopt new true
beliefs, perhaps because having a true belief is intrinsically valuable, the account
I offered is neutral on this debate. The account I offer here only requires agents
to have some beliefs, namely beliefs about those things that might factor into the
explanations of the agent’s actions. The normative claim generated only puts a
constraint on those beliefs that agents have by requiring agents to have that belief if
and only if the content is true. When agents do not have a belief regarding P, my
account is silent. It’s open then to proponents of views that require us to gather
more and more beliefs to explain why we must adopt beliefs in those cases.
One might worry then that the explanation I give is too weak, in that it doesn’t
require agents to have enough true beliefs. Can’t the norm generated by my account
just be satisfied by not believing or reducing the number of beliefs we have to a
minimum?
As I argued above, agents cannot just stop believing in toto. It’s a requirement
of being an agent that one have beliefs, at least enough to explain one’s actions.
Further, a descriptive feature of belief is that it is often difficult to fail to have a belief
about many topics. If, for example, you believe the snow is white, it’s typically not
open to you to stop having a doxastic attitude about that topic. Even when you
do change your attitude by suspending belief or coming to disbelieve the thing we
previously believed, like when you’re presented with new evidence about an issue,
you’re still subject to the norm. To disbelieve P is just to have a belief that not-P, so
this new belief is subject to the norm. Further, we treat an agent’s suspension of
belief as a kind of belief in explaining action, like when a driver slows down at an
unmarked intersection when she’s unsure if someone is coming. So, suspension of
belief, like disbelief, counts as a kind of belief in the explanation I offer. So given
that the agent must adopt some doxastic attitude, the norm generated would say
that the agent ought, in the relevant sense, to stop suspending belief and believe
that P iff P.
Objection: What kind of ‘ought’?
According to the account that I offer, we must believe the truth because there’s
an ‘ought’ that’s part of the concept of belief. We might wonder why that ought
applies to a believer just in virtue of being a believer. To see the objection, consider
an analogy to chess: it’s plausibly part of the idea of chess that when playing chess,
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one ought move the bishop only diagonally. But, you might think that there could
be reason for someone not to move the bishop only diagonally when playing chess,
such as if she would suffer a large financial loss by doing so. So, in the case of chess,
it seems that it might not be that we ought to move the bishop only diagonally even
if that norm is part of the very idea of chess. The same worry is supposed to apply
to the account I offer. The objector rejects the second claim in my explanation: it’s
not the case that if someone is a believer, he or she ought to believe the truth.
There are two important aspects of the account I’m advancing that collectively
reply to this objection. Firstly, belief is disanalogous to chess in that it we aren’t
essentially chess players. What I claim to have shown in the previous section is that
it’s essential to being an agent that we believe. So while it could be the case that
we have all-things-considered reason to stop playing chess (such as if we would
suffer a large financial loss by continuing to play), as agents, we can’t opt out of
being believers. The natural picture here then is that we’re subject to the norms
of an activity when we’re participating in that activity.37 When we would suffer a
large financial loss by moving the bishop only diagonally, we have good reason to
stop participating in playing chess (though we may still have reason to appear to be
playing chess). In the case of belief, insomuch as we ought to do anything, we’re
agents, so we’re stuck being believers. If we’re believers, the norms of belief apply
to us.
Secondly, the above considerations may make it sound like I’m committed to
thinking that we can never have all-things-considered reason to believe something
false. This result doesn’t follow from my account. All that follows from my account
is that other things being equal we ought to believe the truth. So, believers are always
subject to this other-things-being-equal ‘ought’. Unlike in chess, where it is never
permissible to move the bishop except diagonally, the demand on agent’s beliefs
according to my account is only that agents have some reason to believe the truth.
This is enough to explain the categorical nature of the norm but not so strong as to
anticipate that agents may only believe the truth.
Together, these two considerations show that the objection by analogy to chess
is not apt. We’re subject to the norms of the activities in which we’re engaged.
Unlike chess, we cannot opt out of being believers. Also unlike some of the norms
of chess, the truth norm that’s constitutive of belief doesn’t require that agents have
37Participating in an activity need not be active or intentional. Consider, for example, those
unwitting German citizens who participated, though intentionally, in the atrocities of the Second
World War. The notion I’m using here is similar to, but strictly more general than, Rawls’s (1955)
notion of a practice.
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an overriding obligation to believe the truth. This flexibility explains how agents
can engage in activities that put contravening demands on the agent’s attitudes.
Objection: But Why Should I Believe the Truth?
The account of the truth norm that I offer is a kind of constitutivist account, like
those of Korsgaard (2009) and Velleman (2000). The account is constitutivist because
it locates the source of the norm for belief in what is constitutive of belief. Con-
stitutivist accounts of norms share the goal of giving a non-hypothetical account
of why we must conform to (epistemic, in my case) norms in terms of something
constitutive of agency or action. There’s a popular kind of objection to these kinds
of accounts. Enoch (2006, p. 169), quoting David Lewis, puts the objection like this:
Why care about objective value or ethical reality? The sanction is
that if you do not, your inner states will fail to deserve folk theoretical
names. Not a threat that will strike terror into the hearts of the wicked!
But whoever thought that philosophy could replace the hangman?
The worry here is straightforward: Constitutive accounts of norms claim that norms
are grounded in our agency, but a skeptic may just reply that she’s not interested in
agency (or whatever other notion the constitutivist appeals to). ‘What reason to I
have to be an agent, rather than a schmagent?’, the skeptic will ask.
This worry is quite compelling against constitutivist accounts that aim to re-
spond to skeptic of this kind. But, responding to this kind of skeptic is beyond what
is required to give an account of epistemic norms. Consider an analogy to accounts
of medical disorders: what we expect of a good account of a medical disorder is
that it tell us the conditions under which and in virtue of what one has the disorder.
Good accounts of medical disorder need not make it undeniable (or even accessible)
to the patient that he or she has the disorder. In this sense, theories of medical
disorders need not respond to the skeptic. We should expect the same of accounts
of norms. To give an account of a norm, it is sufficient to give the conditions under
which and in virtue of what the norm applies. Theories of norms, like theories in
the sciences, need not make the application of the properties they discuss accessible
to the things to which they apply.
My goal in this chapter was to offer an account of why we ought to believe the
truth that doesn’t treat it as a moral or pragmatic issue. To do this, I needed to give
the conditions under which and in virtue of what the norm applies, and I’ve done
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that. It’s part of the very idea of belief that beliefs ought to be true. Being an agent
requires being a believer. So, agents ought to believe the truth; the norm applies to
all agents in virtue of their agency.
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CHAPTER IV
Epistemic Rationality and the Aim of Belief
ABSTRACT
In “Rational Credence and the Value of Truth,” Allan Gibbard (2008c)
makes two key claims about the nature of epistemic rationality: He
claims (1) that epistemic rationality cannot be explained just by the aim
of belief, and (2) that epistemic rationality is more plausibly explained
in terms of a practical notion, that of maximizing prospective guidance
value. In this chapter, I reconstruct and respond to Gibbard’s arguments
for both of these claims.
In order to understand Gibbard’s second claim, we must clarify the
role of ideal theory and idealizations in the explanation Gibbard pro-
poses. When we do, we see that Gibbard is left appealing to merely
hypothetical bets to explain epistemic rationality even in ideal cases.
These merely hypothetical bets don’t seem to be able to play the role he
needs them to though. I show that Gibbard’s story is also unique in this
respect; he can’t appeal to the kinds of explanations given to save Dutch
Book arguments. So Gibbard must explain how these explanations work.
I then undermine Gibbard’s motivation for pursuing such an account
in the first place, by showing that the argument for the first claim is
unsound. Gibbard isn’t using the best conception of the aim of belief. I
survey five senses in which something or someone can be said to ‘aim.’
According to the normative sense in which ‘belief aims,’ belief aims at
the truth because having a true content is the standard of good or correct
belief. By taking belief to have an aim in this way, I sketch how we can
make sense of epistemic rationality in terms of that aim.
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When we evaluate other people, we distinguish between someone being epistemi-
cally rational and someone being practically rational.1 Broadly speaking, an agent
exhibits epistemic rationality when she properly regulates her beliefs in light of the
information available to her, and she exhibits practical rationality when she pursues
her goals the best she can by her own lights.
A natural way to distinguish epistemic and pragmatic rationality is in terms
of the aims of the corresponding projects. Whereas practical projects aim at the
fulfilment of one’s goals, epistemic projects aim at the production of true belief and
the elimination of false belief. In “Rational Credence and the Value of Truth,” Allan
Gibbard (2008c) poses two worries for this way of distinguishing these types of
rationality. The first worry is that epistemic rationality cannot be fully understood
just in terms of the pursuit of truth. This is because exhibiting epistemic rationality
requires a kind of immodesty that is not guaranteed just by valuing true belief. The
second worry is that the aspect of epistemic rationality that cannot be explained
by the pursuit of truth can be explained in terms of a more practical aim. Being
epistemically rational, Gibbard then concludes, should be understood not in terms
of the value of true belief but instead in terms of potential guidance value.
Gibbard makes many idealizing assumptions about the agents under considera-
tion, what kinds of situations they face, and what epistemic rationality requires of
them. Gibbard appeals to a formal result to show that for Bayesain agents in a spe-
cific betting scenario, epistemic rationality is best understood in terms of the agent
aiming at maximizing the guidance value of her beliefs. In this chapter, I’ll respond
to Gibbard’s argument. In the first part of the response, I’ll argue that Gibbard’s
use of idealization is a peculiar in ways that leave his explanation of epistemic
rationality in need of further exposition. Gibbard’s account is best conceived of as
employing hypothetical collections of bets in explanations, I show. I then suggest
that the practical requirements generated by these hypothetical bets don’t seem to
be able to underpin the epistemic explanada in the way that Gibbard requires.
Gibbard was motivated to pursue such a view in the first place because, as he
argues in the first part of his article, he believes that epistemic rationality cannot
be understood in terms of the aim of belief. In the second part of my response, I
undermine Gibbard’s motivation for pursuing his practical account of epistemic
rationality in the first place. I show that Gibbard takes too narrow a view on what
1Other authors use the terms “theoretical rationality” and “instrumental rationality” to talk about
what I’m calling “epistemic rationality” and “practical rationality” respectively. I don’t want to take
a stand here on where those notion are the exact same kind of rationality as the ones I talk about
here, but they certainly are very similar.
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the aim of belief could be. By conceiving of the aim of belief in a popular way that
is different from Gibbard’s conception, I’ll sketch how we can recover a picture of
epistemic rationality grounded in that aim.
4.1 Gibbard’s Argument
Gibbard’s argument is quite dense and integrated, though I think it is best un-
derstood in two parts, one part arguing for each of the two worries I ascribed to
Gibbard above. The first part is meant to show epistemic rationality cannot be fully
understood in terms of agents valuing the truth. In the second part, Gibbard claims
that epistemic rationality is more plausibly understandable in terms of belief aiming
at maximizing guidance value.
Following Gibbard, throughout the chapter, I’ll think of the beliefs of agents as
representable by a probability function, which represents their degrees of credence
in the propositions they have (partial) belief about.2 What an agent desires and
values will be represented with a utility function on possible states of the world to
how much the agent desires or values that state. Then, following Ramsey (1926),
I’ll assume (again with Gibbard) that what agents ought to decide to do is what
maximizes their expected utility relative to their credences and utility assignments.
4.1.1 Gibbard’s Argument Part I: Epistemic Rationality and the Value of Truth
“Belief aims at the truth” is often given as a gloss of the normative or functional
connection between belief and truth. This aim of belief is thought by some to be able
to explain why we ought to regulate our beliefs for truth, rather than for pleasure
or something else we value. If that’s right, it seems plausible that other norms that
apply to belief, such as norms of justified, rational, or warranted belief (or even
knowledge) could be made sense of in terms of this deeper connection between
belief and truth.3
Gibbard starts with this intuition and tries to unpack the idea that belief aims at
truth, which he takes to be mostly metaphorical: “Belief . . . can’t aim literally; it’s we
who aim” Gibbard (2008c, p. 143) tells us. So, ideal believers must be representable
2Thinking of the doxastic states of agents as representable by a probability function grants to
agents a lot of what others have claimed is required by epistemic rationality. Gibbard (2008a) ac-
knowledges this point but intends to restrict his result to only these idealized agents. My arguments
do not question this idealizing assumption.
3Along with Wedgwood (2002), I think something like this picture is right. Unfortunately, fully
defending this conception of epistemic norms is beyond the scope of what is possible here.
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as aiming for truth in their beliefs, Gibbard concludes. Gibbard takes this idea
to underpin a minimal requirement for epistemic rationality. For an agent to be
epistemically rational, she must aim at the truth in her credences. More precisely, if
an agent is epistemically rational, she must satisfy this minimal test for epistemic
rationality:
MINIMAL TEST FOR EPISTEMIC RATIONALITY “When a person forms her credences
with epistemic rationality, is it as if she were choosing her credences voluntar-
ily, rationally aiming, in light of her credences, at truth in those very credences”
(2008c, p. 147).
Intuitively, to think to a person as epistemically rational, Gibbard is suggesting,
we must think of that person as by their own lights pursuing having accurate
credences.
The first of Gibbard’s two claims is that epistemic rationality cannot be under-
stood solely as resulting from an agent purely valuing the truth of their beliefs.4
This is because an agent purely valuing the truth in her beliefs doesn’t guarantee
that she’ll pass the MINIMAL TEST FOR EPISTEMIC RATIONALITY. Here’s why:
An agent purely values the truth in her beliefs when the agent prefers her beliefs
to be as accurate as possible – that is, when the agent’s utility function orders
possible situations where she has credences in terms of how accurate they are in
that possibility.5 Gibbard formalizes this idea for a simple toy agent who only has
beliefs about one proposition, that modern Europeans descend at least in part from
the Neanderthals, S: Let g1(x) be how much utility the agent assigns to having
credence x in S if S is true and g0(x) be how much utility the agent assigns to having
credence x in S if S is false. Then, according to Gibbard, pursuing the truth, or
purely valuing the truth in one’s beliefs, consists in satisfying CONDITION T:
CONDITION T Function g1(x) increases strictly monotonically with x, and function
g0(x) decreases strictly monotonically with x.
In words, the agent purely values truth when she prefers having higher credences
in S if S is true, and she prefers having lower credences in S if S is false (Gibbard
4It’s important to note that the claim here is that epistemic rationality cannot be made sense of in
terms of valuing the truth. The claim, here at least, is not that it can’t be made sense of in terms of
aiming at the truth, since (what Gibbard takes to be) the metaphor of aiming is underwriting what
Gibbard takes to be the minimal standard of epistemic rationality in the first place. Below, I’ll have
more to say about Gibbard’s argument and aiming at the truth.
5Strictly speaking, Gibbard puts this in terms of the agent being representable as such, not that
the agent must really have such a utility function. For ease of presentation, I’ll say the agent ‘has’
such a utility function when the agent is representable as such.
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2008c, p. 148-9). More generally, the intuition here is that when an agent values
some goal, she takes the states of the world in which the goal is achieved to be
preferable to those where it is not achieved.
Can valuing the truth, in this sense, be all there is to being epistemically rational?
Gibbard doesn’t think so. Being epistemically rational requires more, Gibbard
claims. In order to pass the MINIMAL TEST FOR EPISTEMIC RATIONALITY, epistemi-
cally rational agents must also be representable as having utility functions that are
credence-eliciting:
CREDENCE-ELICITING A utility function is credence-eliciting when, in light of some
credences Cr, the expected utility of adopting Cr is higher than the expected
utility of adopting any other credence function.6
That is, in light of their evidence, epistemically rational agents, prefer to have the
credences that they do have in light of that evidence.
For sufficiently ideal agents, a requirement to be as if one has a credence-eliciting
utility function is generated just by the MINIMAL TEST FOR EPISTEMIC RATIONALITY.
Here’s why: Suppose (for reductio) that there were an epistemically rational ideal
agent who, in light of her evidence, has a credence of .5 in S, and suppose that, in
light of her evidence, the agent prefers, as part of her concern for truth, to have a
credence of .7 in S. Then the agent can rationally advance her quest for the truth by
changing her .5 credence to .7. So, the agent does not view her credences as optimal
in the pursuit of her goal of having accurate credences. According to the MINIMAL
TEST FOR EPISTEMIC RATIONALITY though, for the epistemically rational agent, it is
as if she rationally chooses her credences with the goal of maximizing the accuracy
of those credences, but our agent is not like that. So, epistemically rational agents
must have credence-eliciting utility functions.
Are there ways then to purely value the truth then without satisfying the MIN-
IMAL TEST FOR EPISTEMIC RATIONALITY? Yes. This is because there are utility
functions that satisfy CONDITION T but are not credence-eliciting. The linear score
is an example: g1(x) = x and g0(x) = 1− x. If an agent adopts this linear score as
her utility function, then she satisfies CONDITION T because g1(x) increases strictly
monotonically with x, and function g0(x) decreases strictly monotonically with x.
So, we can think of this agent as purely valuing the truth in her beliefs. But unless
her credence is 0, .5, or 1, she prefers to have a credence that she doesn’t have. If
6When the utility function views the credences as at least as good as any other, then the utility
function is proper. If a utility function has views the credences as strictly the best, then it is strictly
proper. By “credence-eliciting,” Gibbard means strictly proper. See his footnote 11 on p. 152.
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her credence is > .5 then she views having credence 1 as maximizing her payoff
in terms of believing the truth, and if her credence is < .5, she views credence 0 as
maximizing that payoff. If the agent is purely concerned with the truth then, by her
own lights, she can rationally advance that concern my changing her non-extreme
to an extreme one. But this kind of move would be “epistemically rash,” so merely
valuing the truth cannot be all there is to being epistemically rational, Gibbard
(2008c, p. 152) concludes.
Gibbard’s argument has a number of moving parts, but we can understand it
by analogy to a much more tangible example. Suppose that I want to make some
guacamole to accompany dinner tonight. There are a number of things that are
required of me if I am to rationally pursue that goal. The question that is analogous
to the one that Gibbard pursue is whether we can make sense of what is rationally
required for me to do in pursuit of guacamole just in terms of my goal of having
guacamole.
So suppose I am purely concerned with making guacamole for dinner. An
agent is purely concerned with making guacamole when the agent’s desires are
representable by a certain class of utility functions, those that prefer states of the
world in which one makes guacamole. So, to purely value making guacamole is to
satisfy CONDITION G:
CONDITION G The utility function of the agent orders states of the world in which
the agent makes guacamole before those in which she doesn’t.
Further, in order for an agent to be rational (practically or instrumentally, in this
case) with respect to the concern for making guacamole, the agent must obtain
avocados, since they’re required to make guacamole. More generally, practical
rationality requires that agents pursues necessary means:
PURSUING NECESSARY MEANS An agent pursues necessary means with respect to a
goal g when, if φ-ing is a necessary means for attaining that goal, the agent
tries to φ.
Clearly, being practically rational requires that agents satisfy PURSUING NECESSARY
MEANS, but the requirements of PURSUING NECESSARY MEANS with respect to
making guacamole (i.e. getting avocados) are not guaranteed by merely by having
a pure concern for making guacamole. So, in this practical case, being practically
rational with respect to the guacamole goal cannot be reduced to valuing that goal.
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The epistemic case differs from this simple practical case in that the requirement
of practical rationality is a practical requirement, rather than an epistemic one.7
Epistemic rationality, per Gibbard, requires credence-eliciting utility functions in
the same way that practical rationality requires pursuing necessary means. Neither
of these requirements of rationality is guaranteed by an agent adopting the corre-
sponding values. So, Gibbard concludes, a “pure concern with truth for its own
sake [cannot] explain epistemic rationality” (2008c, p. 159).
4.1.2 Gibbard’s Argument Part II: Epistemic Rationality as Maximizing Guidance Value
In the first part of the argument, Gibbard argues that epistemic rationality cannot
be made sense of in terms of a pure concern for truth. The reason why is that
an agent can prefer accuracy in her credences without without thereby satisfying
all of the requirements of epistemic rationality – in particular, without having a
credence-eliciting utility function. In the second part of the argument (the way
I’m reformulating it), Gibbard argues that epistemic rationality is more plausibly
reducible to aiming at maximizing expected guidance value. Requiring that agents
maximize the expected payoffs of their beliefs, unlike requiring that they value the
truth in their beliefs, does require the agent’s utility function to be credence-eliciting.
To see this, notice that an agent’s utility function being credence-eliciting is
a property of the functions g1(x), how much utility the agent assigns to having
credence x in S when S is true, and g0(x), how much utility the agent assigns to
having credence x in S when S is false. What makes a pair of functions credence-
eliciting is that the expected utility, when calculated from the perspective of the
agent, of having the credence that the agent actually has is higher than the expected
utility of having any other credence. Formally, a pair of functions g1(x) and g0(x)
is credence-eliciting just in case they stand in a very particular relationship to
each other. Gibbard (2008c, p. 152-3) discusses the particular way this works,
but the formal aspects of that won’t concern us here. For our purposes, we can
consider a particular pair of functions as an example: If we let g1(x) = −(1− x)2
and g0(x) = −x2, we get the Brier score, a well-studied credence-eliciting utility
function. Using this pair of utility functions, we can calculate the utility of having
some credence c in S is −(1 − x)2c + −x2(1 − c). This quantity is maximized
7There is another important difference the reader should notice: In the case Gibbard actually
considers, he is granting to the opponent that the agent in question maximizes her expected utility.
He then goes on to argue that even if the agent is rational in these other ways, that doesn’t guarantee his
epistemic rationality. In the practical case, we should make that same concession since much more
plausibly, maximizing expected utility is all that’s required for practical rationality.
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when x = c, so if the agent’s credence were c and she uses this pair of utility
functions to calculate the expected accuracy of some credence x, she’d view c,
the credence she actually has, as maximizing that expected accuracy. Of course,
there are many (uncountably-many) more pairs of credence-eliciting pairs of utility
functions. Following Gibbard, I’ll call such a pair of functions SAM-qualifying.
What Gibbard points out is that the collection of SAM-qualifying pairs of utility
functions is exactly the same as the collection of pairs of utility functions such that
if an agent has those utility functions, she views her own credences as maximiz-
ing expected guidance value. From this, Gibbard concludes that since epistemic
rationality requires agents to be as if they have credence-eliciting utility functions,
and this is exactly what is guaranteed by the agent trying to maximize the expected
guidance value of their credences, it is this maximizing of expected guidance value
that best explains epistemic rationality.
To get at these ideas, Gibbard offers an example of a person trying to avoid a
tiger that is behind one of two doors, either the left or the right, one of which he
must open. If the tiger is in fact behind the right door, then choosing the right door
to open has a utility of -100, let’s say, and similarly for the left door. We’ll say that
the guidance value of the policy to open the right door is -100. Gibbard does not
give a precise characterization of what constitutes guidance value, but he does give
some prototypes: In discussing the possible valuable aspects of beliefs, he says,
“Beliefs can be comforting. They can be empowering. They can link one to others in
a fellowship of conviction. I’ll label all the kinds of value that credences can have
apart from their guidance value as side value” (2008c, p. 155). Guidance value, we
might try saying, is the value a belief or policy has in helping us promote our goals,
separate from any goals we might have that involve that belief itself.
Suppose that the tiger is in fact behind the right door and that the agent has
a credence of .4 that the tiger is behind the right door. Then the actual guidance
value of his credence is -100. That is, if the agent follows through on the actions
that maximize his expected utility, then he’ll get -100 utility. The agent cannot
tell that this is the actual guidance value of his credence though, since he doesn’t
know the location of the tiger. In general, the actual guidance value of an array of
credences will depend on factors not accessible to the agent. We can ask what the
agent can expect the guidance value of his credences to be though. In this case, from
the agent’s perspective, it appears that the value of opening the right door is -40,
because he has a .6 credence that the -100 value possibility is on the left side. This is
what Gibbard calls the “prospective guidance value” of the credence (2008c, p. 156).
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When it comes to prospective guidance value, practical rationality seems to
require that we adopt those credences that have the highest prospective guidance
value by our own lights. When we adopt such a policy, we’re being “guidance-
immodest.” A way of choosing credences with respect to a utility function is
guidance-immodest when “if one forms one’s credences that way, one will attribute to
credences formed in that very way, then, a maximal expectation of guidance value”
(2008c, p. 156). What Gibbard shows, using a formal result of Schervish (1989),
is that we maximize the prospective guidance value of our credences on certain
a series of bets iff our utility functions are credence-eliciting. It is this practical,
guidance-seeking aim that seems to underpin our seemingly epistemic obligation to
take ourselves to be maximizing accuracy in our credences then, Gibbard concludes.
To see how this works, recall our agent who is trying to pick the most accurate
credence she can for S. Gibbard proposes that we can offer her a series of bets Gβ
for 0 < β < 1 on whether S such that the payoff of bet Gβ is β : β. If an agent
has a credence x in S, then she’ll view all and only the bets Gβ such that β > x
as better than fair (and she’ll accept them using standard decision theory). What
credence would an agent wish herself to have then if she aims to maximize her
expect payoff for this series of bets? She expects she can do no better than by acting
on the credence she actually has, since having any other credence would have her
accept some bets she now takes to be unfair or reject some she now takes to be
better than fair. So, in this case, the agent is guidance-immodest.
Gibbard then appeals to the formal result from Schervish (1989). Here is Gib-
bard’s restatement of the result:
Smooth functions g1 and g0 are credence-eliciting if and only if for some
possible continuum of bet offers and a policy of accepting any bet offer
Gγ exactly when γ < x, g1(x) gives the expected payoff of the policy
given S, and g0(x) gives the expected payoff of the policy given S.8
The series of bets Gβ that Gibbard gives is a series that satisfies the right-hand side
of the biconditional, so we can conclude that the utility functions g1 and g0 of the
agent are credence-eliciting.
So, by constructing the series of bets on S, Gibbard shows that the agent having
a credence-eliciting utility function, though it is not demanded by having a pure
concern for truth, is required if the agent’s credences maximize their expected
8This is Gibbard’s (2008c, p. 157) restatement of a formal result gestured at by Schervish (1989, p.
1869). It ignores some minor formal issues that will be irrelevant to the discussion here.
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guidance value for those bets. Since epistemic rationality requires being as if one
has credence-eliciting utility functions, Gibbard claims, a pure concern for truth
doesn’t seem well suited to explain epistemic rationality (that’s part one of the
argument), but a concern for maximizing the expected guidance value of one’s
credences can explain it (that’s part two). As Gibbard goes on mention, since the
value of true belief is only a side value, it cannot factor into the guidance value, the
prospective maximization of which seems to explain the requirement of epistemic
rationality that our concern for truth be SAM-qualifying. Gibbard puts the point
like this:
Simply wanting truth or accuracy for its own sake does not explain
[why our concern for truth must be SAM-qualifying]. Wanting truth
entirely for the sake of guidance would explain it – and this is the only
explanation we have found. (2008c, p. 160)
Putting it all together then, if we aim at the truth by valuing accuracy in our
credences, the aim of truth can’t explain epistemic rationality, Gibbard argues.
Epistemic rationality requires that we aim at the truth in a special way – a way that
lines up with aiming to maximize the prospective guidance value of our credences.
It is this second aim then that best explains epistemic rationality, Gibbard suggests.
4.2 Saving the Epistemic from the Pragmatic
As I presented it above, Gibbard offers a two-part argument in which he tries to
show that epistemic rationality is best understood in practical terms. Gibbard’s
proposed practical understanding of epistemic rationality relies heavily on the use
of idealized agents and situations: Gibbard argues that for a perfect Bayesian agent
that can “[perform], at will, whatever acts have highest expected utility as reckoned
using [her] credences” (2008c, p. 156), that agent will be epistemically rational
when she’s offered a certain infinite collection of bets. In this section, I’ll claim
that Gibbard’s use of idealization is peculiar and that Gibbard must tell a further
explanatory story. There are some possible avenues of response open to Gibbard
here and canvassing all of them is not my main focus here. Instead, the worry I
pose about Gibbard’s idealization should give us reason to consider whether there
are other options open for explaining epistemic rationality. In the second part of
this chapter, I provide another such option. I show that Gibbard’s motivation for
rejecting the most natural type of explanation of epistemic rationality, in terms of
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the aim of belief, is unsound. He employs a bad understanding of the aim of belief.
I’ll survey various different kinds of aims there are and point out arguments in
favor of interpreting the aim of belief radically differently from how Gibbard does.
I then claim that we can understand epistemic rationality in terms of that a different
understanding of the aim of belief and sketch the beginnings of such an account.
4.2.1 On Reducing Epistemic Rationality to Practical Rationality
In the second part of Gibbard’s argument, he proposes that we explain the demands
of epistemic rationality in terms of the demands of practical rationality. On this
picture, our epistemic obligations derive from our pursuing what is best for us in
terms of prospective guidance value.
It’s important to notice that Gibbard’s proposed explanation, in order to be
plausible, must appeal to very idealized practical decision scenarios. His proposal
can’t be that the demands of epistemic rationality for actual agents are derivative
upon a practical requirement to maximize the actual prospective guidance value of
their beliefs. Here is a case that shows that:
NERVOUS BETTER Richard, a psychotherapist, is being shown the outcomes of flips
of a weighted coin that is 55% likely to come up heads on any given flip. He
starts out assuming that the coin is fair but then correctly comes to have a .55
credence that the coin will come up heads on the next flip after a very large
number of trials. Richard also knows that he’s about to be offered a series of
bets Hβ for 0 < β < 1 such that the payoff of bet Hβ is β : β on whether the
coin will come up heads on the next flip. Since Richard is a psychotherapist,
he is very cognizant of how he acts under pressure and knows that when
he’s faced with bets, he tends to doubt his own mental arithmetic. Richard
anticipates that when he’s offered the bets, he’ll probably doubt his views,
assume the coin is closer to fair than he now takes it to be (since most coins
are), and thereby not maximize his prospective returns. Richard knows that
he can prevent this by making his credence more extreme, since he will then
moderate his actions the appropriate amount when he’s confronted with the
bets. So, Richard actively tries to inculcate in himself a .6 credence that the coin
will come up heads by seeking out evidence for that, imagining explanations
of why the coin would be so biased, and asking friends to reinforce that idea.
In cases like this, maximizing the actual prospective guidance value of our beliefs
in exactly the betting situation Gibbard describes seems to require us to be epistem-
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ically irrational. As a practical requirement, the real Richard must not accord his
beliefs to his evidence if he is to maximize his prospective returns.
One might say in reply to this case that Gibbard is offering an ideal, rather than
non-ideal, theory of epistemic rationality. The idea would be that Gibbard’s account
tells us about the ‘epistemically rationally Utopian’ state, where agents always act
with full epistemic rationality and are not limited by the kinds of problems that
face Richard above.9 A full account of epistemic rationality would then supplement
Gibbard’s story with a more realistic story about limited agents.
This kind of response to the case is right but not quite complete. Gibbard is
working in ideal theory, but we shouldn’t think of Gibbard as offering a description
of the ideal in presenting the betting scenarios.10 When we do ideal theory for
some realm, such as ideal political theory, we give a description of how things
would ideally be in that regard, such as satisfying the difference principle, and then
explain why they are that way, such as being the result of a system constructed by
a fair procedure. When Gibbard offers his explanation of epistemic rationality in
terms of the practical, he is already taking for granted the relevant features of the
epistemically rationally ideal state, namely that the agents are Bayesian agents who
can be represented as having a credence-eliciting utility function. Gibbard’s aim is
then to explain in virtue of what the ideal state is that way. The betting scenarios
are supposed to explain the features of the epistemically rationally ideal world: in
the ideal state, we’re epistemically rational because we’re practically rational with
respect to this series of bets, Gibbard claims.
Idealization plays two distinct roles in this methodology: First, there is the
difference between limited, everyday agents, such as you and me, and ideally
epistemically rational agents, who are perfectly Bayesian, have credence-eliciting
utility functions, and can “[perform], at will, whatever acts have highest expected
utility as reckoned using [their] credences” (2008c, p. 156), among other perfections.
This first kind of idealization is present in the methodology because we’re doing
ideal theory. After Gibbard restricts his attention to agents who are ideal in this
first way, there is another kind of idealization – one that treats the ideal agents as
only facing an infinite series of bets, having credences about only one proposition,
9The idea here is analogous to the ideal/non-ideal theory distinction typically made in political
philosophy. See Valentini (2012) for an overview of the ways the distinction functions there.
10Suppose Gibbard were offering a description of the epistemically rationally ideal state in giving
the betting scenarios. Then we would have to take Gibbard to be saying that in the epistemically
rationally ideal world, agents are faced with infinite series of bets about each proposition they have
credences about. Epistemic rationality certainly doesn’t require that.
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caring only about money, etc.11 To keep the terminology clear, let’s call the first
kind of idealization, moving from limited to ideal agents (that factors in switching
from non-ideal to ideal theory), idealling. Objects that are the result of idealling are
ideal. I’ll use idealization and idealized only for the second kind of idealization, which
Gibbard uses in moving from talk about ideal agents in general to talk about ideal
agents in ideal betting cases.
In these terms, we ought to view Gibbard as working entirely within ideal theory,
so he is only talking about ideal agents and ideal scenarios. Gibbard then takes up
the task of explaining the constraints of epistemic rationality on these ideal agents.
He does this by idealizing the ideal agent: he treats the ideal agent as being in an
ideal betting scenario. For this idealized ideal agent, their being practically rational
can explain their being epistemically rational, Gibbard claims. I will grant Gibbard’s
claim about the idealized ideal cases, but I’ll ask what the import of these idealized
cases is for the demands of epistemic rationality on non-idealized ideal agents, such
as ideal versions of ourselves.12 I suggest we look towards an understanding of
the role of idealizations in explanations to find out. When we do, we’ll see that
it’s unclear what Gibbard’s idealizations have to say about the non-idealized ideal
cases.
4.2.1.1 Concerning Idealization in Gibbard’s Explanation
I take it that, generally speaking, we use idealized agents and situations in episte-
mology because doing so allows us to focus on the important explanatory features
of the phenomena that we’re interested in. Consider an analogy to science: we
might try to understand the motion of a spring by treating it as an idealized simple
harmonic oscillator, thereby restricting our focus to the major factors in the spring’s
motion. In creating an account of epistemic rationality, by intentionally idealizing
away potentially distracting aspects of real cases, we can hopefully give a tractable
account of epistemic rationality in terms of its core features. The goal then would
be to apply the understanding gained from the idealized cases to unidealized cases.
Michael Weisberg (2007) catalogues three kinds of idealization: Galilean idealiza-
tion, where distortions are intentionally introduced to make phenomena more easily
11Although supposing that the agents have a “sufficiently rich prospect for what ‘bets’ one will
face in life” (2008c, p. 159) is the main idealization of the second type, the second type also includes
many other idealizing assumptions, including those that I list here and those that Gibbard lists both
in the concluding section of his article and in Gibbard (2008a).
12As such, I’ll restrict the discussion below to discussion of ideal, though not necessarily idealized,
agents.
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tractable, minimalist idealization, where the phenomenon is idealized to include
only its core explanatory features, and multiple-models idealization, where different
incompatible models of the phenomenon are used to understand it.13 The kind
of idealization present in Gibbard’s cases doesn’t look like multiple-models ide-
alization, since Gibbard is not offering different incompatible stories that explain
various aspects of the epistemic rationality in the ideal agents. So, if the idealization
in Gibbard’s cases is one of these kinds, we should expect it to be either Galilean or
minimalist idealization.
The question of whether the kind of idealization employed by Gibbard (and
philosophers more generally in these kinds of argument) is Galilean or minimalist is
not one I intend to answer here. Instead, it’s enough for our purposes to notice that
if the idealization is one of those two types, the main explanatory features of the
idealized cases (or something quite similar to them) must be present in the rest of
the ideal (though not idealized) cases to be explained. More precisely, both Galilean
and minimalist idealizations satisfy SAVES MAJOR FACTORS:
SAVES MAJOR FACTORS If M* is an idealized version of M and C1, C2, . . . are the
primary causal or explanatory elements in M*, then each of C1, C2, . . . or
something that plays a similar role is present in M.
Intuitively, SAVES MAJOR FACTORS tells us that either the parts of the idealization
that are important for explaining the idealized phenomenon or something that
plays the same role in the explanation exists in the unidealized target phenomenon
to be explained. When we offer explanations in terms of an idealized version of a
target, we should want our idealizations to satisfy SAVES MAJOR FACTORS. If an
idealization that we appeal to does not satisfy SAVES MAJOR FACTORS, explanations
that may work in the idealized cases may not work for the unidealized case, since
the explanatory parts of the idealization may be missing analogous parts in the
unidealized case.
Minimalist idealizations satisfy SAVES MAJOR FACTORS straightforwardly: mini-
malist idealizations are idealizations which include only the primary explanatory
features of the real phenomenon, so every primary explanatory feature must be
part of the real phenomenon. Galilean idealizations are idealizations that leave out
13Weisberg’s discussion takes place in the context of a discussion about idealization in scientific
theories. I see no reason to think the lessons from that discussion don’t apply to idealization
in philosophy as well, with some natural generalization. For example, Weisberg characterizes
minimalist idealizations as including only the core causal features; by generalizing that to the core
explanatory features, we make the account more easily application to philosophical discussion where
causation doesn’t play the same central role as it does in the sciences.
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or simply elements of the phenomenon to make it more computationally tractable.
For example, we may idealize a spring by treating it as frictionless and a simple
harmonic oscillator. Not every primary feature of a Galilean idealization is neces-
sarily present in the real phenomenon, since some features may be computationally
simpler approximations of the features of the real phenomenon, such as the simple
harmonic oscillation in the spring example. In that case though, something similar
to the feature of the idealized model will be present in the real phenomenon, namely
the computationally hard real part of the phenomenon (dampened harmonic oscil-
lation). So Galilean idealizations will also satisfy SAVES MAJOR FACTORS.
Gibbard’s proposed explanation of epistemic rationality appeals to idealized
versions of ideal agents. Gibbard’s idealized cases do not seem to satisfy SAVES
MAJOR FACTORS though. For example, consider ideal Sandra:
GRANDMA’S PHONE NUMBER Sandra’s grandmother passed away about a month
ago, and her family is working to settle her affairs. The family sold grandma’s
house and closed her account with the phone company months ago. Today,
Sandra received a letter from the phone company confirming that the account
had been closed and that the phone number would be reused no sooner than
100 years from now, so saving that number wouldn’t be useful. Just below that,
the letter lists the details of the closed account including the phone number.
The last digit of the phone number is smudged though, and Sandra can’t
read it. Seeing that made Sandra wonder what that number was. Through
the smudge, she can see that whatever number it was, it was curved on top.
So, she lowers her credence that is was the number 4. Sandra then goes on
dealing with her grandmother’s estate. The question of her grandmother’s
phone number never comes up again and having had that number would not
have helped Sandra in achieving any of her other goals.
In this unidealized case, epistemic rationality puts demands on Sandra that she
satisfies: In lowering her credence that the last digit was 4, it seems that Sandra is
acting epistemically rationally – coming to that conclusion is the proper response to
her evidence. Because this is an instance of the phenomenon that Gibbard purports
to explain, namely epistemic rationality in ideal agents, if Gibbard’s idealization sat-
isfies SAVES MAJOR FACTORS, we should expect that all of the primary explanatory
features of Gibbard’s idealized cases are present here. In the idealized cases, the in-
finite series of bets that plays the practical role is key to the practical understanding
of epistemic rationality, but nothing seems to play a similar role in this unidealized
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case. There is no practical element to do the explanatory work GRANDMA’S PHONE
NUMBER. So, it seems that Gibbard’s idealizations do not satisfy SAVES MAJOR
FACTORS.
Perhaps the kind of idealization that Gibbard uses is not one of the types of ide-
alization given by Weisberg. Even if so, we’d still expect that kind of idealization to
satisfy SAVES MAJOR FACTORS. That’s because, as I mentioned above, explanations
of a target phenomenon that appeal to elements of idealized models only seem to
be able to explain the target insomuch as those elements exist in the unidealized
cases. Explanatory features of the idealized case can’t explain the unidealized cases,
even by analogy, if those features don’t exist in the explananda.
Gibbard might reply that the mere possibility of there being a practical element in
the ideal cases is enough to explain the epistemic rationality. In GRANDMA’S PHONE
NUMBER, for example, it’s possible for Sandra to have been faced by the type of bets
Gibbard’s explanations require. This is where Gibbard’s formal result pulls through:
Using any credence-eliciting scoring rule, such as the Brier score, we can create a
series of bets for which the agent would have the required prospective guidance
value maximizing policy if the agent is epistemically rational. The proposal would
then be that the series of bets that the agent faces is purely hypothetical. In all cases
of epistemic rationality, there will always be this merely hypothetical series of bets
that Gibbard could appeal to. If Gibbard were to then treat the bets as hypothetical
also in the idealized cases, Gibbard’s idealizations would satisfy SAVES MAJOR
FACTORS.
I worry about a version of Gibbard’s claim that treats the bets as merely hy-
pothetical for both the idealized and unidealized ideal agent. Doing so removes
the practical import of the bets from the agents. The practical import of the bets is
crucial to the sort of explanation that Gibbard is offering of epistemic rationality in
terms of the practical in the idealized case. To conceive of the sort of explanation
that Gibbard is offering without the real gains and losses to the idealized agent is
just to think of it as offering an account of epistemic rationality as modelable as a
practical requirement on the agent. This wouldn’t license Gibbard’s conclusion that
the explanation given is a practical one, rather than another type. For example, it’s
possible that the total utility in the world could have been directly tied to an ideal
agent’s doxastic life and maximized when the agent is epistemically rational. This
mere possibility doesn’t license the conclusion that the requirement that the agent
be epistemically rational stems from moral obligation, even by the utilitarian’s
lights. He would have a moral obligation only if that possibility were actual. The
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analogous worry holds for the hypothetical version of Gibbard’s claims: if the claim
is just that there could have been a series of bets such that the idealized agent is
practically rational with respect to them only if he is epistemically rational, this
doesn’t show that the agent being epistemically rational in that idealized case can
be explained in practical terms.
So suppose then that Gibbard’s explanation treats the bets as non-hypothetical
for the idealized ideal agent. GRANDMA’S PHONE NUMBER shows us that, in order
for Gibbard to explain epistemic rationality in all ideal cases, the explanation must
still treat the bets as merely hypothetical for some unidealized ideal agents. The
natural story then would be that hypothetical bets play the explanatory role for the
merely ideal agent that the non-hypothetical bets play for the idealized ideal agent.
The worry now is just that there is no good story about how merely hypothetical
bets could explain epistemic rationality in the unidealized cases in a practical way,
as Gibbard claims they do.
In GRANDMA’S PHONE NUMBER, Sandra knows that knowing phone number
won’t ever be of practical importance to her. Norms of practical rationality require
agents to do the best they can in actually satisfying their goals. It hardly seems
then that practical rationality directs Sandra to do anything in this case, even if
Sandra could merely hypothetically have been faced with the relevant series of bets.
More generally, it seems strange to think that when it isn’t epistemically possible
to the agent that the relevant proposition could play a practical role nonetheless
directives of practical rationality apply to the agent in virtue of there being a
merely hypothetical series of bets that the agent could face on that proposition.
But without the directives of practical rationality in these unidealized ideal cases,
Gibbard’s cannot explain the agent’s epistemic rationality in terms of that agent
being practically rational.14
Some seem to think that my worry here is mistaken though. In the literature on
defenses of probabilist coherence, an appeal to merely hypothetical bets is taken
by some to save Dutch Books arguments from a similar worry. There, Dutch Book
arguments are given to show that if one’s beliefs are probabilistically incoherent,
then there is (in a merely hypothetical sense) a series of bets that one would view as
fair and guarantee a loss. The objection then is that the merely hypothetical nature
of the bets hurts the Dutch Book argument: Just as the merely hypothetical nature
14Put another way, the worry here is that merely hypothetical bets can’t play the same explanatory
role as real bets, since the merely hypothetical ones do not generate practical implications. So
then, in trying to have the idealizations satisfy SAVES MAJOR FACTORS, the hypothetical bets in the
unidealized cases cannot play the same explanatory role as the bets in the idealized cases.
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of the bets above appears problematic for the explanation in Gibbard’s unidealized
cases, when it comes to Dutch Books, the hypothetical nature of the bets seems to
remove the practical implications of the bets from the intended epistemological
conclusion.
In response to these worries, several authors have given ‘depragmatized’ Dutch
Book arguments, which (generally speaking) take one’s willingness to accept de-
fective bets to expose a kind of defectiveness of the beliefs that would sanction
accepting those bets. For these kinds of arguments see Christensen (1996), Howson
and Urbach (1993, p. 75–89), and Hellman (1997). One might think that Gibbard
could appeal to similar considerations to dispel my worry about his bets having to
be merely hypothetical for the unidealized agents.
This seems difficult though. The depragmatized Dutch Books use a hypothetical
practical defect to expose, but not explain, a real epistemic defect. Christensen
(1996), for example, links beliefs to hypothetical collections of bets via a normative
principle about what bets are ‘sanctioned’ by an agent’s credences. Christensen
then employs the principle to show that probabilistically incoherent credences
sanction defective bets. This then is supposed to expose an inconsistency in the
credences themselves. Maher (1997) poses a formal problem for this kind of result,
but let’s ignore that for a moment. Even if Christensen’s argument were right,
the result would be that we can expose an epistemic inconsistency in the agent’s
credences by showing that it sanctions a defective collection of bets. Why ought
we have probabilistically coherent credences then on this picture? The reason
is to avoid epistemic, rather than practical, inconsistency.15 Unlike this kind of
approach, Gibbard is attempting to explain the epistemic requirements in terms
of the practical requirements, not merely use hypothetical practical requirements
to expose epistemic requirements that are justified independently. On Gibbard’s
picture, it is agents “[w]anting truth entirely for the sake of guidance” (2008c, p.
160), a merely hypothetical practical concern for some ideal agents, that is supposed
15Christensen makes this quite clear. He says, “Interpreted in this way, Dutch-book arguments
do not show that degrees of belief that violate the probability calculus are inconsistent in some
previously understood sense. But that is reasonable enough. We need not reduce or assimilate
consistency of graded beliefs to some previously understood kind of consistency (such as consistency
of all-or-nothing beliefs or of preferences). We are seeking intuitive support for taking a certain set
of principles as the best candidate for a formal constraint which plays a role similar to deductive
consistency, but which applies to graded beliefs” (p. 457) and later, “Hypothetical vulnerability to
guaranteed betting losses is not a practical financial liability. Thus, the force of arguments purporting
to derive rules for rational belief from betting-loss considerations must see the hypothetical betting
losses as an indicator of a deeper problem. . . . The defect disclosed by Dutch-book vulnerability is
then seen as a defect in the beliefs themselves” (p. 478).
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to explain their epistemic rationality.
This then is where we stand: The most plausible picture for Gibbard to offer
is one in which, for most ideal agents, the agent acting practically rationally with
respect to a merely hypothetical series of bets explains the agent being epistemically
rational. The worry was that a merely hypothetical practical constraint on an agent
don’t seem to be able to generate real demands on an agent that may able to explain
her epistemic rationality, in the way Gibbard proposes. Similar worries have been
posed and responded to for Dutch Book arguments. The responses there though
only save the arguments by using the hypothetical practical constraints to expose,
rather than justify or explain, the epistemic constraints. Gibbard must claim that
the merely hypothetical practical constraints can do more than that. Hypothetical
practical constraints must be able to explain or underpin real epistemic constraints.
Intuitively, merely hypothetical practical requirements don’t seem to be able to
explain anything as long as they remain merely hypothetical. So, Gibbard needs a
story about how this explanation works. How can a merely hypothetical practical
constraint on an agent explain, rather than just expose, a real epistemic constraint
on that agent?
I worry that the merely hypothetical practical constraints cannot explain real
epistemic constraints, as Gibbard would require, but I won’t pursue that line any
further here. In the next section, I’ll undermine Gibbard’s motivation for producing
this kind of account in the first place by showing that there is alternative way to
think about the connection between epistemic rationality and the aim of belief.
4.3 Aiming at the Truth
Recall that at the beginning of his argument, Gibbard appeals to what he takes to be
a metaphor about belief, that belief aims at the truth. “Belief . . . can’t aim literally;
it’s we who aim,” he tells us (2008c, p. 143). Gibbard then uses this idea to motivate
his MINIMAL TEST FOR EPISTEMIC RATIONALITY:
MINIMAL TEST FOR EPISTEMIC RATIONALITY “When a person forms her credences
with epistemic rationality, is it as if she were choosing her credences voluntar-
ily, rationally aiming, in light of her credences, at truth in those very credences”
(2008c, p. 147).
Using this minimal requirement for epistemic rationality, Gibbard then argues that
valuing the truth cannot fully explain epistemic rationality, because one can value
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the truth (satisfy CONDITION T) without thereby having a credence-eliciting utility
function, which Gibbard takes to be a requirement that follows from the MINIMAL
TEST FOR EPISTEMIC RATIONALITY. Gibbard puts his conclusion like this though:
Does belief, then, aim at truth? Yes, but in a special way. Belief, we have
seen, aims at truth, but not perhaps for the sake of truth itself. Belief
aims at truth for the sake of guidance. (2008c, p. 161)
Gibbard concludes that only a species of aiming at the truth could explain epistemic
rationality. But strictly speaking, this doesn’t follow from what he says in the first
part of the argument. There, he only shows that valuing the truth, i.e. having a
utility function that satisfies CONDITION T, isn’t sufficient for epistemic rationality.
Gibbard seems to need another premise here, namely that to aim at the truth is
to value the truth. I think Gibbard is intentionally aligning these two notions
and that he makes that intention especially clear, for example, when he speaks of
utility functions that satisfy CONDITION T (a restriction on what the agent values) as
“variants of ‘aiming at truth”’ (2008c, p. 149-50).16
In getting his argument started then, Gibbard employs two substantive claims
about the popular idiom that belief aims at the truth: First, Gibbard takes the aim
to be merely metaphorical – expressing only something about believers, not beliefs.
Second, Gibbard takes it that for an agent to aim at the truth is for her to value
accuracy in her credences. This combination of these two claims seems too strong
though. If believers aim at the truth and to aim at the truth requires valuing the
truth, then agents who deny that they value the truth would seem to fail to have
any beliefs. Perhaps such agents as modelable as though they value the truth (even
in so denying it), but such a model would be deficient at least in being charitable
to the agent. So, in this final section, I’ll suggest that a externally well-motivated
conception of what is required for belief to aim at truth could deny both of Gibbard’s
claims. I’ll also sketch how this kind of account might offer a promising account of
how to make sense of epistemic rationality in terms of this newly-conceived-of aim.
4.3.1 Conceiving of the Aim
Gibbard says, “Belief . . . can’t aim literally; it’s we who aim,” and in a sense, he is
right. If aiming is an action, no belief can perform it (as only agents can perform
16In discussing Gibbard, Swanson (2008, p. 179) seems to follow Gibbard in switching between
these two distinct notions. This is particularly clear in Swanson’s summary of Gibbard’s argument,
where Swanson only uses ‘value’ talk but then puts the conclusion in terms of aims.
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actions). But, we can take the idiom to be ascribing a property to belief: “Belief aims
at the truth” is short for “belief has an aim of truth.” This way of understanding
the idiom saves the idea that the idiom is about belief itself, rather than believers,
which makes it a more charitable interpretation.17
What then does it mean for belief, or any other thing, to have an aim? There are
a few ways in which something can be said to ‘aim at’ or ‘have an aim of’:18
• In the most common form of aiming, agents have aims that guide their action.
When aims are of the type that can guide our action, they must be conceptually
individuated. For example, the moral saint has the aim of promoting the good.
She need not also have the aim (in this sense) of producing the greatest amount
of utility, even if utilitarianism is true, since judging something to be utility
maximizing need not have the same reasons-giving role by the agent’s lights
as judging it to promote the good.19 I’ll say that these are aims in the narrow
goal sense.
• Agents also have aims, in the sense of having a goal, but in a less finely-
individuated way. For example, suppose Bob is trying to sum 57 and 68. We
can say, “he aims to believe that 57 and 68 is 125.” We don’t thereby attribute
to Bob that goal in the narrow sense. Since Bob doesn’t know what 57 and 68
is, it doesn’t motivate him in the way narrow goals motivate agents.20 In this
wide goal sense of ‘aim,’ an agent has an aim at some goal when the agent is
pursing a state of where the goal obtains.21
• There is a teleological sense in which things have aims. If it is the telos or proper
function of an object to φ, we can describe the object has having an aim of
φ-ing. A dam in a river, for example, aims at obstructing the flow of water.
17Also notice that this way of expressing that some thing has a property is not so uncommon:
we might say, for example, “This recipe demands 2 grams of rosewater.” In doing so, we’re not
suggesting that the recipe is actually demanding, like a parent demands a child’s obedience; rather,
it’s the recipe that has a demand.
18I am very thankful to the discussion of possible senses of ‘aim’ by David Plunkett (2012, p. 20-1).
Many of these senses of ‘aim’ are similar to his, but my senses differ from his in some important
ways.
19For example, we could say to the moral saint, “φ-ing produces the greatest amount of utility,” to
which he could properly respond, “So? I don’t aim to produces the greatest amount of utility. I aim
to promote the good.” So, in this narrow sense of aims, aims are individuated conceptually.
20To see that believing that 57 and 68 is 125 is not Bob’s narrow goal, notice that were he to adopt it
in a normal way, he would thereby satisfy it and it would not be his goal. A natural thing to think
about this kind of goal, though, is that one has this wider kind of aim at P just in case one has an a
narrow aim that entails P, but I won’t take a stand on that here.
21There is an intentional sense of ‘aim,’ in which one aims at some goal when they intend to bring
about the goal (Plunkett 2012, p. 20). I believe that the narrow and wide goal senses of ‘aim’ more
finely distinguishes this kind of intentional aim.
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This is not because the dam adopts any goals or values. Rather, the dam,
insomuch as it functions properly, obstructs the flow.
• We also say of objects, such as projectiles, that they are ‘aimed’ at their targets.
An arrow need not have the proper function of hitting the bullseye or be the
subject of an agent’s intention to hit the bullseye in order to be aimed at the
bullseye. The stock market might also be “aiming to make a recovery,” in the
same sense of ‘aim.’ In this trajectory sense, we say that something has an
aim at some object or state of affairs when, under some salient conditions, the
object would come in contact with the object or produce the state of affairs.
• Finally, there is a normative sense of ‘aim.’ Aims, in the normative sense,
specify standards of success, goodness, or other types of evaluation. Clocks
aim at telling the time because a clock is a good clock insomuch as it tells the
right time. This kind of aim is also sometimes put in terms of correctness
conditions: The clock is correct when it tells the time. Importantly, the term
‘correct’ here is distinctly normative; to say that the clock is correct is to say
more than it tells the actual time; it also conveys that the clock is as the clock
ought to be.22
The first two kinds of ‘aim,’ the narrow and wide goal senses, are kinds that only
agents can have, so belief, as opposed to believers, cannot have aims in these senses.
Belief also doesn’t have an aim of truth in the trajectory sense since a belief cannot
literally contact truth. The remaining two senses of ‘aim,’ the teleological sense and
the normative sense, are popularly endorsed in the literature as senses in which
belief does have an aim of truth.
The normative conception of the aim of truth is typically formulated as a con-
ceptual truth about BELIEF: it’s a conceptual truth that a belief that P is correct if and
only if P.23 This claim expresses a standard of correctness for belief. It’s important
that the sense of ‘correct’ being used is normative, so that, following Ewing (1939),
a correct belief is a belief the one ought to have, for some sense of ‘ought.’24 If belief
22We sometimes use the word ‘correct’ in a non-normative way, as in ‘correct supposition.’ To
call something a ‘correct supposition’ is just to say that the content of the supposition is true, since
suppositions aren’t evaluated as good or bad in virtue of whether their contents are true.
23For example, see Wedgwood (2002), Shah (2003), Shah and Velleman (2005), Engel (2005), Engel
(2008), and Chapter III. In the first paper, Shah only advocates for the ‘only if’ direction of this claim.
In the later paper, the biconditional is advanced. A bit ironically, Gibbard is often taken to espouse
this view as well. He says, for example, “For belief, correctness is truth. Correct belief is true belief.
. . . Correctness, now, seems normative . . . The correct belief, if all this is right, seems to be the one [a
person] ought, in this sense, to have” (2005, p. 338-9)
24It’s also important to distinguish the normative aim thesis from a similar merely descriptive
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aims at the truth in this normative sense, it’s a conceptual truth that beliefs ought
to be true, for some sense of ‘ought.’ The sense of ‘ought’ in play is a distinctly
doxastic one, that’s part of the very idea of belief. So in this sense, a true belief is a
belief how it ought to be, i.e. being true is good for a belief.25
Proponents of a teleological conception of the aim of belief typically agree with
the normative conception that a belief is correct iff its content is true. They disagree
with the normative conception in how this is to be understood though. According
to the teleological conception of the aim, true belief is correct “because only true
beliefs achieve the aim involved in believing” (Engel 2012, p. 4). There is value,
proponents of the teleological conception argue, in belief functioning properly, i.e.
having a true content. This explains why correct belief is true belief, they claim.26
Nishi Shah (2003) argues that a purely teleological conception sense of the aim of
belief is incompatible with a good explanation of the phenomenon of transparency,
that “when asking oneself whether to believe that p, [one must] immediately recognize
that this question is settled by, and only by, answering the question whether p is true”
(2003, p. 447). Shah (2003) goes on, with Shah and Velleman (2005), to show that
the normative conception of the aim of belief can explain the phenomenon. I agree
with Shah and Velleman and provide a new argument for the normative conception
of the aim in Chapter III. In the next section, I’ll suppose that belief does aim in the
normative sense, and I’ll use this aim to sketch an account of epistemic rationality
in terms of this aim.
4.3.2 Saving Epistemic Rationality: A Sketch
Gibbard’s argument against understanding epistemic rationality in terms of the
aim of belief depends on taking claims about the aim of belief to be metaphorical
for claims about what agents value. According to the normative conception of
that aim, belief aims at truth in that it’s a conceptual truth that belief ought to be
characterization of belief, i.e. that belief is (generally) produced, revised, and destroyed by truth-
conducive processes. The normative sense of ‘aiming at the truth’ is different: it says that beliefs
ought to be true (independently of whether they are).
25Again here, the ‘good’ is relative to the standards of belief. Similarly, a good clock is one that
tells time well. We can evaluate beliefs (and clocks) by other standards, such as how well they
promote moral goals or how well they roast chickens, but typically when we say that something is a
good clock, we mean that it’s good for a clock, i.e. relative too the standards against which clocks are
evaluated. So, the claim here is the a good belief is on that’s true. That’s because beliefs are to be
evaluated relative to a standard of truth, so a true belief is good for a belief.
26See Engel (2012) for further discussion of the difference between the teleological and normative
conceptions. For defences of the teleological conception, see Velleman (2000, p. 17) (who later gives
up the view), Noordhof (2001), and Steglich-Petersen (2006).
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true. In contrast to Gibbard, a defender of the normative conception isn’t thereby
committed there being any constraints on the goals of believers. To be a believer is
just to have a belief – an attitude that ought to be true. As far as the aim of belief
is concerned, one can be a believer without adopting the goal that one have true
beliefs. So, with the normative conception of the aim of belief, we can try anew to
make sense of epistemic rationality in terms of the aim of belief.
Ralph Wedgwood takes up this project explicitly and characterizes rationality
as a kind of means of achieving the end of having true beliefs (2002, p. 276). He
says, “Roughly, rational beliefs are beliefs that either result from, or (in the case
of background beliefs) amount to, one’s following a rule or set of rules that it is
rational for one to believe to be reliable” (2002, p. 282). Norms of rationality, on
Wedgwood’s view, amount to instruments derivative on the normativity of the aim
of belief, since by trying to use reliable processes, we’re trying to have true beliefs.
I agree with the general approach of Wedgwood, that of trying to make sense of
the normativity of epistemic rationality in terms of the distinctly doxastic normativ-
ity of the aim of belief. Here I won’t challenge Wedgwood’s proposal, but I’ll sketch
a simpler and more general framework for making sense of epistemic rationality in
terms of the aim of belief. My goal is not to give a full defense of this account (or
even give all the details); rather, I intend to make the account plausible.
Start with the account of rationality due to Richard Foley (1987). He claims that
we can think of different kinds of rationality as rationality with respect to the goals
of agents: “rationality is best understood in terms of a person pursuing his goals in
a way he would believe to be effective were he to take time to reflect carefully on
the question of how best to pursue them” Foley (1987, p. 6). On Foley’s view, one is
rational in pursuing an end when one is doing the best they can do by their own
lights to achieve that goal they have for themselves.
On Foley’s account, there are two elements of rationality: there’s the end which
rationality serves, and there’s the conditions under which one counts as rationally
pursuing that end (which we may call “the condition of rational pursuit”). Ac-
cording to him, the ends of rationality are goals of the agent, and the condition of
rational pursuit is that the agent pursue the goal “in a way he would believe to
be effective were he to take time to reflect carefully on the question of how best to
pursue them.” Both the end of rationality and the condition of pursuit are internal
to the agent, in that the end is a goal that the agent adopts for herself and the
condition of rational pursuit is dependent on states internal to the agent.
We can take Kelly (2003) as showing that Foley’s account of rationality cannot be
107
fully general if it only assess agents relative to their goals.27 We can generalize Fo-
ley’s view of rationality to avoid Kelly’s concerns by allowing the end of rationality
to be any standard, not just a goal of the agent:
λ-RATIONALITY An agent is rational with respect to some standard λ just in case
they are doing the best they can consistent with their abilities in achieving λ.
On this account of rationality, we can assess the rationality of an agent relative to
any standard that the agent might satisfy – independently of whether the agent
adopts for herself that standard as a goal. Whereas according to Foley, the ends of
rationality are goals of the agent (and are thereby internal to the agent), by treating
rationality as merely relative to a standard, we’re left with a more externalist
understanding of rationality – one that allows us to assess agents as rational or not
with respect to any aim, not just the ones the agent sets for herself.28
This generalized version of Foley’s scheme still admits of the standard cases
by substituting in the agent’s goals for the standard. For example, an account of
practical rationality is produced by letting the standard be the agent’s goals:
PRACTICAL RATIONALITY An agent is practically rational just in case they are doing
the best they can consistent with their abilities in satisfying their goals.
When it comes to generating an account of epistemic rationality then, the question
is what standards to we hold an agent accountable to when we evaluate them as
epistemically rational or not. According to the normative conception of the aim
of belief, there is a natural contender for what that standard should be – it’s the
standard for belief built-in to the very idea of belief. Supposing we can generalize
the aim of full belief to the aim of degreed belief or credences, we can say that the
aim of degreed belief is to be accurate. The proposal then is that the standard for
epistemic rationality is the standard of correctness for (degreed) belief – accuracy.
EPISTEMIC RATIONALITY An agent is epistemically rational just in case they are doing
the best they can consistent with their abilities in having accurate credences.
27Kelly doesn’t exactly put his point like this, but this is one lesson of it. Kelly shows that the
instrumental conception of epistemic rationality fails, so what follows is that epistemic rationality
cannot be made sense of in terms of just the agent’s goals. It doesn’t follow that a more generalized
evaluation of the agent in Foley’s style doesn’t work.
28I suspect that rationality judgments are more external in regard to the condition of rational
pursuit than Foley’s account suggests. This is why λ-RATIONALITY also generalizes Foley’s condition
of rational pursuit, making it more external. For the purposes of this sketch, that difference isn’t
what is doing the work.
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So, on this sketch of an account, whether an agent is epistemically rational is a
question of whether they are doing the best their abilities will permit them to do in
achieving the aim of belief. Being epistemically rational then doesn’t require that
the agent adopt such a goal for themselves or even intentionally pursue it.
Gibbard’s primary focus was on explaining why epistemically rational agents
must be as if they have credence-eliciting utility functions. This is because the
MINIMAL TEST FOR EPISTEMIC RATIONALITY seems to require that of agents. Being
epistemically rational in the sense I propose would require agents to pass this test
and be as if they have credence-eliciting utility functions. This is because if the
kinds of ideal agents under consideration were doing the best they can to have
accurate credences, they would not let themselves be in a position where they
take themselves to be able to rationally advance their pursuit of truth by merely
adjusting their credences. As I explained in section 4.1.1 above, doing so would not
leave the agent in a position to see herself as pursuing the truth to the best of their
abilities.
A natural objection to this kind of account might appeal to the fact that epis-
temic rationality seems to have something to do with one’s evidence: a person is
epistemically rational, we might say, only if she properly responds to her evidence.
The sketch of an account I propose doesn’t mention an agent’s evidence at all.
My reply to this objection is that the kind of sketch of an account I propose is
meant to be a more general understanding of epistemic rationality than the kind
that the objector has in mind. Surely, being epistemically rational does require
that agents properly respond to their evidence, but this could follow from a more
general account. To see that the evidence responsiveness requirement follows from
the account, notice that the general account requires that the agent be doing the
best she can by her own lights in having accurate credences. An agent’s evidence
bears on the truth or falsity of something the agent has a doxastic attitude about.
So, if they agent is not responding to the evidence, she’s not doing the best she can
in terms of having accurate credences.
A similar kind of story will work for Wedgwood’s account of epistemic ratio-
nality summarized above. Wedgwood’s account requires that one’s beliefs “result
from, or (in the case of background beliefs) amount to, one’s following a rule or
set of rules that it is rational for one to believe to be reliable” (2002, p. 282). Like
the evidence responsiveness proposal above, Wedgwood can be seen as offering a
precisification of what is required for an agent to count as doing the best they can
by their own lights in satisfying the doxastic standard of having true beliefs.
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4.3.3 Epistemic Rationality: Saved?
So, can we avoid Gibbard’s conclusion that epistemic rationality cannot be made
sense of just in terms of the aim of belief by adopting a new conception of that aim?
In a sense, we can, but in another sense, we cannot.
As many have recognized, rationality is not a distinctly epistemic notion. We can
be rational or not in many different respects – including practically and epistemically.
Epistemic rationality is distinguished from other kinds because of its distinctive
standard of evaluation. Epistemic rationality is rationality evaluated with respect to
belief’s aim – true beliefs or accurate credences. So, contra Gibbard, in a sense, we
can understand epistemic rationality in terms of the aim of belief.
Of course, the claim here is that epistemic rationality can be understood in terms
of the aim of belief, if we already understand what rationality is more generally.
But, epistemic rationality cannot be understood solely in terms of the aim of belief.
Gibbard’s example from the first part of the his argument is enough to show that
the standard set by aim of belief is insufficient to generate the norms of epistemic
rationality. Epistemic rationality requires agents to be as if they have credence-
eliciting utility functions, but all that comes from the aim of belief, on the normative
conception, is that accurate credences are correct. Just satisfying this standard for
credences doesn’t guarantee one a credence-eliciting utility function. So, since
being as if one has a credence-eliciting utility function is a requirement of epistemic
rationality, that requirement must be explained by what it is for an agent to act
epistemically rationally – it is the rational pursuit of the epistemic end that explains it,
not the aim itself. So, Gibbard is right that the requirements of epistemic rationality
cannot be fully explained in terms of the aim of belief. Only when the aim of belief
functions as a standard for rationality can it explain those requirements.
4.4 Concluding Remarks
In the first part of this chapter, I presented a summary of Gibbard’s arguments
for two separate conclusions: (1) that epistemic rationality cannot be understood
in terms of the aim of belief, and (2) that epistemic rationality is more plausibly
explained by the requirement of practical rationality that one maximize prospective
guidance value. I then responded to the claims in reverse order.
Once we understand the role of idealizations in Gibbard’s proposed explanation,
we see that the most plausible version of the claim has the epistemic rationality of
some ideal agents being explained in terms of a merely hypothetical practical re-
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quirement. It’s unclear though how those merely hypothetical practical constraints
can explain anything about the constraints on the real agent though. Whereas some
have taken merely hypothetical practical requirements to expose epistemic require-
ments, in order for Gibbard to develop his proposal as he has given it, he must
go further and show how those merely hypothetical can explain (in a justificatory
sense) the epistemic requirements.
Gibbard gets saddled with that explanatory project because in the first part of
the argument, he claims that epistemic rationality cannot be understood in terms
of the aim of belief. Key to that argument is the idea that ‘belief aims at the truth’
is metaphorical for a claim about believers’ values. In the last section, I suggested
that this wasn’t the best way to understand to aim of belief. I offered five senses in
which something or someone can be said to ‘aim.’ Two of those senses of aim only
apply to agents, but the idiom tells us that it’s belief, not believers, that have the
aim. So I focused my attention on the remaining three. Of those, two senses of ‘aim’
are popularly endorsed in the literatures as senses in which belief aims at truth. If
we take belief to aim at truth in the normative sense of ‘aim,’ then I showed that
we can begin to see how to make sense of epistemic rationality in terms of that aim.
According to the normative reading of the idiom, belief aims at the truth in that
true belief is correct belief.
Epistemic rationality, I suggest, is a species of a larger genus, that of rationality.
Gibbard is right that not all of the requirements of being epistemically rational are
derivable from the aim of belief. Epistemic rationality is the rational advancement
towards the standard set by the aim of belief, and what’s required to rationally
advance toward a standard is more than what is required merely by the standard
itself. On the other hand, there is a sense in which we can understand epistemic
rationality in terms of the aim of belief: What’s distinctive about epistemic rationality
is that it’s rationality evaluated relative to the aim of belief.
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32(S12):241–254.
Prior, A. N. (1960a). The Autonomy of Ethics. Australasian Journal of Philosophy,
38(3):199 – 206.
Prior, A. N. (1960b). The Runabout Inference Ticket. Analysis, 21:38–39.
Pritchard, D. (2007). Epistemic Luck. Oxford University Press.
Quine, W. V. (1951). Two Dogmas of Empiricism. Philosophical Review, 60(1):20–43.
Railton, P. (1997). On the Hypothetical and Non-hypothetical in Reasoning about
Belief and Action. Ethics and Practical Reason, pages 53–79.
Ramsey, F. P. (1926). Truth and Probability. In Braithwaite, R., editor, The Founda-
tions of Mathematics and other Logical Essays. Kegan, Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co.,
London.
Rawls, J. (1955). Two Concepts of Rules. Philosophical Review, 64(1):3–32.
Regan, D. (1980). Utilitarianism and co-operation. Clarendon Press.
Russell, G. (2010). In Defence of Hume’s Law. In Pigden, C., editor, Hume on Is and
Ought. Palgrave MacMillan.
Russell, G. and Restall, G. (2010). Barriers to Implication. In Pigden, C., editor,
Hume on Is and Ought. Palgrave MacMillan.
Schervish, M. (1989). A general method for comparing probability assessors. The
Annals of Statistics, 17(4):1856–1879.
Schroeder, M. (2010). Value and the Right Kind of Reason. Oxford Studies in
Metaethics, 5:25–55.
116
Schroeder, M. (2011). Attitudes and Epistemics. Unpublished Manuscript.
Shah, N. (2003). How Truth Governs Belief. Philosophical Review, 112(4):447–482.
Shah, N. and Velleman, J. D. (2005). Doxastic Deliberation. The Philosophical Review,
114(4):497.
Smith, H. M. (2010). Subjective Rightness. Social Philosophy and Policy, 27(2):64–110.
Smith, M. (1994). The Moral Problem. Blackwell.
Sosa, E. (2007). A Virtue Epistemology. Oxford University Press.
Steglich-Petersen, A. (2006). No Norm Needed: On the Aim of Belief. Philosophical
Quarterly, 56(225):499–516.
Swanson, E. (2008). Note on Gibbard, ‘Rational Credence and the Value of Truth’.
Oxford Studies in Epistemology, 2.
Valentini, L. (2012). Ideal Vs. Non-Ideal Theory: A Conceptual Map. Philosophy
Compass, 7(9):654–664.
Van Fraassen, B. C. (1980). The Scientific Image. Oxford University Press.
Velleman, J. D. (2000). The Possibility of Practical Reason. Oxford University Press.
Vranas, P. (2010). Comments on ‘Barriers to Implication’. In Pigden, C., editor, Hume
on Is and Ought. Palgrave MacMillan.
Wedgwood, R. (2002). The Aim of Belief. Philosophical Perspectives, 16:267–97.
Wedgwood, R. (2007a). The Nature of Normativity. Clarendon University Press.
Wedgwood, R. (2007b). Normativism Defended. In Contemporary Debates in Philoso-
phy of Mind. Blackwell.
Weisberg, M. (2007). Three Kinds of Idealization. Journal of Philosophy, CIV(12):639–
659.
Williamson, T. (2000). Knowledge and its Limits. Oxford New York.
Williamson, T. (2003). Blind Reasoning. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume,
77(1):249–293.
Williamson, T. (2006). Conceptual Truth. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume,
80(1):1–41.
Williamson, T. (2007). The Philosophy of Philosophy. Blackwell Pub. Ltd.
Wright, C. (1994). Truth and objectivity. Harvard University Press.
117
Zagzebski, L. T. (1996). Virtues of the Mind: An Inquiry Into the Nature of Virtue and
the Ethical Foundations of Knowledge. Cambridge University Press.
Zollman, K. J. S. (2007). The Communication Structure of Epistemic Communities.
Philosophy of Science, 74(5):574–587.
118
